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xExecutive Summary
The new Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Strategic Framework, 2012–2022 marks a major shift 
in the GMS Program, reflecting changes in the regional environment and the achievements of 
the program to date. Adopted at the Fourth GMS Summit held at Myanmar in December 2011, 
the new framework calls for increased focus from conventional infrastructure to multi-sector 
investments, and greater emphasis on infrastructure “software” to build on physical connectivity 
and increased coordination across sectors. The GMS countries requested Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) assistance in preparing a multi-sector regional investment framework (RIF) to foster economic 
corridor development and in proposing an investment program aligned to the new framework. The 
substantive outcome of the regional planning exercise was presented at the 18th GMS Ministerial 
Conference in Nanning, People’s Republic of China in December 2012. This GMS energy report was 
made available at that meeting as a background document.
As an input to the development of the RIF, this report includes analyses of national plans at sector 
levels, and regional investment priorities that were preliminarily identified in the energy sector. 
The primary objective is to update information on regional energy resources and to analyze the 
prospects for regional energy sector development, taking into account the progress of projects 
under the GMS Vientiane Plan of Action, 2008–2012, and the various national energy projects, 
especially those with important regional implications. The ultimate goal is to determine how 
regional cooperation can contribute to national objectives, recognizing that regional cooperation 
is not an end in itself, but a means to further national goals. 
The report assumes that Asia will continue to grow above the average global rate and that by 2050 
the Asian region will be responsible for 50% of world’s gross domestic product (GDP), consistent 
with ADB forecasts in the Asian century. Investments in infrastructure have begun and changes in 
practice adopted now will still be felt in 40 years. Given this scenario, it is inconceivable for Asian 
countries to continue to operate as largely independent national economies, all giving priority to 
external trade. The only realistic vision of an Asian century is one where Asia develops, in parallel 
with its efforts in external trade—a dynamic, integrated internal market. This means integrating 
markets not only in manufactured goods and services but also in energy. The Asian vision for 2050 
also poses huge challenges in terms of energy security and climate change. Management of these 
problems also can be helped by regional cooperation and solutions can be more readily found 
within a fully integrated energy market. The sum of nationally optimal policies will not automatically 
lead to an integrated, dynamic regional market. There needs to be a conscious reflection on what 
actions will facilitate regional cooperation and that may benefit from the limited funding available 
from international financial institutions. 
There has been remarkable progress in the GMS energy sector over the past 2 decades. 
Considerable success was also achieved in rolling out rural electrification in member countries. 
Rapid provision of large-scale, high-volume national grid systems; successful mobilization of 
indigenous resources; and the beginnings of cross-country trade also took place. These successes 
have been achieved mainly at the national level. Despite considerable political pronouncements 
that recognize the imperatives of regional cooperation, progress has not matched national 
achievements. The high-volume trans-boundary connections that have been made to date within 
the GMS do not achieve a true interconnection of systems with synchronous operations, but are 
simply an extension of the national grids of the large- consuming countries into the territories of 
producers of (mainly) hydropower. On a wider canvas, the TransASEAN gas pipeline is somewhat 
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similar—it comprises a collection of gas pipelines that are aligned along apparent corridors, but 
offering little or no real connectivity.
In terms of infrastructure “software” and market liberalization, progress has been uneven. The 
agreement to establish a Regional Power Coordination Center is an important step forward on the 
route toward an integrated regional power market, but it needs to be complemented by national 
reform policies that will support power exchanges. Some GMS countries have clear policies for 
market liberalization in varying degrees, but some countries have excluded this option for the time 
being. Without a common, minimum degree of liberalization in national markets, it will be difficult 
to make the regional market work. Third-party access for single buyer is strictly necessary, but it will 
only be a limited solution. Third-party access for generators and users at the wholesale level would 
be more effective; vertically integrated utilities always have their own agendas not necessarily in 
the wider interest.
Regional cooperation and reform of national policies for the energy network are key activities 
that can contribute to national objectives for energy security, but stronger flanking policies for 
renewable energy and energy efficiency are also required. Here again, regional cooperation can 
contribute through benchmarking and upgrading policies across the GMS to match good practice. 
At the national level, there is some reluctance to accept the incremental costs of renewable 
energy and the administrative and social costs of certain measures of energy efficiency (e.g., the 
administrative burden of enforcing compliance with regulations and the social implications of 
cost-reflective pricing), but solidarity across the GMS can be helpful in bringing forward costly 
or unpopular policies. There is also scope for pooling efforts in research on key technologies of 
special significance for the subregion, such as second-generation biotechnology; a concerted effort 
reduces costs to individual countries and reduces risk for all.
There are strong reasons why regional cooperation should be high up in the agenda of national 
policy makers. Energy security, climate change, and energy access are the overriding objectives of 
energy policy. Broadly, these are achieved through diversity of supply (including liquefied natural gas 
imports, unconventional gas, renewable energy, and clean coal). These all require interconnected 
infrastructure, and a flexible market structure that allows rapid response to changing circumstances. 
Interconnection also favors access as the peripheral areas of countries are often the least well 
supplied. 
The approach to constructing a regional market within the GMS has been consciously gradual. This 
is understandable as the requirements are complex and imply a novel kind of relationships among 
countries, but the great challenges that face the world are unfortunately not gradual—climate 
change and resource depletion are expected to have a significant impact on energy development 
efforts within the next 20 years. If action is not taken now, it may be more difficult to make the 
necessary and timely adjustments later.
Two major infrastructure initiatives that would contribute to the creation of a truly integrated 
market are (i) a backbone 500 kilovolt (kV) line in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic to 
move power across the country and provide high value-added services from its hydro plants to 
its GMS neighbors, and (ii) an interconnection line between Viet Nam and Thailand. Without a 
direct connection between these two large grids of the GMS, no proper regional market can be 
established. Connection of the isolated grid at Mawlamyine to the main grid of Myanmar would 
bring the country’s 500 kV system closer to Thailand’s grid for future interconnection. Transmission 
interconnection, as part of a concerted planned development of energy, transport, and urban 
infrastructure in the East–West transmission alignment (from Thailand to Mawlamyine), should 
also be investigated. Grid extension and off-grid projects, where necessary, should be initiated in 
Myanmar and continued in Cambodia.
xii
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Institutional arrangements for regional cooperation need to be extended beyond the electricity 
sector, where the main historic emphasis has been. The GMS Strategic Framework, 2012–2022 sets 
out principles to govern the next moves toward economic integration, including a greater focus 
on decision making on issues that are clearly regional in nature. The Subregional Energy Sector 
Forum (SEF) is an important innovation with strong potential for decision support. The GMS Road 
Map for Expanded Energy Cooperation is the new vehicle for cooperation, but the selection of 
projects at present is very diverse and do not all play to the competencies and authority of the SEF. 
Moreover, the implementation arrangements do not seem to have worked; it was envisaged that 
countries would be proactive in designing projects, seeking finance, and managing and monitoring 
implementation. This has not meaningfully happened as yet. Future technical assistance projects 
should be directed to support the SEF in policy analysis, and in parallel, the SEF needs to be 
recognized as a main platform of enhanced regional energy policy proposals to the GMS Ministerial 
meetings.
1National Programs
Policy
Cambodia
The Electricity Law of the Kingdom of Cambodia, adopted by the National Assembly in November 
2000, defines responsibilities in the energy sector and has several good aspects, which shall be 
explained further in this report. The Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy (MIME) is responsible 
for energy policy; electric power strategies; the power development plan; and for technical, safety, 
and environmental standards. The law attributes to the Electricity Authority of Cambodia the 
duties and powers to regulate the electricity market and the power to issue regulations, issue and 
revoke licenses, review costs and approve tariffs, resolve disputes, and impose penalties . It was 
promulgated by a Royal Decree in 2001 (Government of Cambodia 2001).
The objectives of the energy policy, as formulated by the MIME, are as follows (Gnhoung 2010):
•	 To provide an adequate supply of energy throughout Cambodia at reasonable and 
affordable price.
•	 To ensure a reliable and secured electricity supply to encourage investments in Cambodia 
and support the development of the national economy.
•	 To encourage the exploration and an environmentally and socially acceptable development 
of energy resources.
•	 To encourage the efficient use of energy and to minimize the detrimental environmental 
effects resulting from energy supply and consumption.
Lao People’s Democratic Republic
Several government ministries and departments are involved in the oversight of the electricity 
subsector. The Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) under the Prime Minister’s Office is responsible 
for power sector planning, regulation, rural electrification, and management of environmental and 
social aspects of the sector. Commercial operations come under the state-owned Electricité du Laos 
(EDL). The power sector policy established by the government has the following objectives: 
•	 To maintain and expand an affordable, reliable supply of electricity.
•	 To promote power exports that will earn revenues for poverty reduction programs.
•	 To improve the legal and regulatory framework.
•	 To build capacity and ensure accountability and transparency of environmental and social 
impacts.
The last objective reflects the National Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability of the 
Hydropower Sector in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) since 2005 (Government of 
Lao PDR 2005), but there is some evidence that the policy has not been fully applied and that there 
are gaps in implementation and enforcement capacity (World Bank 2011a). There is also a target 
to increase access to electricity to 90% by 2020 and targets for renewable energy. 
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Myanmar
Energy use in Myanmar mainly depends upon traditional energy such as fuelwood, charcoal, and 
other forms of biomass. During 2009–2010, only 28% of the total energy consumption came from 
commercial energy despite the very substantial resources of coal, gas, and hydropower. The policy 
guidelines for energy sector, according to the Ministry of Energy (MOE) are
•	 to maintain energy independence,
•	 to promote wider use of new and renewable sources of energy,
•	 to promote energy efficiency and conservation, and
•	 to promote the use of alternative fuels in households.
The MOE is responsible for the exploration and production of crude oil and natural gas, refining, 
manufacturing of petrochemicals, and transport and distribution of products. It performs these 
functions through enterprises within the ministry, namely the Energy Planning Department 
(EPD), Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), Myanma Petrochemical Enterprise, and Myanma 
Petroleum Products Enterprise. MOGE, created in 1963, is responsible for oil and gas exploration 
and production, as well as gas transmission across the territory of Myanmar. Until 1988, MOGE had 
a monopoly of exploration; foreign companies were not encouraged to participate and there was 
no adequate, legal basis for their involvement. In 1988, a law was passed setting out conditions 
for foreign participation and since then, several foreign oil companies have entered the country. 
The most significant oil-producing fields are the offshore Yadana and Yetagun fields; production is 
piped to a receiving terminal on the coast from where it is transported overland to the Ratchaburi 
and Wang Noi power plants in Thailand. Gas from Yadana is also landed near Yangon and is used 
domestically along with the products from some 20 smaller onshore fields. The large offshore Shwe 
project in the Gulf of Martaban is now being developed with reserves of some 100 billion cubic 
meters (bcm). There has been some interest from Bangladesh and India in a pipeline to South Asia, 
but in this instance, the eventual destination is the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The gas will 
be piped ashore at Kyaukryu on the west coast of Myanmar and then taken overland to the border 
city of Ruili in Yunnan. A large offshore in the same area was found by the Petroleum Authority of 
Thailand and will be developed—the outputs will be for export to Thailand and for domestic use. 
Total production of natural gas in 2009 was 11.5 bcm, of which about 16% was used domestically; 
gas from Shwe and Zawtika is expected to bring production to some 25.0 bcm in 2019 with 
over 30% being used domestically. The production of coal is the responsibility of No. (3) Mining 
Enterprise within the Ministry of Mines, and electric power comes under the Ministry of Electric 
Power No. (1), and the Ministry of Electric Power No. (2).1
People’s Republic of China (Guangxi and Yunnan)
Yunnan has estimated coal reserves of 69 billion tons (9th among PRC provinces in terms of 
production) and large reserves of lignite. It is expected that production of coal in 2012 will be over 
100 million tons (China Coal Resource 2012). Guangxi, in contrast, is the largest coal importer 
in the country and in 2011, imported 27 million tons (15% of the national total), mainly from 
Australia, Indonesia, and Viet Nam.
The main energy resource of Yunnan is hydropower; the province has over 600 rivers in six water 
systems with 222 bcm of water resources. Its theoretical hydropower reserve is estimated at more 
1 The two ministries in Myanmar responsible for the electricity sector are the (i) Ministry of Electric Power (1), which is 
responsible for hydro and coal power generation; and (ii) Ministry of Electric Power (2), which is responsible for power 
transmission and distribution, gas-fired generation, and mini-hydro.
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than 100 gigawatts (GW), the exploitable capacity could be 90 GW, and the annual generating 
capacity is estimated at nearly 400 terawatt-hour (TWh) (People’s Government of Yunnan 2012). 
The topography for constructing large hydropower stations is favorable and the resources are 
concentrated in several sites, which facilitate development and construction. There is also a 
substantial geothermal resource—360 million cubic meters of hot water are discharged from 
springs each year.
Energy policy is formulated by agencies of the central government. The National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC) is responsible for national economic and social development and 
planning; it is also responsible for the administration of the National Energy Administration (NEA) 
established in 2008. As the NEA had difficulty in coordinating multiple agencies with interests in 
the energy sector, the National Energy Commission (NEC) was formed in 2010 to provide strong 
political coordination of the overall energy policy. The NEA has members from other agencies, 
including the NDRC. The NEA implements the decision of the NEC, which reviews and approves 
investment projects of the energy sector in conformity with national plans. It is the NEC that 
recommends energy pricing.
The 12th Five-Year Plan for 2011–2015 has a strong focus on energy. In particular, it aims to
•	 upgrade the traditional energy supply base with advanced technologies; 
•	 promote emerging industry, e.g., nuclear, wind, solar, and biomass; 
•	 optimize regional energy resource allocation (including the main transport and transmission 
infrastructure and new oil and gas import options); 
•	 enhance innovation of energy technologies and equipment; 
•	 strengthen control of energy consumption, and environmental protection; and
•	 promote wider access to energy services and narrow the gap between urban and rural, and 
regional energy supply levels. 
Among the seven strategic investment areas identified in the plan, three relate to the energy sector: 
clean energy, energy conservation, and clean cars. The plan sets a goal of cutting carbon intensity 
by 17% by 2015, compared with 2010 levels; cutting energy consumption intensity by 16%, 
relative to the gross domestic product; and meeting 11.4% of its primary energy requirements 
from nonfossil sources by 2015 (KPMG 2011). 
Thailand
For many years there was no single entity in Thailand responsible for energy policy. The Metropolitan 
Electricity Authority and the Provincial Electricity Authority were under the Ministry of Interior, 
and the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) depended on the Prime Minister’s 
Office as did the National Energy Policy Office (NEPO). On 1 October 2002, the Government of 
Thailand established six new ministries, including the Ministry of Energy and the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Environment; NEPO changed its name to Energy Policy and Planning Office (EPPO) 
and came under the responsibility of the ministry. An important clarification of the responsibilities 
in the energy sector was provided by the Energy Industry Act 2007 (Government of Thailand 2007), 
that among other things, establishes an Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC). The act specifies that 
the government should establish fundamental policy guidelines on the energy industry to ensure 
energy security at fair price, to promote the development of renewable energy sources and domestic 
resources, to limit import, and to encourage energy efficiency. It also specifies that the government 
should foster public participation and education to ensure transparency of management and tariff 
setting. The responsibility of government for the entire electricity network is reiterated in this act. 
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The duties of the minister include the following: (i) make proposals to the Cabinet for an energy 
industry structure and propose policies of the National Energy Policy Council (NEPC) on energy 
procurement, diversification of fuel sources, and types of electricity generation; (ii) review the power 
development plan, the investment plan of the electricity industry, the natural gas procurement plan, 
and the energy network system expansion plan for submission to the Cabinet for approval; (iii) set 
the policy on customer service standards and energy industry operation standards; (iv) scrutinize 
and approve the plans and operations of the ERC, as discussed in greater detail below.
The Electricity Act 2007 established an ERC that is partially independent; the members of the 
commission are appointed by the King of Thailand, but there is substantial ministerial supervision of 
budgets, plans, and operations. The duties and powers of the ERC are (i) to regulate energy industry 
operation to ensure compliance with the objectives of this act under the policy framework of the 
government; (ii) to license energy industry operations where necessary; (iii) to impose measures 
to ensure security and reliability of electricity systems; (iv) to issue Requests for Proposals for the 
purchase of electricity and monitor the selection procedures; (v) to provide opinions on the power 
development plan, the investment plan of the electricity industry, the natural gas procurement 
plan, and the energy network system expansion plan for submission to the minister; and (vi) to 
inspect the energy industry operation of the licensees.
The most recent statement of Thailand’s energy policy is contained in the Policy Statement of the 
Government to the National Assembly in December 2008. The statement places a considerable stress 
on energy security that will be supported by the development of national resources, cooperation 
with neighbor countries, and increased reliance on renewable resources, including biofuels and 
biomass. The statement includes a state role to supervise and control energy prices at a level that 
covers production costs and emphasize the importance of public participation in managing social 
and environmental issues. There is a strong component of energy conservation. Some targets are 
set, as follows: 
For short-term oil production:
•	 to maintain the level of proved and provable (2P) natural gas reserves,
•	 to maintain a reserve margin of 15%–20% on the power system,
•	 to maintain the share of power generation at more than 50% of the total, and
•	 to promote short-term use of ethanol.
For short-term (2011) targets for renewable energy:
•	 to increase the energy conservation target stipulated in the Energy Conservation Program 
to 20%; 
•	 to set a target to reduce “energy intensity,” or energy consumption per production unit, in 
the industrial sector by 20% compared with the base year (2006); and
•	 to implement the Minimum Energy Performance Standard (MEPS) for 15 electrical 
appliances by 2009.
Viet Nam
The Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT) is the principal department of government for policy 
development in the energy sector. It is responsible for the review and submission of laws, regulations, 
master plans, and major investment projects for the Prime Minister’s approval. Such materials 
generally need review and approval from the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) and the 
Prime Minister’s office, but MOIT is the initiator. Viet Nam’s energy policy objectives are set out in 
the National Energy Development Strategy up to 2020, with vision to 2050, and produced in 2007. 
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The overall goal is to ensure energy supply security for the country’s rapidly growing domestic 
demand. The energy sector has a substantial, legal basis that include (i) the Electricity Law (2004); 
(ii) the Environmental Protection Law (2005) and the Energy Conservation and Energy Efficiency 
Law (2010); (iii) the regulation on avoided cost-based electricity tariffs for small hydropower plants, 
which use renewable energy published by the MOIT in 2008; and (iv) the decision on a support 
mechanism for development of wind power projects in Viet Nam (2010). The Electricity Regulatory 
Authority of Vietnam (ERAV) is a part of the MOIT but with some limited autonomy; it is responsible 
for the regulation of the sector including the issuing of licensing; review of the power system 
expansion plans and financing needs; preparation, issuance, and enforcement of regulations; and 
review and recommendation of tariffs.
The National Energy Development Strategy for the period up to 2020 with an outlook to 2050, 
was approved by the Prime Minister on 27 December 2008 (Decision No. 1855/QD-TTg), (Prime 
Minister of Viet Nam 2007). The strategy sets the following targets:
•	 Ensuring sufficient supply of energy to meet the demands of socioeconomic development, 
in which primary energy is expected to reach 47.5–47.9 million tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe) 
in 2010, 100–110 Mtoe in 2020, and 310–320 Mtoe in 2050.
•	 Developing power plants and power networks, ensuring sufficient supply of electricity for 
socioeconomic development, and ensuring the 99.7% reliability of electricity supply in 
2010.
•	 Ensuring the phased development of refineries to meet domestic demand for petroleum 
products, and increasing the capacity of refineries to roughly 25–30 million tons (Mt) of 
crude oil in 2020.
•	 Ensuring strategic oil stockpiling adequate for 45 days in 2010, 60 days in 2020, and 90 
days in 2025.
•	 Achieving a share of renewable energy in the total commercial primary energy supply of 3% 
in 2010, 5% in 2025, and 11% in 2050.
•	 Completing the energy program for rural and mountainous areas, and increasing the 
proportion of rural households using commercial energy to 50% in 2010 and 80% in 2020 
(by 2010, 95% of rural households will have access to electricity).
•	 Transforming the electricity, coal, and oil–gas sectors to operate in competitive markets with 
state regulation; establishing a competitive electricity retail market after 2022; in addition 
to establishing a coal and petroleum product business market by 2015.
•	 Actively preparing the conditions for putting the first unit of a nuclear power plant into 
operation in 2020, and then increasing the contribution of nuclear power to the economy’s 
energy structure (by 2050, nuclear electricity will account for about 15%–20% of total 
commercial energy consumption).
Summary Conclusions
Policy making and communication to the public is variable across the region. In Cambodia, the Lao 
PDR, and Myanmar, external communication of energy policy is limited to occasional documents 
that are not always available through usual disclosure channels. In Thailand and Viet Nam, there are 
clear policy statements, but the analytical underpinning is not presented and there is little supporting 
discussion so they cannot act as a basis for public debate. Public consultation is not regularly 
practiced, and there is very limited contact with civil society organizations. There is generally no 
formal manner in which they may submit information and opinion to the decision-making process. 
This attitude may make it difficult to enlist public support for demand-side policies and to manage 
social and environmental impacts. At the project level, social and environmental aspects are not 
given attention commensurate with the importance assigned to them in overall environmental 
policies dealing with biodiversity and climate change. To some extent, this is a reflection of a much 
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wider problem, which is, that the capacity to enforce regulation is often insufficient. There is similar 
weakness, for example, in the enforcement of regulations pertaining to energy efficiency. Table 1 
summarizes the conclusions.
Organization of the Power Sector
Cambodia
The organization of the electricity sector in Cambodia is fragmented and the state of physical 
assets is poor as a consequence of the destruction and neglect of infrastructure during the years 
of conflict. The Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy is responsible for policy and for the Power 
Development Plan. The Electricity Authority of Cambodia acts as regulator; it is a legal public entity 
with powers under the Electricity Law to regulate the electric power services, and issue and revoke 
licenses. There are different licenses for generation, transmission, distribution, and retail, and a 
Table 1 Summary Conclusions for Energy Policy
Clear 
Responsibilities
Recent Policy 
Document Coverage
Consultation  
with Civil Society
Cambodia Responsibility rests with 
the MIME
There appears to 
be no recent policy 
document.
NA There appears to be no 
consultation outside of 
the government.
Lao People’s 
Democratic 
Republic
Responsibility rests with 
the MEM
There appears 
to be no recent 
comprehensive policy 
document.
NA There appears to be no 
consultation outside of 
the government.
Myanmar Responsibility rests with 
the MOE
There appears 
to be no recent 
comprehensive policy 
document.
NA There appears to be no 
consultation outside of 
the government.
People’s Republic 
of China 
(Guangxi and 
Yunnan)
Responsibility rests with 
the Energy Commission
The 12th Five-Year 
Plan
Comprehensive There appears to be no 
consultation outside of 
the government.
Thailand Immediate responsibility 
is with the MOE, but 
there is substantial 
influence of the NESDB 
and the Cabinet
A policy statement 
was made to the 
National Assembly 
in 2008. There are 
several separate plans 
for subsectors.
Most issues are covered 
but only briefly; there is 
little analysis. No direct 
treatment of carbon 
emissions.
Government is supportive 
of consultation, but 
in practice it does not 
happen.
Viet Nam Immediate responsibility 
is with the MOIT, but 
there is substantial 
influence of the MPI and 
the Office of the Prime 
Minister
A National Energy 
Development Strategy 
has been formulated 
to 2020 with outlook 
to 2050.
The strategy is quite 
detailed and extensive, but 
there is no indication of 
the underlying analysis. 
There is extensive 
consultation within 
official circles, but little 
or no public consultation.
MEM = Ministry of Energy and Mines; MIME = Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy; MOE = Ministry of Electric Power; MOIT = Ministry 
of Industry and Trade; MPI = Ministry of Planning and Investment; NA = not applicable; NESDB = National Economic and Social Development 
Board.
Sources: Various country energy reports and assessments.
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consolidated license that permits the holder to engage in all or some of these businesses. The 
principal licensee is Electricité du Cambodge (EDC), a wholly state-owned limited liability company 
with licenses to generate and transmit over the territory of the country with some exceptions; it may 
also distribute in specified areas. There is a special purpose transmission license—for the Cambodia 
Power Transmission Lines Co.—to own and operate transmission facilities that run across the border 
into Thailand, and similar specific provisions for cross-border links with Viet Nam. There are 291 
valid licenses, many of which are issued to very small organizations or individuals that operate one 
or two small diesel engines for local distribution (EAC 2012a). Many of the smaller licenses are 
engaged in rural electrification and are separately classified as rural electrification enterprises (REEs), 
about 200 of which are mostly off-grid. These operations tend to lack technical, managerial, and 
financial capacity, which contributes to distribution losses of REE-operated networks on average of 
25%–30% (ADB 2011a). EDC owns rather little generation of its own, but relies on privately owned 
power plants in the country and on imports. In 2009, EDC supplied 13% of electricity consumed 
in Phnom Penh, 31% was imported, and 56% came from independent power producers (IPPs). In 
the provinces, EDC contributed 18%, 51% was imported from Thailand, and 19% was imported 
from Viet Nam; IPPs generated 12% (Gnhoung 2010). Tariffs vary geographically; they are set by 
the Electricity Authority of Cambodia and are changed periodically to reflect the cost of diesel; the 
profit margin is typically from 9% to 15%. 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic
The electricity sector in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) is partially unbundled. 
Electricité du Laos (EDL) is a state-owned corporation under the Ministry of Energy and Mines 
(MEM) that owns and operates generation, transmission, and distribution assets in the country; 
manages electricity imports into its grids; and exports from its stations. EDL-Gen was created from 
the generating assets and associated liabilities of EDL and from an initial public offering (IPO) 
made on the Lao PDR stock exchange in October 2010. EDL retains a 75% interest in EDL-Gen and 
Ratchaburi Electricity Generating Holding Public Company Limited has a 9.3% holding. EDL-Gen’s 
principal assets are the hydroelectric power plants (HPPs) at Nam Ngum (155 megawatts [MW]), 
Xe Set 2 (76 MW), Nam Leuk (60 MW), Xe Set 1 (45 MW), Nam Mang 3 (40 MW), and Xe Labam 
(5 MW) the outputs of which are sold to EDL under long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs); 
EDL retains control of the associated transmission lines. Regulation is performed by the MEM.
Myanmar
The Ministry of Electric Power (MOEP) was detached from the Ministry of Energy in 1997 and 
reorganized as two ministries in 2006—the Ministry of Electric Power No. (1) and the Ministry of 
Electric Power No. (2). There is no independent regulator. The Ministry of Electric Power No. (1) 
is responsible for hydropower generation. The Ministry of Electric Power No. (2) is responsible for 
planning, including the power system development plan; system control; and the construction of 
transmission and substations in compliance with the power system plan. It owns and operates 
thermal plants, mainly gas turbine and combined cycle plants, and purchases electricity from the 
Ministry of Electric Power No. (1) and from IPPs and joint ventures; it also manages the distribution 
of assets and sells to users through subsidiaries. 
People’s Republic of China (Guangxi and Yunnan)
The Electric Power Law of April 1996 creates the basic legal framework for the electricity sector. 
In 2002, the sector was reformed and the monopoly State Power Corporation was unbundled 
into separate generation, transmission, and services units. The China Southern Power Grid (CSG) 
is a state-owned enterprise that was established as a part of this reform; it is responsible for the 
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development, operation, and maintenance of the power transmission and distribution in the five 
southern provinces of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including Guangxi and Yunnan. There 
are five major generating companies directly administered by the State-Owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission; in addition, each company has corporatized and substantially 
independent subsidiaries that also generate revenues. Foreign investment in the sector is modest. 
The State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC) is empowered by the State Council to regulate 
the national power sector, establish a unified system for electricity regulation, and exercise 
direct leadership over its local branches. It can issue regulations and establish rules for electricity 
market operations. It regulates the electricity market, including transmission, distribution, and 
noncompetitive generation businesses. It proposes tariffs to the government and regulates fees 
and charges for ancillary services.
A main challenge facing the State Power Corporation is to move the large resources of electricity 
available in the West in Yunnan to the large loads in the East, especially in the rapidly growing 
industrial area around the Pearl River delta in Guangdong Province with its megacities Guangzhou 
and Shenzhen. Transport is facilitated by an 800 kilovolt (kV) high-voltage direct current (HVDC) 
transmission system comprising two poles—one operates at +800 kV and the other at –800 kV; 
this voltage difference is the largest on any transmission system in the world. The capacity of the 
combined poles is 5,000 megawatts (MW) and it extends over nearly 1,500 kilometers (km).
Thailand
The dominant commercial actor in the electricity sector is the Electricity Generating Authority of 
Thailand (EGAT). It is a state-owned enterprise under the supervision of the Ministry of Energy, and 
the Ministry of Finance that has a monopoly of transmission and substantial generating assets and 
acts as a single buyer under long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs) of generation from nine 
IPPs (12,152 MW) and from a variety of small power producers (SPPs) (2,182 MW). It also owns 
and operates 1,588 MW of high-voltage connections with the Lao PDR and Malaysia. EGAT is a 
shareholder in several companies that invest in IPPs in Thailand and abroad. It owns the following: 
•	 25% of the EGCO Group that has interests in 15 power plants in Thailand, the Nam Thuen 
2 plant in the Lao PDR, and three plants in the Philippines; 
•	 45% of Ratchaburi Electricity Generating Holding that owns the 3,645 MW Ratchaburi’s 
power plant and some smaller plants in Thailand, together with interests in the Nam Ngum 
2 HPP, Hongsa HPP, Nam Ngum 3 HPP, and Xe Pien Xe Nam Noy HPP in the Lao PDR; and
•	 99.9% of EGAT International Company Limited that was established by EGAT to invest in 
power projects in neighboring countries with the intention to supply energy to Thailand, 
but that as yet has no certain projects. 
A Cabinet resolution of 5 March 1996 issued instructions to separate generation, transmission, and 
distribution businesses. Under this resolution, EGAT’s thermal power plants would be separated 
into business units and then corporatized, registered, and listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand. 
A subsequent Cabinet resolution of 1 September 1998 gave consent to the Master Plan for State 
Enterprise Sector Reform (the Master Plan), to serve as a framework in determining the scope 
and direction of restructuring and privatizing four main economic sectors, including the energy 
sector. Under this Master Plan, the electricity supply industry would evolve into a competitive 
model with an independent transmission system operator (TSO) that would own no generation. 
Implementation was foreseen in three stages with over 5 or more years to accomplish. The three 
stages were essentially (i) corporatization of EGAT and separation of business units, (ii) EGAT as 
single buyer with gradual introduction of a third-party access (TPA), and (iii) competitive wholesale 
market (NEPO 2001). After some delays, EGAT was corporatized on 24 June 2005 and an IPO 
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was scheduled in November 2005. The IPO was suspended by the Administrative Court following 
complaints filed by various interest groups, and in 2006 the corporatization of EGAT was revoked 
by a Royal Decree and EGAT reverted to the status of state enterprise (Chandler & Thong-Ek 2011). 
The reform process was halted and it is unclear when or if it will begin again. 
Private participation in the electricity sector dates from 1994 when the first request for proposals 
for IPPs was announced. Seven projects were awarded, financed by domestic companies, together 
with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). 
A second round of bids for IPPs was opened in June 2007. After the financial crisis, no further 
IPPs were constructed until a project finance contract was signed in November 2011 for a 1,600 
MW combined cycle plant at Nong Saeng near Saraburi to be operational in 2014. The plant will 
be built by a local subsidiary of a Japanese company and is financed by ADB, JBIC, and Thai and 
Japanese commercial banks. The same developer is preparing a similar IPP project near Ayutthaya 
to be operational in 2014. 
EGAT has a monopoly of transmission and dispatch and owns 15,000 MW of plant equal to 
48.5% of the capacity of the national power system. It buys electricity under long-term PPAs from 
seven IPPs and two generators that were separated from EGAT, but in which it maintains an equity 
interest.
Viet Nam
Viet Nam has engaged upon an ambitious reform program for the power sector that will create 
competition and support private participation. One of the drivers for reform was the very rapid rate 
of growth in power demand that increased annually at an average of 14.5% from 2001 to 2010. 
The vertically integrated state-owned structure struggled to match this rate of growth in demand. 
The first private participation came through the Phu My 2.2 and 3 combined cycle power build–
operate–transfer (BOT) plants that were tendered in 2002. By the end of 2010, non-Electricity of 
Vietnam (EVN)-owned power plants (BOTs and IPPs) contributed 6,269 MW (32% out of a total 
installed capacity of 21,542 MW), but it was perceived that private investors were deterred by the 
lack of a clear mechanism for determining pricing from private power plants. A more profound 
reform was introduced by the Electricity Law of 2005 that laid down the principles of reform and 
established a regulatory body known as the Electricity Regulatory Authority of Vietnam (ERAV), 
which is responsible for establishing and supervising the power market, power system planning, 
tariff regulation, and licensing; Decision No. 26 (2006) of the Prime Minister approved the road map 
for power market reform. 
In June 2006, the EVN was converted into a holding company structure and in 2008, a separate 
legal entity—the National Power Transmission Corporation (NPT)—was formed with responsibility 
to operate, maintain, and develop the transmission assets at 220 kilovolts (kV) and 500 kV under 
a license issued by ERAV. NPT is an independent accounting unit and a wholly owned subsidiary 
of EVN; it has seven subsidiaries including Power Transmission Companies No. 1, 2, 3, 4 that serve 
different parts of the country. In 2006, the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT) issued Decision 
30/2006/QD-BCN to regulate the investment, construction, and operation of IPPs (MOIT 2006). 
Foreign investors have shown much interest, but few projects have come to fruition because of 
legal and regulatory obstacles, low electricity purchase prices by EVN, the lack of a transparent 
and competitive market, and poor coordination among related government agencies. 
Distribution is at 110 kV and below through 11 subsidiary power companies (PCs) of which the 
largest are PC1 (northern Viet Nam), PC2 (southern Viet Nam), and PC3 (central Viet Nam); the 
remainder mostly serve large cities. Much of the retail distribution system in rural Viet Nam is owned 
by local distribution utilities that arose out of the very aggressive program of rural electrification. 
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Details of a competitive market model and a path to wholesale competition were gradually 
developed by ERAV and in July 2011, a competitive generating market was implemented in which 
48 of the 73 power plants with installed capacity greater than 30 MW directly bid into the market. 
Big hydroelectric plants that have multi-strategic objectives (e.g., Son La, Hoa Binh, and Yali) do not 
participate in the market. Participating generators forward their asking prices to the Electric Power 
Trading Company that then prepares a schedule for dispatch. The competitive generating market 
should be completed by 2014 after which a competitive wholesale market will be developed, from 
2014–2020, and eventually a competitive retail market, after 2020.
Summary Conclusions
The power sector is corporatized in all countries except in Myanmar and Thailand. There are distinct 
regulatory agencies in all countries except in the Lao PDR and Myanmar. There is some unbundling 
of transmission in all countries except in Myanmar and Thailand. Use-of-system charges are not 
practiced anywhere, but they will presumably be introduced in Viet Nam and could be possible 
in the Lao PDR; they are implicit in the arrangements for the 500 kV interconnection between 
Na Bong (Lao PDR) and Udon Thani (Thailand). 
Table 2  Summary Conclusions for the Organization  
of the Power Sector
Country Corporatization Unbundling Regulation Use of System
Cambodia EDC is a wholly state-
owned corporation.
The sector is fragmented, 
but the main transmission 
operator is also a 
generator and distributor.
There is a regulator 
with distinct legal 
identity.
None
Lao People’s 
Democratic 
Republic
EDL-Gen operates 
as a private company 
and its shares are 
privately traded. EDL 
is a wholly state-owned 
corporation.
The sector is formally 
unbundled although there 
are substantial cross-share 
holdings.
There is no 
independent 
regulator.
There are no published 
use-of-system charges, 
but there seems no reason 
why they could not be 
introduced.
Myanmar Electricity supply is a 
part of government.
Different government 
departments are 
responsible for hydro 
plants and the remainder 
of the system.
There is no 
independent 
regulator.
None
People’s Republic 
of China (Guangxi 
and Yunnan)
This is largely the 
preserve of SOE and 
their corporatized 
subsidiaries.
Generation and 
transmission was 
unbundled since 2002.
Regulation is done by 
the State Electricity 
Regulatory 
Commission.
Set by the State Electricity 
Regulatory Commission.
Thailand An initial 
corporatization of 
EGAT was reversed and 
it reverted to an SOE.
There is no unbundling 
of EGAT’s generation and 
transmission activities.
There is a partially 
independent 
Energy Regulatory 
Commission.
There is no published 
use-of-system charge. 
There is no separate 
accounting of 
transmission.
continued on next page
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Country Corporatization Unbundling Regulation Use of System
Viet Nam The Vietnam Electricity 
Group is a state-owned 
holding company.
Transmission is a separate 
accounting unit of the 
EVN holding, but will 
probably be separated. 
Many plants participate in 
a competitive generating 
market.
The Electricity 
Regulatory Authority 
of Vietnam (ERAV) 
is a department 
within the Ministry 
of Industry and Trade 
(MOIT).
None exists at present, 
but presumably will 
be developed in a 
competitive market.
EDC = Electricité du Cambodge, EDL = Electricité du Laos, EGAT = Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand, EVN = Electricity of Vietnam, 
SOE = state-owned enterprise.
Sources: Various country energy reports.
Power System Development
Cambodia
Cambodia’s power sector was severely damaged by years of war and neglect and is still in a 
poor condition with little domestic generation from large, modern sources and a high reliance 
on imports. Several substantial hydro projects have been undertaken on a BOT basis by Chinese 
companies with funding from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and are enumerated in a later 
section. The generation expansion plan for the period 2008–2020 foresees a very rapid rise in 
demand and in installed capacity reaching 3,045 megawatts (MW) in 2024 and supplying 16.2 
terawatt-hour (TWh) (MIME 2009). The source of generation will also shift radically. In 2007, 85% 
of power was generated from oil products, 12% was imported, and 3% was from hydropower. 
By 2020, the dominant source will be hydropower with a significant contribution from coal. The 
transmission system will be extended by a factor of 5 or 6, mainly at 230 kV.
No publicly available power system expansion plan is evident, but according to a presentation of 
the Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy (MIME), there are plants envisaged up to 2020 (Table 3). 
Given limited documentation of the plan, it will be difficult to determine with certainty whether 
elements of the plan could be realized at the stipulated time frame. The same presentation also 
contains a list of hydro projects of around 6,000 MW in total that are envisaged to be developed 
by the private sector for export (MIME 2009).
The focus of technical assistance since 2005 has been to build high-voltage (230 and 115 kV) 
and medium-voltage (22 kV) transmission lines to connect the isolated systems that supply most 
provincial towns, and to create a 220 kV backbone across the country. By 2010, four high-voltage 
lines were operating: three at 115 kV and one at 230 kV. ADB supported the construction of a 
double circuit 220 kV transmission line approximately 110 kilometers (km) long from the Vietnamese 
border via Takeo to Phnom Penh, together with associated substations and distribution works 
in Phnom Penh, which were cofinanced by the World Bank and the Nordic Development Fund. 
Subsequently, ADB cofinanced with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) a 230 kV 
transmission from Kampot to Preah Sihanouk that is nearing completion; this provides power to 
Sihanoukville and contributes to the 230 kV backbone transmission lines in the southern part of 
the country. An innovative 30-year BOT project for power transmission from Thailand to meet 
the demand in the Siem Reap area was partially funded by ADB’s private sector operations; the 
privately owned transmission system comprises 221 km of 115 kV lines and supplies the provinces 
of Banteay Meanchey, Siem Reap, and Battambang from the Aranyaprathet substation in Thailand. 
ADB contributed an $8 million loan; the balance of the $32 million project cost came from private 
equity and loans from the Export–Import Bank of Thailand and local Cambodian banks. 
Table 2 continued
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In 2007, the World Bank under its Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Power Trade Program made 
available a grant of $18.5 million to the Government of Cambodia to construct cross-border 
transmission lines from the Lao PDR and Viet Nam with a view to bring grid-based electricity to 
selected provinces in Cambodia with concomitant reduction of cost through import of power from 
the Lao PDR and Viet Nam. The project had several components including a cross-border 115 kV 
line linking the Lao PDR (Ban Hat) and Cambodia (Stung Treng); a cross-border 115 kV transmission 
line linking Viet Nam (Tan Bien) and Cambodia (Kampong Cham) for bilateral power exchanges 
and eventually hydro exports from Cambodia; linking the Xeset 1 hydroelectric power plant (HPP) 
in the Lao PDR to the Saravan segment of the proposed 115 kV transmission that would eventually 
interconnect electricity grids from (western) Thailand through (southern) Lao PDR to (southern) 
Cambodia. Eventually, the 115 kV transmission system from Viet Nam to Kampong Cham was 
cancelled and it was proposed instead that the planned line from the Lao PDR border to Stung 
Treng be upgraded into a 230 kV, but eventually the Government of Cambodia requested full 
cancellation of the grant in October 2011. Table 4 summarizes existing and planned connections.
The sector assessment of ADB notes delays in the implementation of energy projects that it attributes 
to the limited human resource capacity of Electricité du Cambodge (EDC) and poor implementation 
efficiency in recruiting implementation consultants, handling procurement, and implementing 
environment and resettlement plans. Delays are also caused by institutional arrangements between 
EDC and the Ministry of Economy and Finance, such as in the evaluation of procurement (ADB 
2011a). The energy sector is identified as a sector for limited engagement during the Country 
Partnership Strategy period with an emphasis on consolidation, advisory assistance, and policy 
dialogue (ADB 2011c). 
Table 3 Generation Expansion Plan for Cambodia
Project Fuel
Capacity 
(MW) COD
Kamchay Hydro Power Plant Hydro 193 2011
200 MW Coal Power Plant (I) in Sihanoukville–Phase 1 Coal 100 2011
Kirirom III Hydro Power Plant Hydro 18 2012
Atay Hydro Power Plant Hydro 110 2012
200 MW Coal Power Plant (I) in Sihanoukville–Phase 2 Coal 100 2012
Tatay Hydro Power Plant Hydro 246 2013
Lower Stung Rusey Chrum Hydro Power Plant Hydro 338 2013
700 MW Coal Power Plant (II) in Sihanoukville–Phase 1 Coal 100 2013
700 MW Coal Power Plant (II) in Sihanoukville–Phase 2 Coal 100 2014
700 MW Coal Power Plant (II) in Sihanoukville–Phase 3 Coal 100 2015
700 MW Coal Power Plant (II) in Sihanoukville–Phase 4 Coal 100 2016
Lower Sesan II + Lower Srepok II Hydro 420 2016
Stung Chay Areng Hydro Power Plant Hydro 108 2017
700 MW Coal Power Plant (II) in Sihanoukville–Phase 5 Coal 100 2017
700 MW Coal Power Plant (II) in Sihanoukville–Phase 6 Coal 200 2018
Steung Treng Power Plant Hydro 980 2018
Sambor Hydro Power Plant Hydro 2600 2019
Coal Power Plant (III) or Gas Power Plant Coal/NG 450 2020
COD = commercial operation date, MW = megawatt, NG = natural gas.
Source: EAC (2012b). 
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Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
The Power Sector Policy Statement issued in March 2001 established four policy objectives for the 
power sector to (i) maintain and expand an affordable, reliable, and sustainable electricity supply; 
(ii) promote power generation for export; (iii) enhance the legal and regulatory framework; and 
(iv) strengthen the institutional framework. It identified the commercialization of Electricité du Laos 
(EDL) as a priority.
An initial Power Development Plan was prepared in 2004 with funding from the World Bank 
(Maunsell Limited and Lahmeyer International 2004). The most recent plan covers the period from 
2010–2020 (Somvichith 2011). Detailed information on planned HPP development is available 
from the website of Promotion and Development under the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) 
(EPD 2012) and from the annual report of EDL (2011). JICA is supporting a project to improve 
power system planning capacity in the Lao PDR and simultaneously to review the present Power 
Development Plan, with the intention of identifying power development projects that may be 
applicable for yen loan assistance (National Portal of Laos 2012).
ADB has provided consistent support to the development of the electricity subsector in the Lao PDR. 
Support has been given to (i) managing the hydropower resource in an effective and acceptable 
manner, (ii) developing a national transmission system, (iii) encouraging cross-border connections, 
(iv) extending access to electricity, and (v) improving the structure and capacities of the electricity 
industry. In the 1990s, ADB offered loans for the 210 MW Theun–Hinboun HPP and the 60 MW 
Nam Leuk HPP, and provided technical assistance (TA) for legal, environmental, and social issues. 
ADB later approved financial support for the 1,088 MW Nam Theun 2 HPP along with the World 
Bank and other lenders, and supported associated TA, including a study of the cumulative impacts 
of the expected sector developments in the Nam Ngum River Basin in preparation for Nam 
Ngum 3. ADB has funded several 115 kV transmission projects in Northern Lao PDR, and signed 
in Vientiane, Lao PDR in February 2012 a loan agreement for the Northern Power Transmission 
Project cofinanced by ADB to construct 400 km of 115 kV transmission lines, substations, and 
distribution lines in the provinces of Xaignabouli and Phongsali, and in western Vientiane and 
a cross-border interconnection, enabling electricity trading between the EDL and the Electricity 
Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) (ADB 2011d).
Preparatory studies have been conducted under an ADBTA of a 500kV interconnection between 
Na Bong (Lao PDR) and Udon Thani (Thailand). This line is planned to export about 2,000 MW 
from four hydropower plants in the Lao PDR—Nam Ngum 2, Nam Ngum 3, Nam Ngiep 1, and 
Nam Theun 1. Nam Ngum 2 is operational, Nam Ngum 3 is under final negotiations, and Nam 
Ngiep 1 is also being negotiated. The study proposed that EDL would create a 100% wholly owned 
special purpose vehicle (SPV) to act as a Transmission System Operator that would manage the 
Table 4 Existing and Planned Cross-Border Linksa
Type Lao PDR Thailand Viet Nam Total
22/35 kV 1 7 14 (9) 22 (9)
115 kV – 1 – 1
230 kV (1) – 1 1 (1)
Total 1 (1) 8 15 (9) 24 (10)
– = no data, kV = kilovolt, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic.
a Planned figures are in parentheses.
Source: EAC (2012b).
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transmission assets and collect use-of-system charges from the owners of the hydro plants. This 
would be an important innovation, contributing to the concept of unbundling and clarity on cost-
allocation that is necessary to sustain investment in transmission facilities in the future. Preparation 
of the loan was deferred (ADB 2009c), but has recently been added to the 2012–2014 lending 
program (ADB 2011e). 
The Song Da Corporation of Viet Nam and the Viet–Lao Power Joint Stock Company, in which 
Song Da holds a 60% share, are engaged in the construction of a series of hydro plants in Sekong 
Province for export to Viet Nam. The plants include Xe Kaman 1 (488 MW), Upper Se Kong 3 (152 
MW), Lower Se Kong 3 (96 MW), and Dak Emeule (138 MW) hydropower projects. More details 
are provided later in the section on private finance. The project proposed to evacuate the power by 
means of a single, high-capacity cross-border connection and a collector substation with links to 
the power plants. Under an ADB TA, a proposal has been developed to construct a new substation 
at Ban Sok that would connect a 500 kV line to Pleiku in Central Viet Nam. Lending for the project 
is included in the 2013 program. 
Lending for a transmission line to connect settlements along the East–West Economic Corridor to 
the Lao PDR grid was included in the GMS Regional Cooperation Operations Business Plan (RCOBP) 
2011–2013 pipeline, as a standby project for 2012, but has since been dropped (ADB 2011e). 
The Lao PDR was a beneficiary of the GMS Power Trade Project of the World Bank. The main 
components were (i) the cross-border 115 kV link from the Lao PDR (Ban Hat) to Cambodia (Stung 
Treng), (ii) the Xset 1 to Saravan segment of the proposed 115 kV transmission link that would 
eventually interconnect electricity grids from (western) Thailand through (southern) Lao PDR to 
(southern) Cambodia, and lead to the installation of a modern Load Dispatch Center for the 
Lao PDR. The project’s progress was significantly affected by the withdrawal of Cambodia. The 
connection from Xeset 1 to Saravan was completed in August 2011 to meet demand in Saravan. 
The interconnections of the Lao PDR with other countries of the region will not, at present, be 
possible because of the cancellation of the Cambodia section. Finance for the Load Dispatch Center 
was also cancelled because the Government of the Lao PDR had identified alternative financing. 
Altogether, there are 25 existing cross-border interconnection points. Low-voltage lines are used to 
import power in border districts; 115 kV lines are used to exchange power and the higher voltage 
lines are for export from the hydro sites.
Myanmar
The country has an installed capacity of 3,435 MW on the grid in 2012 of which 2,600 MW 
were hydro, 715 MW were gas-fired, and 120 MW were coal-fired. There are also some 200 MW 
of isolated plants, mainly diesel. There appears to be no publicly available development plan; in 
practice, development is driven partly by foreign interest, particularly from firms in the PRC and, to 
a lesser extent, Thailand. There is nearly 40,000 MW potential of hydropower near the country’s 
borders with Thailand and the PRC that could be exported, as shown in Table 6. There are also some 
good wind sites and coal reserves that could support export projects. 
The transmission system comprises one 230 kV line running north from the four combined cycle 
gas turbine stations around Yangon (Hlawga, Thaketa, Ywama, and Ahlone), roughly along Route 
1 up to Bago and then to Thazi. Another 230 kV line starts from the same point near Yangon and 
runs also north, but west of the Bago Yoma forest, up to Shwe Daung gas turbine, and then to 
Taungdwingyi, generally in the same corridor as Route 2. The total length of the 230 kV system is 
a little more than 3,000 km. Mainly to the north of the 230 kV system, there is another 2,300 km 
of 132 kV transmission. The small grid around Mawlamyine is isolated.
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Table 5 Existing and Planned Cross-Border Linksa
Type EDC EVN CSG EGAT PEA Total
22/35 kV 1 6 3 5 15
115 kV 1 5 (2) 6 (2)
230 kV (1) (2) (1) 2 (1) 2 (5)
500 kV (1) 2 (1) 2 (2)
Total 1 (1) 6 (3) 4 (1) 9 (2) 5 (2) 25 (9)
CSG = China Southern Power Grid, EDC = Electricité du Cambodge, EGAT = Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand, EVN = Electricity 
of Vietnam, kV = kilovolts, PEA = Provincial Electricity Authority.
a Planned figures are in parentheses.
Source: EDL (2011).
Cross-border connections exist at present with the PRC to evacuate power from the 600 MW 
Shweli HPP and from the Dapein HPP. A study of future connections within the Greater Mekong 
Subregion (GMS) indicated that up to 100 terawatt hours (TWh) might in the future be exported 
from Myanmar to the PRC, which would require an order of 20–30 gigawatts (GW) of transmission 
Table 6  Potential Hydropower Plants near Borders of Myanmar
Northern Borders Other Borders
Project Capacity (MW) Project Capacity (MW)
Myitsone 6,000 Dapein–2 168
Chipwi 3,400 Kunlong (Upper Thanlwin) 1,400
Wutsok 1,800 Naopha 1,000
Kawnglanghpu 2,700 Mantong 200
Yenam 1,200 Shweli–2 520
Pisa 2,000 Keng Tong 96
Laza 1,900 Wan Ta Pin 25
Chipwinge 99 So Lue 165
Gawlan 100 Mong Wa 50
Wu Zhongze 60 Keng Yang 28
Hkankawn 140 He Kou 88
Tongxinqiao 320 Namkha 200
Lawngdin 435 Mong Ton (Upper Thanlwin) 7,110
Tamanthi 1,200 Htu Kyan 105
Nam Tamhpak (Kachin) 200 Henna 45
Tha Kwa 150
Palaung 105
Bawlake 180
Nam Tamhpak 180
Ywathit 4,000
Hutgyi 1,360
Tanintharyi 600
Total 21,554 Total 17,775
MW= megawatt.
Source: RTE International (2010b).
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Table 7  Expected Capacity Imports from Myanmar
Site Developer Capacity (MW) COD
Dapein (2) Datang Co., Ltd 140 2014
Shweli (2) Huaneng Group 520 2015
Saing Din Datang Co., Ltd 47 2015
Nam Pawn and Nam Tamhpak Datang Co., Ltd 765 2020
Ngaw Chan Kha Yunnan Power Investment Co., Ltd 1200 2018
Northern Region China Power Investment Corp. 21,500 2016–2021
Kunlong Hanneng Holding Group 1,400 2018
Ywathi Datang Co., Ltd 4,000 2019
Mongton Three Gorges Corp./CSG/ Sinohydro 7,000 2023
Lemro 1 and 2 Datang Co., Ltd 690 Planning stage
Total 37,262
COD = commercial operation date, CSG = China Southern Power Grid, MW = megawatt.
Source: Presentation by the PRC to the Regional Power Trade Coordination Committee.
capacity, but it is not clear what routes it would take and when it might be built. The import 
of power by Thailand is also likely; the same study suggested about 6,000 MW of transmission 
capacity by 2030, but again there is no clarity as to the route (RTE International 2010b). Much 
needs to be done to create mechanisms to finance these very large transmission lines to ensure that 
they form an integral part of a transmission grid that benefits Myanmar and not simply for export; 
and also to minimize environmental and social damages.
People’s Republic of China (Guangxi and Yunnan)
As of 2010, there were 169 GW of generating capacity in China Southern Power Grid (CSG) of 
which 95 GW were thermal, 68 GW were hydro, 5 GW were nuclear, and a little over 1 GW was 
renewable. By 2011, the total capacity had increased to 188 GW. Large energy exchanges take 
place within the system from West to East—Yunnan exported 32 TWh to Guangdong in 2011, 
Guizhou exported 35 TWh, and Guangxi exported 8 TWh. The demand forecast for 2015 is that 
peak demand will increase from 113 GW in 2011 to 191 GW in 2015, and consumption from 
788 TWh to 1170 TWh. Capacity additions will come from thermal plant (68 GW), hydro (46 
GW), nuclear (12 GW), and renewables (10 GW). Transfers inside the CSG will continue to increase 
and 38 GW will be imported into Guangdong by 2015 from other provinces. Large imports are 
anticipated from Myanmar during this period and beyond, as shown in Table 7. 
There are also several projects planned with the Lao PDR, some of which are on the mainstream of 
the Mekong, but they appear to be mainly if not exclusively independent power producers (IPPs) 
intended to produce power for sale in the Lao PDR.
The CSG has several existing links with Viet Nam and an additional 500 kV line is undergoing a 
feasibility study. There are two existing links with the Lao PDR at 115 kV and 230 kV. The ownership 
and benefit-sharing of a large-scale transmission project involving a 500 kV line from the PRC 
to Thailand via the Lao PDR was examined in the past, funded by a World Bank Trust Fund. It is 
possible that the feasibility study of this project will be reexamined soon.
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Thailand
The Ministry of Energy is responsible for power system planning; this is done within a subcommittee 
appointed by the minister of which EGAT is a member and it is EGAT that develops the plan within 
policy guidelines established by the ministry. Accordingly, the latest plan or Power Development Plan 
(PDP) 2010 (2010–2030) was designated as a Green PDP, placing particular emphasis on energy 
security, carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions cuts, energy efficiency improvement, and promotion of 
energy efficiency (EGAT 2010). The plan was approved by the National Energy Policy Council (NEPC) 
and the Cabinet in March 2010. Minor adjustments to cope with more rise in demand than was 
foreseen have been applied since. 
The plan covers new generation capacity from EGAT and IPPs, imports from neighboring countries, 
and the transmission system expansion. Power purchase agreements (PPAs) have been agreed for 
more than 3,000 MW of generation from the Lao PDR by 2016— comprising Nam Theun 2 HPP 
(920 MW), Nam Ngum 2 HPP (600 MW), Theun–Hinboun expansion HPP (220 MW), and Hong 
Sa Lignite TPP (1,473 MW). Other imports from the Lao PDR, from coal to hydropower plant, 
are in negotiation, including the controversial Xayaburi dam on the main stream of the Mekong. 
The Xayaburi Power Company of Thailand has been granted a concession by the Government of 
the Lao PDR to develop a 1,280 MW HPP and is reported to have entered into a loan agreement 
with commercial banks and to have signed a 29-year PPA with EGAT. The dam is scheduled for 
completion in 2020, but construction is opposed by environment groups and some members of 
the Mekong River Commission (Bangkok Post 2012). The expansion plan also includes a 369 MW 
coal-fired power project at Mai-Khot in Myanmar. There is also a high expectation from the Small 
Power Plant and Very Small Power Plant programs. The volume of projects planned from 2020 to 
2030 is also shown in Table 8. It appears not to envisage any new IPP projects.
The EGAT-owned plants to be constructed from 2020 to 2030 include (i) 11,400 MW of natural 
gas plant, (ii) 6,400 MW of clean coal, and (iii) 4,000 MW of nuclear capacity. The extent to which 
natural gas is sourced from domestic production and pipeline imports and to what extent from 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) is not indicated. Imports of electricity are subject to constraints; it is not 
permitted that imports from any single country should exceed 13%, from two countries—25%, 
from three countries—33%, and from four countries—38%.
EGAT has signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Government of the Lao 
PDR for the import of 7,000 MW of power. The cumulative capacity of the existing plants at 
Table 8 Power Plant Projects from 2010–2020, and from 2020–2030
2010–2020 (MW) 2020–2030 (MW)
EGAT-owned power plants 4,821 21,897
Independent power producers 4,400 0
Small power plants 3,539 3,800
Very small power plants 2,335 1,745
New CCGT supporting LPG production at Khanom Gas Separation 
Plant 
800 –
Power purchase from neighboring countries 5,669 6,000
Total 13,568 31,699
– = no data, CCGT = combined cycle gas turbine, EGAT = Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand, LPG = liquefied petroleum gas, 
MW = megawatt.
Source: EGAT (2010).
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Theun Hinboun, Houay Ho, Nam Theun 2, and Nam Ngum 2 has a total of 1,863 MW. Power is 
evacuated by a 500 kV transmission from Nam Theun 2 that runs to Roi Et and was completed in 
2009, and a 500 kV line from Nam Ngum 2 that runs to Udon Thani and was completed in 2010. 
PPAs have been signed for an expansion of the site at Theun Hinboun, for three units of lignite-
fired plant at Hongsa that are expected for 2015 to 2016, and for the controversial main stream 
dam at Xayaburi on which work has not yet begun. The transmission line for the evacuation of 
power from the Theun Hinboun extension was completed in 2012 and runs to Nakhon Phanom 
at 230 kV; transmission from Hongsa will be assured by a 500 kV line to Mae Moh that will be 
commissioned in 2014. The transmission from Xayaburi is planned to be accomplished through 
a 500 kV link to Loei and then on to Khon Kaen, to be completed in 2017. 
MOUs have also been signed for imports from Nam Ngum 3 that are expected for 2017 and from 
Xe Pian Xe Namnoy, expected for 2018. Transmission from Nam Ngum 3 will involve the upgrading 
of an existing 230 kV line from the border to Udon Thani, to operate at 500 kV, together with 
the construction of new 500 kV lines toward Chaiyaphum and Tha Tako. Power from Xe Pian Xe 
Namnoy will be conveyed at 500 KV to Ubon Ratchathani. These cross-border connections are 
summarized in Table 9 along with some future potential projects. There is also the connection to 
Malaysia that is not shown because it is not a part of the GMS. The main function is to improve 
reliability and stability on the two systems. 
The PDP of EGAT identifies two possible HPPs in Myanmar in the near term. One is the Hutgyi HPP 
(1,190 MW) that would connect to the EGAT system at Tha Song Yang in Tak Province; the other is 
the Tasang HPP (7,000 MW) that would connect at Mae Eye in Chiang Mai Province. EGAT has also 
signed a tariff MOU with Myanmar for the output from 3 x 123 MW units of lignite-fired plant at 
Mai Khot; the latter will require an extension of the high-voltage network to the border through 
a 230 kV transmission line linking the Chiang Rai substation to the delivery point at the Thailand–
Myanmar border through the substation at Mae Chan. 
Viet Nam
The Power Master Plan VII for the 2011–2020 with a vision to 2030 was approved by the Prime Minister 
in July 2011. The plan lays down objectives and strategies for the development of generation and 
transmission; cross-border interconnections; and access to electricity in remote rural, mountainous, 
and island areas (Government of Viet Nam 2011). Total installed power generation capacity should 
reach 75,000 MW by 2020 and 146,800 MW by 2030. A very large resort to coal is planned; the 
percentage of power from coal should rise from 19% in 2011 to 48% in 2020 and 52% in 2030; 
this means that the amount of electricity sourced from coal will increase about 17 times from 
2011 to 2030. More natural gas plants will be built, fuelled with imported LNG. In 2020, electricity 
generation capacity using LNG is expected to be about 2,000 MW, rising to about 6,000 MW by 
2030. Nuclear power is envisaged to enter the fuel mix in 2020 and to be 6% by 2030. 
The approximate cost of the program is $50 billion up to 2020 and $75 billion from 2020 to 2030, 
roughly two-thirds in generation and one-third in transmission. Tariffs will be raised as a part of the 
incentives to be given to private investors and the drive to market competition will be maintained, 
leaving only the state monopoly of power transmission. Through tariff reform and policy on energy 
efficiency, the income elasticity will be reduced from 2.0 to 1.0 by 2020. The development of 
renewable energy sources for electricity production will be accelerated, increasing the percentage 
of electricity produced from these energy sources from 3.5% of total electricity production in 2010 
up to 4.5% in 2020 and 6.0% in 2030. The 500 kV transmissions will be greatly expanded with 
more than 80,000 megavolt amperes of 500 kV substations up to 2030. To pursue the goal, 
the Viet Nam Electricity National Power Transmission Corporation (NPT) has recently signed an 
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Table 9  Existing, Expected, and Possible Cross-Border Connections 
from Thailand
Project
Capacity 
(MW) Substation in Thailand
Date of 
Operation Voltage (kV)
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
Existing
Nam Theun 2 920 Roi Et 2009 500
Nam Ngum 2 597 Udon Thani 2010 500
Theun Hinboun expansion 220 Nakhon Phanom 2012 230
Expected
Hongsa (lignite) 1,473 Mae Moh 2014 500
Xayaburi 1,220 Loei–Khon Kaen 2017 500
Nam Ngum 3 660 Udon Thani 2016 500
Xe Pian Xe Namnoy 390 Ubon Ratchathani 2017 500
Possible
Nam Theun 1 510 Udon Thani
Pak Beng 912 Nan
Sanakham 660 Khon Kaen
Xe Kong 4 300 Ubon Ratchathani
Nam Kong 1 75 Ubon Ratchathani
Xe Kong 5 330 Ubon Ratchathani
Don Sahong 240 Ubon Ratchathani
Myanmar
Expected
Mai Khot (lignite) 369 Mae Chan
Possible
Hutgyi 1,190 Tak
Dawei 1,800 Ratchaburi
Tasang 7,000 Chiang Mai
Tanintayi 600 Prachuap Khiri Khan
Mong Ton 3,500 Mae Moh
Cambodia
Possible
Stengnam 100 Chanthaburi
Koh Kong 1,800 Rayong
People’s Republic of China (PRC)
South PRC 3,000 Lopburi high-voltage direct 
current
kV = kilovolt, MW = megawatt.
Source: EGAT (2010).
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extension to an existing loan agreement with the World Bank to include 10 new transmission line 
and substation subprojects—four of the projects (one transmission line and three substations) are 
to extend the 500 kV grid (NPT 2011).
Viet Nam is connected across its borders to the PRC through five connections at 110 kV and 220 kV 
as shown in Table 10, and through some lower-voltage lines that are not shown. Connectivity 
to power grids of other countries in the region will be considerably increased under the PDP. 
Connectivity to the Lao PDR grid will be enhanced by 220 kV and 500 kV lines from Northern 
Lao PDR toward Thanh Hoa and Nho Quan (Ninh Binh) and Son La, and by 220 kV and 500 kV 
transmission lines from central Lao PDR toward Thach My (Quang Nam) and Pleiku (Gia Lai). 
Connectivity to the Cambodian grid will be expanded at 220 kV or possibly 500 kV through future 
connections from the dams on the lower Sesan (220 kV) and the lower Serepok (400 MW) to 
Pleiku, and from Sung Treng (220 kV) to Chau Doc (400 MW). Imports from the PRC at 110 kV 
and 220 kV will be maintained and a future 500 kV connection between Northern Viet Nam and 
Yunnan with a capacity of 2,000–3,000 MW is under study between the China Southern Power 
Grid (CSG) and the Electricity of Vietnam (EVN). The projects are summarized in Table 10.
ADB has funded the Northern Power Transmission to expand and strengthen the transmission 
system of EVN in the north and to support the restructuring and commercialization of EVN, 
corporatizing the generation units, and merging the four previous transmission units prior to the 
Table 10 Existing and Planned High-Voltage Cross-Border Connections
Route Voltage (kV) Capacity (MW)
Existing
Viet Nam
 Xinqiao–Lao Cai 220 473 
 Malutang–Ha Giang 220 447 
 Maomaotiao–Hà Giang 110 116 
 Hekou–Lao Cai 110 91 
 Fangcheng (Guangxi)–Mong Cai 110 25 
Cambodia
 Chao Doc–Taveo 220 156
Planned
People’s Republic of China
 Yunnan–North Viet Nam 500 2,000–3,000
Cambodia
 Lower Sesan and Serepok–Pleiku 220 400
 Stung Treng–Chau Doc 220 207
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
 Ban Hatsan–Pleiku 500, 220
 Sekaman 3–Thanh My 220 248
 HPP Nam Mo–Ban Ve 220
 Luang Prabang–Nho Quan 500 
kV = kilovolt, MW = megawatt.
Source: RTE International (2010b).
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unbundling of EVN. In the immediate future, ADB will cofinance the 750 MW combined cycle gas 
turbine power plant at O Mon—about 250 km south of Ho Chi Minh City. Future lending in the 
Country Operations Business Plan for 2012–2014 is shown in Table 11. Lending for Vinh Tan 3 
TPP and O Mon 3 TPP, which was included in previous years, was dropped. Technical assistance in 
the sector is foreseen, including capacity building and technical support for the national rollout of 
benefit sharing and capacity building for low carbon market development (ADB 2011b).
Table 11  Lending in the Country Operations Business Plan  
for 2012–2014
Name
ADB 
Contribution 
($ million)
Total 
Expenditure 
($ million) Comment
2012 Firm
Energy Efficiency Program in 
the Industry Sector 
10 75 Refurbish and upgrade the production lines of five 
cement and two steel plants
2013 Firm
Lao PDR–Viet Nam Power 
Interconnection (Ban 
Hatsan–Pleiku) 
30 90 Loan to construct 94 km of 500 kV transmission 
line and expand existing 220 kV/500 kV Pleiku 
substation. This project will transfer 3,157 GWh/
year of electricity from hydropower plants in 
Southern Lao PDR.
2013 Standby
Power Transmission 
Investment Program (MFF)
200 420 Constructing and upgrading 500 kV and 220 kV 
transmission lines and associated substations.
ADB = Asian Development Bank, GWh = gigawatt-hour, km = kilometer, kV =  kilovolt, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
MFF = Multitranche Financing Facility.
Source: ADB (2011b).
The Country Strategy and Program Midterm Review identified procurement as a potential concern, 
in particular, the fragmenting of packages of international competitive bidding and poor bid 
specification in energy and transport was perceived to lead to the use of under-qualified contractors 
and poor value-for-money. The review confirmed the basic thrust and scope of ADB support, 
including the primary focus on business-led, pro-poor economic growth and the complementary 
themes of social equity and a balance between growth and environment. In December 2007, the 
Government of Viet Nam implemented a national targeted program to mitigate climate change 
and requested the assistance of ADB in developing renewable energy options that will supply 
sustainable energy to remote rural areas to promote economic activity and reduce poverty. ADB 
will support such efforts and assist in developing an enabling regulatory framework (ADB 2009b).
Summary Conclusions
All countries appear to have power system development plans and occasional results from those 
plans are made public, but in some countries they are difficult to find. The Electricity Generating 
Authority of Thailand (EGAT) makes the entire plan publicly available and easily accessible. Viet Nam 
includes a fairly detailed summary of intentions as a part of the published government decision 
that implements the plan. The quality of the content in countries that do not publish detailed 
plans is difficult to assess, but it seems probable, given the complexity of the issues, that the power 
capacity of Cambodia, the Lao PDR, and Myanmar would benefit from technical assistance. It is not 
clear from available documentation how decisions on site and scheduling of large power plants in 
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these countries are arrived at, and whether they result from an extensive national power planning 
process. It appears that foreign investment considerations carry much weight in these decisions. 
Investments, particularly the transmission investments associated with a particular power plant, 
may therefore not add much to the power system of the host country. National plans that set out 
the desirable expansion in time and locality and the associated transmission should determine the 
siting and scheduling of plant that should then be tendered by competitive bidding. For this, a 
supportive framework for private–public partnerships (PPPs) is needed and this is discussed in a 
later section. A summary is provided in Table 12.
Extending Access to Electricity
Cambodia
Utilities in Cambodia are still very underdeveloped; electricity gas and water contributed 0.6% 
to gross domestic product (GDP) in 2008 (ADB 2012d) and rate of electrification in Cambodia 
is among the lowest in Southeast Asia. Where electricity is available, the prices are some of the 
Table 12 Summary Conclusions for Power System Development
Published Current 
Development Plan International Connections Private Participation
Cambodia There is a power development 
plan, but it does not seem to be 
publicly available.
Several cross-border interconnections are 
planned mainly at low voltage. A 230 kV 
line to Lao PDR may be constructed, but it 
is not clear.
This is significant both for 
large-scale and small-scale 
generation.
Lao People’s 
Democratic 
Republic (Lao 
PDR)
No power system expansion 
plan appears to be publicly 
available.
Many cross-border connections are 
planned mainly for the export of power to 
Thailand and Viet Nam.
Very strong in generation 
and potentially will enter 
transmission.
Myanmar No power system expansion 
plan appears to be publicly 
available.
Very large investments are likely to be 
needed to evacuate power to the PRC and 
Myanmar. These pose great challenges of 
sustainability.
There is considerable 
private finance at present 
and it is the only conceivable 
basis for expansion on the 
scale envisaged.
People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) 
(Guangxi and 
Yunnan)
No power system expansion 
plan could be found.
Strong links will be needed if the projects 
with Myanmar proceed. FS is being 
prepared for a 500 kV link to Viet Nam; a 
500 kV link to Thailand via the Lao PDR 
may be reexamined. 
Some private participation 
in IPPs, mostly domestic, 
and in large part from 
corporatized subsidiaries of 
the SOEs.
Thailand A detailed and regularly 
updated power system 
expansion plan is freely and 
publicly available.
There are strong connections with the Lao 
PDR and several planned cross-border 
connections with Cambodia, the PRC, and 
Myanmar.
The most recent PDP 
appears to eschew private 
finance, except for SPPs and 
VSPPs.
Viet Nam A PDP is prepared, regularly 
updated, and a summary is 
published as a decree. The 
underlying analysis is not 
publicly available.
There are several lines to the PRC that 
may be substantially strengthened; greater 
connectivity to Cambodia is likely.
Private finance was 
successful in the early 
2000s, but then dried up. 
Reforms have been made to 
the PPP regime.
FS = feasibility study, IPPs = independent power producers, kV = kilovolt, PDP = Power Development Plan, PPP = public–private partnership, 
SOEs = state-owned enterprises, SPPs = small power producers, VSPPs = very small power producers.
Sources: Various country energy reports.
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highest in the world. The World Bank identified the absence of electricity as a binding constraint 
on economic activity especially on agriculture (World Bank 2009). The Government of Cambodia, 
through the Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy (MIME), has established two targets for rural 
electrification (MIME 2011), as follows:
•	 By 2020, all villages will have electricity of some type.
•	 By 2030, at least 70% of households will have access to grid-quality electricity.
This strategy relies on Electricité du Cambodge (EDC) to undertake the expansion of the national 
grid into rural areas, while private entrepreneurs invest in rural distribution and electricity supply, 
including supply from neighboring countries. Both components of the strategy have been supported 
by official development assistance (ODA). Tariffs for the sale of electricity are set for each licensee 
according to their costs of supply. According to the Electricity Authority of Cambodia (EAC), of the 
electricity generated by licensees in Cambodia,93% use diesel and/or heavy fuel oil as fuel. So the 
tariff is linked to the cost of fuel and adjusted through a fuel cost adjustment mechanism. Where 
a licensee purchases electricity from other sources, then the EAC has fixed the tariff for sale to 
consumers as the cost of purchase of electricity plus a fixed charge (EAC 2012a).
A prominent feature of the off-grid component has been the Rural Electrification Fund (REF) 
established with loan assistance from the World Bank up until 2009, a grant from the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) up until 2009, and the internal resources of the Government of Cambodia. 
The outputs were technical assistance, in particular a Strategic Plan for Rural Electrification (REF 
2008), and the distribution of grants to subprojects (new connections, mini and micro hydro, 
biomass, and solar system) for rural electrification. The grants were aimed at rural electrification 
enterprises (REEs) that met specified lending criteria. The program aimed to achieve 50,000 new 
connections and by the end of December 2010 this has been done—99.5% of the target had been 
contracted (REF 2011). The PRC has also supported rural electrification in Cambodia through the 
extension of the EDC grid; distribution is being extended in four provinces including Kampong 
Cham, Prey Veng, Kampong Speu, and Preah Sihanouk through a concessional loan of $53 million 
(China Daily 2012).
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
The country has conducted a strong policy of rural electrification. In 1995, only 15% of households 
had access to electricity; by November 2010, access had increased to 71% of the population in 
734,600 households and the Government of Lao PDR has an ambitious goal of providing electricity 
to 90% of the country’s households by 2020 (80% by 2015). The effort has been supported by 
several international financial institutions (IFIs) and bilateral donors. In the late 1990s, technical 
assistance and loans supported the extension of the 115 kV transmission system and provided 
electricity to selected villages in northern Lao PDR. Subsequent loans continued to support further 
grid extension in northern provinces, but as the emphasis of implementation has moved increasingly 
to remote areas where grid extension is expensive, so alternative solutions based on small-scale, 
renewable, energy-based mini grids have been introduced, often privately owned (ADB 2010b). 
Four consecutive rural electrification projects have been funded by the World Bank’s International 
Development Association (IDA) since the mid-1990s, with cofinancing from the GEF and the 
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (World Bank 2011b). Off-grid systems contribute 
significantly; by 2010, 35,000 households were using off-grid systems powered by solar or 
mini hydro.
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The rate of electrification in the Lao PDR has been one of the fastest ever seen and the factors 
underlying this success have been identified as
•	 strong and visible government leadership,
•	 consistent and high performance from the Electricité du Laos (EDL),
•	 a prudent balance between subsidies to rural consumers and a strong financial position for 
EDL, and
•	 particular and gender-sensitive provisions for the poorest consumers. 
EDL and the Government of Lao PDR were successful in finding a balance between the need to 
maintain EDL as a financially viable entity and the need to create subsidies and cross-subsidies to 
ensure that supply was affordable by poor communities. Concessional funding and grants from 
international development organizations transmitted to EDL by the Ministry of Finance as subsidiary 
loans and grants were and continue to be an important part of the funding of EDL. The government 
also transmits part of the revenues from the hydropower development to EDL as dividends; EDL is 
the designated nominee shareholder of government participation in several IPPs including Theun 
Hinboun and Houay Ho. For a large part during the 1990s, revenues and dividends from the export 
of hydropower constituted more than 70% of EDL’s revenue (World Bank 2012). 
A review in 2005 showed significant commercial development in villages newly extended with 
electricity, including retail, weaving and knitting shops, and rice mills, averaging 30 new businesses 
per village. Electric tools and appliances have improved living standards and stimulated productive 
activities. Light in the evening hours extends working hours and allows study periods. 
Future ADB support to the energy sector, in line with national strategy, will focus on developing 
(i) the national grid to integrate into the regional GMS and ASEAN grids, (ii) small and mini 
hydropower development, and (iii) off-grid renewable energy development in remote communities. 
Gender equity will be an important theme for the latter. In the hydro subsector, support will be 
given to regional power transfer and trading to earn foreign exchange through wheeling charges 
and power exports (ADB 2012b).
Myanmar
The electrification rate is low, but there is a plan for rural electrification that should increase the 
number of villages with access to electricity from 3,152 in 2012 to 5,419 in 2016.
People’s Republic of China (Guangxi and Yunnan)
The International Energy Agency (IEA) reported that the China Southern Power Grid (CSG) aims 
to have completed the construction of power grids by 2010. At the end of 2008, out of a total 
of 63,249 administrative villages, only 37 (all located in Yunnan Province) still lacked electricity 
access with an access rate of 99.94%. Of the 47,614,000 rural households, 232,800 were without 
electricity—an access rate of 99.51% (OECD/IEA 2010).
The Township Electrification Program provided financial support to the construction of off-grid 
renewable energy systems (mainly hydropower, photovoltaic systems, and wind) in 11 provinces 
from 2002–2005. In some places, the program was entirely financed by the central government; 
in other cases, the costs were shared by the provincial government. Selection of the developers 
was made by competitive bidding in which private companies, municipalities, and state-owned 
enterprises could participate. The main provinces involved were in the West; Yunnan had only a 
modest participation (all hydro) and Guangxi did not at all participate.
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Thailand
Thailand has close to universal access to electricity mainly brought about by grid extension. The 
first major campaign was the accelerated rural electrification program implemented from 1976 to 
1996. At the end of this period, 98% of villages were connected, but not necessarily all households 
within the village. Subsequent campaigns were addressed more directly to the poor households not 
connected and by the end of 2004, 99% of villages and 96% of households had grid access. The 
remaining unconnected villages were located in especially remote areas, including national parks, 
forest reservations, islands, and mountainous areas; their needs were addressed by the solar home 
system project. 
The key success factors were 
•	 high degree of standardization of equipment and practice,
•	 local manufacture of materials as far as possible,
•	 concessional financial support from IFIs,
•	 private contractors properly supervised,
•	 good liaison with village leaders and prior meetings that helped avoid disputes over routing, 
and
•	 cross subsidy from the EGAT through a bulk supply tariff that gave significantly lower-priced 
electricity to the Provincial Electricity Authority (PEA) than to the Metropolitan Electricity 
Authority (MEA). 
Concessional finance was obtained from ADB, the World Bank, and some bilateral donors 
and this was blended with commercial loans to achieve a volume of impact while maintaining 
financial viability. 
Communities were ranked numerically for priority taking into account the level of income, the 
number of existing commercial enterprises, and the government’s plans for other infrastructure 
investments in the region; this is considered to have contributed to the success of the program. 
An unusual aspect of the program was that local communities were encouraged to raise funds to 
contribute to the cost of the network and if they did so then they were able to receive electricity 
service before the originally targeted date although ownership of the network remained with PEA 
(Barnes and Foley 2004).
Viet Nam
Viet Nam has been very successful in its programs of rural electrification. An interesting facet of 
its rural electrification policy has been the extensive involvement of private finance in the retail 
stage. About two-thirds of the low-voltage retail distribution system in rural Viet Nam is owned 
by local distribution utilities that arose as a mechanism to share the cost of rural electrification 
between the central budget and users, either directly or through municipal authorities. This was 
the result of Decree 22-1999/CT-TTg.1999 that permitted communes to connect consumers to a 
low-voltage system supplied by the main grid at a concessionary tariff. The resale prices by the local 
distribution utilities were initially considerably higher than those paid by direct customers of the 
power companies, recognizing the high costs of rural electrification and the consumers’ willingness 
to pay. This was reversed by a decision of the Prime Minister in 2009, stipulating a unified national 
tariff. The decision also signaled a consolidation of the structure by allowing power companies to 
takeover financially weak local distribution utilities.
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The country’s most recent Power Development Plan (PDP) up to 2030 proposes to accelerate 
the program of electrification in rural and mountainous areas to ensure that in 2020 most rural 
households will have access to electricity. This will be achieved by new investment in grid extension 
or local power sources (small hydro, micro; solar, wind, combined with diesel power plants) to 
supply electricity to rural areas; 100% of communes and 98.6% of rural households should have 
access to electricity by 2015 while most of the rural households should have access to electricity by 
2020. The PDP is also foreseen to renovate and upgrade rural power grids to meet the technical 
standards and improve the quality of supply to make it more suitable for productive development. 
From 2011 to 2015, an additional 500,000 households in rural areas should have grid connection 
and about 377,000 rural households should have a supply from renewable energy sources. An 
additional 200,000 rural households will be grid-connected during 2016–2020 and 231,000 rural 
households supplied from renewable energy sources.
A detailed assessment of the impacts of rural electrification on households in Viet Nam, including 
self-assessment by households, showed many benefits. Electrification relieved the income constraint 
on households by reducing the use of expensive forms of energy (kerosene for lighting and batteries 
for TVs). Increased ownership of electrical goods reduced time spent on household chores (e.g., 
rice cookers), while school enrolment and farm productivity increased. The assessment estimated 
the willingness to pay of rural consumers at about $0.70 per kWh (World Bank 2011d).
Summary Conclusions
Access rates to electricity vary widely across the subregion, as shown in Table 13. Sources are the 
IEA for electricity consumption (IEA 2011b) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) for 
population in 2009 (UNFPA 2010). The proportion of the population with electricity averaged 
74.1% across the subregion. Cambodia and Myanmar have electrification rates below average. 
Yunnan and Guangxi are not included in this table, but as noted earlier, their rates are very high. 
Myanmar contributes very strongly to the total population without electricity because it has a large 
population and a very low rate of electrification.
The main instrument of near universal access in Thailand and Viet Nam has been grid extension. 
Small-scale renewables were initially seen as having a substantial role to play, but now are mainly 
seen as ancillary technologies for remote areas (or as distributed generation feeding into the grid). 
In Viet Nam, private capital has contributed effectively to retail distribution. The Lao PDR has the 
lowest population density among the countries by some considerable margin and its achievements 
recently in rural electrification are all the more remarkable for that. The Lao PDR has placed 
Table 13  Electrification Rates and Per Capita Consumption, 2009
Country
Electrification 
Rate (%)
Population without 
Electricity (millions)
Consumption 
(kWh/person)
Population 
Density 
(people/km2)
Cambodia 24.0 11.3 138 80
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 55.0 2.6 1,508 27
Myanmar 13.0 43.5 117 90
Thailand 99.3 0.5 2,202 132
Viet Nam 97.6 2.1 987 265
Total for Greater Mekong Subregion 74.1 60.0 1,117 122
km2= square kilometer, kWh = kilowatt-hour.
Sources: IEA for electricity consumption (IEA 2011b), and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) for population in 2009 (UNFPA 2010).
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considerable reliance on small-scale renewables, probably because the low population density tilts 
the economic balance in comparison with grid extension. All three countries have made strong 
production subsidies to rural electrification. The hypothecation of a part of hydro revenues to rural 
electrification in the Lao PDR has apparently been the determinant and this could be a lesson for 
Myanmar and Cambodia where there are potential rents from gas and hydro. Both Cambodia 
and Myanmar have a long way to go yet and there is probably much to be learned from the 
experience of the other three countries. Reviews of successful programs show large benefits and a 
high willingness to pay by consumers. These and other comments are shown in Table 14.
Policy for Renewable Energy
Cambodia
Cambodia has a good renewable energy potential and many people rely upon it for their energy 
needs. The solar regime is typical of tropical countries, but very little exploited. Natural forests are 
the main source of fuelwood, but they have been severely degraded by logging and conversion 
to other uses. Biomass residues from forestry and agriculture are plentiful. The Wind Energy 
Resource Atlas Report on Southeast Asia that covers Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Thailand, and 
Viet Nam shows that the theoretical wind energy resource potential in the country is equivalent to 
Table 14  Summary Conclusions for Rural Electrification
Country
Production 
Subsidies
Private 
Participation
Off-Grid 
Systems Other Comments
Cambodia No general scheme of 
subsidy; some subsidy to 
off-grid schemes through 
ODA.
A significant part of 
rural electrification is in 
private hands.
Funded by several 
ODA projects.
The high cost of electricity 
is a binding constraint on 
development. The capacity of 
EDL is weak.
Lao People’s 
Democratic 
Republic 
Concessional loans. 
Dividends for hydro 
export.
Off-grid networks can 
be privately owned.
Substantial role. Hypothecation of hydro 
revenues to rural electrification 
has apparently been the 
determinant. 
Myanmar No special scheme 
of subsidy for rural 
electrification is evident.
None identified. In experimental 
stage.
People’s Republic 
of China 
(Guangxi and 
Yunnan)
Pricing is unclear, but 
there has been and there 
is still substantial subsidy.
Private operators were 
permitted under the 
Township Program in 
the case of off-grid.
Off-grid was an 
objective of the 
11th Five-Year 
Renewable Energy 
Plan.
There is considerable 
delegation of administrative 
responsibility to
local levels.
Thailand Concessional loans. 
Cross-subsidy through 
the bulk supply tariff.
Communes encouraged 
to contribute to costs.
Minor role. Standardization of materials 
and practice.
Scheduling of connection 
through quantitative indicators.
Viet Nam Concessional loans. 
Cross-subsidy through 
the bulk supply tariff. 
Concessionary prices to 
cooperatives.
Important participation 
of municipalities and 
others in cooperative-
style retail companies.
Minor role. High initial prices for 
consumers of cooperative; 
indicates high willingness to 
pay, as confirmed by assessment 
results.
EDL = Electricité du Laos, ODA = official development assistance.
Sources: Various country energy reports.
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1,380 megawatts (MW) (World Bank 2001). Small pilot projects have been financed by bilateral 
donors. The Renewable Electricity Action Plan, 2002–2012 (REAP) was largely conceived as a part 
of rural electrification and aims to provide framework for a decentralized system of electricity. 
REAP was implemented by the Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy (MIME) in three phases: 
(i) market preparation, (ii) early growth, and (iii) market scale-up, but was absorbed within the 
Strategic Plan for Rural Electrification. There is no feed-in tariff or other support for grid-connected 
renewable energy.
Lao People’s Democratic Republic
The Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM), with support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Finland, has prepared a National Strategy on Renewable Energy Development to 2025 that 
analyzes the potential for renewable energy, sets targets, and defines implementation measures. 
The intention is to increase renewable energy consumption to 30% of total energy use by 2025; 
biofuels are expected to account for 10% of total transport energy in that year. Measures that will be 
implemented to meet this target will focus on promoting public and private domestic and foreign 
investment in biofuel production, small-scale electric power plants, and other forms of renewable 
energy such as solar, biomass, biogas, and wind, and alternative energy for transport. Special 
tariffs for renewable energy are to be introduced and low-interest loans offered for investment in 
renewable energy production. 
Myanmar
Most of the primary energy (64%) used in Myanmar is traditional energy such as fuelwood, 
charcoal, and biomass, but it is not used in an efficient, modern, and sustainable manner. There 
are substantial resources of small hydro, wind, solar, geothermal, and biomass. The main aim of 
energy policy in the country is not only to substitute traditional fuels with modern fuels, but also 
to develop where appropriate its ample resources of renewable energy. However, the technical and 
administrative capacity to mobilize these resources is lacking. The main focus for hydro plant has 
been on medium-size plants for domestic consumption, large plants for export, and less on small 
plants for rural electrification. Some experimental work has been done on wind energy, but there 
is insufficient data to judge whether there are commercially viable sites. Some small pilot-scale 
projects on solar energy have been installed in remote areas. There is a substantial geothermal 
resource that has been investigated by the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise and the Myanmar 
Electric Power Enterprise, but its commercial volume is unclear. About one-half of the land area of 
the country is forested; firewood and agricultural wastes are used for household purposes leading 
to significant deforestation. Efforts have been made to introduce efficient cooking stoves and 
briquettes of carbonized residues. Since 1980, there is some promotion of biogas generation from 
animal residue in rural areas. Key issues in the renewable energy sector as identified by the Ministry 
of Energy on its website are as follows:
•	 To have adequate information on the renewable energy resources of the country.
•	 To encourage more inter-ministry and inter-department interaction and cooperation.
•	 To promote private participation in the development program.
•	 To define and specify energy policy incorporating renewable energy.
People’s Republic of China (Guangxi and Yunnan)
The PRC is a leading player in renewable energy; it installed more wind power capacity during 
2010 than any other country (accounting for half of the global market); it plans to install 
30 gigawatts (GW) more of wind power capacity during 2011–2012; by the end of 2009 it had 
29
National Programs
the largest total renewable energy generation in the world (third place if large hydropower is 
excluded). The PRC is the leading global market for solar hot water systems and the third-largest 
producer of ethanol.
The Renewable Energy Law, promulgated in 2005, was an important step in creating dynamic 
renewable energy policy and industry in the PRC. The law sets out institutional responsibilities 
including those at the state level to survey resources and, in cooperation with the provinces, to 
set targets and publish development plans. The law obliges various agencies of the central state 
to develop and publish appropriate standards; it establishes a licensing regime, provides for a 
feed-in tariff for specified technologies and an obligation on the grid to purchase, and outlines 
rules and rights concerning grid access. It sets out principles for cost-sharing specifying how the 
incremental costs of renewable energy are to be shared among utility consumers. A renewable 
energy development fund is created for research and development (R&D), various subsidies, and 
surveys. The law is a framework law and has subsequently been elaborated by regulations.
The Medium- and Long-Term Renewable Energy Development Plan, published in 2007, sets a 
national target to meet 10% of total energy consumption by 2010 and 15% by 2020. The largest 
generating companies were required to source 3% of their total generation from renewable energy 
by 2010, and at least 8% by 2020. 
The most recent 5-year plan anticipates 235 GW of new power generation from clean energy 
sources over the next 5 years for the whole of the PRC, which includes nuclear and natural gas. It 
envisages that 20% of energy will come from nonfossil fuel sources, of which 40 GW will be new 
nuclear, 120 GW will be new hydropower projects, 70 GW will be wind power capacity, and 5 GW 
will come from new solar power capacity.
Bidding for concessions for large onshore wind power and later offshore has been used since 2003. 
Included in the tender documents was a benchmark tariff, but initially the tariffs offered were too 
low and response was poor. The experiment was not entirely successful, but the received bids gave 
some price clarity to support the design of feed-in tariffs. Similar bidding procedures have since 
been extended to photovoltaic and solar power projects.
Thailand
Thailand has a long history of promoting renewable energy and has experimented with several 
instruments. The National Energy Administration (NEA) had a significant program of isolated micro-
hydro installations in the 1970s using local labor and simple technology. The first formal instrument 
was the Regulation to Purchase Power from Small Power Producers (the “SPP regulation”) that was 
approved in 1991; this permitted the sale by private producers of cogenerated electricity and power 
from renewable sources. The Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) was obliged to 
purchase the output at its own avoided cost. The initial limit on the size of qualifying producers was 
60 MW, but this was raised to 90 MW later. This endeavor marked the first entry of private finance 
into the electricity sector and preceded the large independent power producer (IPP) program. 
The main uptake was from cogeneration plant on industrial sites and from the use of agricultural 
wastes as fuel, particularly bagasse, rice husk, and wood wastes. 
The economic crisis in 1997 reduced the demand for electricity and led to overcapacity of 
generation. Consequently, the SPP program was rescinded and only reintroduced some years later. 
The requirements of the SPP for connection were deemed too demanding to encourage small 
renewable plants other than those fuelled by biomass. The Very Small Power Producer Program 
(VSPP) introduced in 2001 permitted sale to the grid by plant of less than 1 MW under the less 
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restrictive sales regime of net metering. VSPPs can sell at low voltage to the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and PEA. The Ministry of Energy created in 2002 moved away from the SPP concept and 
introduced a Renewable Portfolio Standard in 2004 that required EGAT to source 160 MW of new 
capacity from renewable energy. The administrative procedures to implement this policy were never 
completed and it failed (Piyasvasti 2008). 
A premium FIT, known in Thailand as the “adder” was introduced in 2006. Under this scheme, 
an additional payment is made to renewable energy generators on top of the normal prices that 
power producers would receive. The “adder” was initially determined through a competitive 
bidding system, which resulted in approval of projects with rather low adders agricultural and 
forestry wastes as fuels. There was no submission of projects using other forms of renewable 
energy. In 2007, the renewable program was revised and changes were made to the SPP regime to 
encourage more participants; the upper limit on VSPPs was raised to 10 MW. The scheme of adders 
was made more complex and differentiated according to source; targets were set by source and 
special incentives were introduced for the three southernmost provinces where there was a local 
power shortage and political risk. In June 2010, as a consequence of the falling cost of photovoltaic 
systems, the Cabinet passed a resolution to stop accepting applications for solar installations and 
to severely reduce the adder for solar plants for those projects that had not signed power purchase 
agreements (PPAs). The resolution changed the FIT from a premium tariff to a fixed feed-in tariff—
which means that payments to generators are no longer affected by electricity prices. 
In 2008, the Renewable Energy Development Plan, 2008–2022 (REDP) was published with the 
goal that renewables should provide 20% of final energy demand by 2020. Intermediate targets 
were set, to reach 15.6% by 2011 and 19.1% by 2016. This was updated to the Alternative Energy 
Development Program, 2012–2021 at the end of 2011 with more ambitious targets. Biofuels were 
a key component because of the strong dependence of the country on imported oil. By 2022, the 
plan envisaged 5,608 MW of renewable electricity generation, (mainly from biomass); 800 MW of 
wind (half the technical potential identified), and 500 MW of solar power. As of January 2010, the 
contract capacity of 35 potential SPPs using renewable energy was 903 MW and as of December 
2009, there were 159 VSPPs using renewable energy with a total capacity of 350.3 MW connected 
to distribution utilities. Of these were 51 solar energy projects (7.8 MW), 41 biogas projects 
(43.0 MW), 53 biomass projects (287.8 MW), 8 municipal solid waste projects (10.8 MW), 3 small 
hydro projects (0.5 MW) and 3 wind energy projects (0.4 MW) (EGAT 2010).
The most recent power development plan of EGAT sets out expectations from its own investments 
and for the SPP and VSPP programs. It proposes to invest itself not only in power generation from 
renewable energy where the production cost is not higher than the sum of average bulk tariff plus 
the Government’s Adder Subsidy, but also to conduct some semi-research prototype projects that 
promote clean energy. The tentative targets in EGAT’s plan are shown in Table 15.
In addition, EGAT expects 1,045 MW of extra renewable generation from the SPP program by 2015 
and additions of nearly 4,000 MW from the VSPP program by 2030. These expectations are not 
entirely consistent with the targets of the REDP and the Alternative Energy Development Program; 
the latter envisages that renewables would represent 19.3% of installed capacity by 2021, whereas 
the EGAT PDP indicates only 6% (Tongsopit and Greacen 2012). The same source draws attention 
to the lack of a clear legal basis for the renewable energy policy and the confusion caused by 
chronic alterations of policy, often with little warning.
Thailand experimented with ethanol as an additive to reduce pollution from vehicles in the 1980s, 
but it was only when oil prices began to rise sharply in 1984 that significant programs for bulk use 
of biofuels were introduced. The current 15-year ethanol and biodiesel targets are derived from the 
REDP according to which, production of ethanol production should have reached 3.0 million liters/
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day by 2011, 6.2 million liters/day by 2016, and 9.0 million liters/day in the long term during 
2017–2022. The targets for biodiesel are 3.02 million liters/day in 2011, 3.64 million liters/day in 
2016, and 4.50 million liters/day in 2022. The targets have proved challenging as consumers have 
not found the price differential between gasoline and gasohol sufficient incentive to change with 
the result that ethanol production (from sugar molasses and cassava) has exceeded the target and 
only been accommodated through exports at distressed prices. In the case of biodiesel, the supply 
of biodiesel has been erratic and insufficient (GAIN 2011) with the consequence that production of 
biodiesel in 2011 was probably no more than 2.22 million liters/day. Compulsory blending to B52 
has therefore been withdrawn and B2, B3, and B4 were permitted instead. 
The instruments intended to meet the targets set out in the REDP 2008–2022 include production 
mandates for biodiesel, tax privileges from the Board of Investment, tax and retail price incentives, 
R&D support, and public awareness programs. Ethanol producers receive an excise tax exemption 
on ethanol of B7.0 per liter when selling ethanol for gasohol production in the domestic market, 
which is higher than for other uses, and gasohol refineries receive a subsidy of B13.5 per liter 
for E85 gasohol production. Automobile manufacturers who produce vehicles compatible with 
E85 are able to import parts and components duty free from 2011 to 2013. In 2011, there were 
19 ethanol plants in operation with a combined capacity of 1.8 million liters/day with five more 
in construction. In February 2008, the government adopted a 15-year Biodiesel Development Plan 
up to 2022 that required the compulsory use of B2 biodiesel, with the intention that B5 would be 
compulsory from 2011, and B10 would also be available for use on a voluntary basis, in the event, 
as noted, the feedstock was not available to meet this goal. Attempts to extend the land used for 
palm oil planting have been only partly successful. 
Viet Nam
The first Renewable Energy Action Plan of Viet Nam was prepared in 2001 by the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade (MOIT) and Electricity of Vietnam (EVN) with financial support from the World 
Bank. It was designed mainly as an ancillary approach to rural electrification for remote and 
mountainous areas. It identified a potential of between 1,100 and 1,600 MW (mainly mini hydro 
wind and biomass) that could be developed by 2020 and that could generate between 3.6 and 
5.0 terawatt-hour (TWh) of electricity; by 2030, the potential was estimated at 3,300 MW and 
9.5 TWh. A small part of the System Efficiency Improvement, Equitization, and Renewables Project 
financed by the World Bank was devoted to improving the policy and regulatory framework and, 
in particular, to support the implementation of a simplified PPA. A standardized “no negotiations” 
2 B1 to B5 refers to mandated blending of biodiesel in percentage terms (e.g., B1 at 1%, B5 at 5%).
Table 15   Tentative Renewable Additions under  
the Power Development Plan to 2022
MW Additions
2008–2011 2012–2016 2017–2022 Total
Small hydro 48.7 86.0 59.0 193.7
Wind energy 20.5 19.0 89.0 128.5
Solar energy 1.0 0.5 0.5 2.0
Municipal solid waste – 7.5 7.5 15.0
Total 70.2 113.0 156.0 339.2
– = no data, MW = megawatt.
Source: EGAT (2010).
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PPA (SPPA) for power plant less than 30 MW and a standard tariff for small generators based on 
the avoided costs of EVN were implemented through Regulation No. 18/2008/QD-BCT of MOIT in 
2008 (MOIT 2008). 
In the National Energy Development Strategy of Vietnam for the period up to 2020 with outlook to 
2050, the government encourages the development and use of new and renewable energy sources 
and provides financial support for R&D and pilot demonstration (Prime Minister of Viet Nam 
2007a). The strategy specifies the objective to increase the share of renewable energy in total 
commercial primary energy from 3% in 2010 to 5% in 2020 and 11% in 2050. The National 
Master Plan for Power Development for the 2011–2020 period with a vision to 2030 requires that 
the percentage of electricity produced from renewable energy should increase from 3.5% of total 
electricity production in 2010 to 4.5% in 2020 and to 6.0% in 2030. In particular, the total wind 
power capacity should rise from the current negligible levels to around 1,000 MW by 2020 and 
6,200 MW by 2030. The proportions of electricity production from wind power would then be 
0.7% in 2020 and 2.4% in 2030. Biomass power, and power generation in sugar mills, should be 
500 MW by 2020 and 2,000 MW by 2030; the proportion of electricity production will increase 
from 0.6% in 2020 to 1.1% in 2030.
The World Bank is supporting a new Renewable Energy Development Project for Viet Nam with the 
aim to increase the supply of electricity to the national grid from renewable energy sources on a 
commercially, environmentally, and socially sustainable basis. The project appraisal document notes 
the obstacles to more effective development of renewable energy in Viet Nam that it is proposed 
to address, namely:
•	 High transaction costs. The approvals and contracting procedures for projects are 
similar regardless of the size. Approvals, including obtaining the necessary investment, 
construction, environment, and other licenses are also the same. These create a significant 
burden for relatively small projects and also, given the limited capacity of the project 
developers.
•	 Site allocation. There is no procedure for allocation (and reallocation) of small-scale 
renewable energy project sites, which means that the best sites are often allocated to those 
not best able to develop them and then tied up for years.
•	 Weak developers. Few developers have the capacity to prepare and implement small-scale 
renewable energy projects according to technical, economic, financial, environmental, or 
social best practices.
•	 Lack of access to long-term financing. Viet Nam’s commercial banks do not provide long-
term financing suited to the cash flow profiles of small-scale renewable energy projects, 
which are capital-intensive and receive returns over long periods.
•	 Poor capacity to address risks. The limited number of projects that are proposed for 
financing, and the limited financing available means that few sponsors or financiers have 
experience in appraising renewable energy projects. Coming from an environment of 
directed credit and reliance on sponsor size and financial strength, banks are particularly 
weak at assessing credit risks.
The beginning of a policy for biofuels was marked by the Prime Minister’s Decision No. 177/ 2007/
QD-TTg published in 2007 that gave approval to a scheme for the development of biofuels up to 
2015, with a vision to 2025 (Prime Minister of Viet Nam 2007b). The decision is very general; it 
sets targets of an annual output of 100,000 tons of E53 and 50,000 tons of B5 by 2010, which 
is equivalent to 0.4% of the projected total demand for oil and gasoline. The combined output 
3 E5 refers to the blending of ethanol with gasoline in percentage terms.
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of ethanol and vegetable oil by 2025 is envisaged to be 1.8 million tons equivalent to 5% of 
oil and gasoline demand. The decision also specifies government responsibilities in the area and 
provides financial support for research and capacity building. PetroVietnam, in conformity with 
this policy, invested heavily in ethanol production but delays in implementing a blending mandate, 
now expected for 2013, have meant that it must export the majority of its product. PetroVietnam 
has three ethanol projects in various stages of construction, each of 100 million liter/year capacity. 
There is an operating plant at Dong Xanh in central Quang Nam’s Dai Loc District, which started 
production in 2009; another is located in the southern province of Binh Phuoc and the third in the 
northern Phu Tho Province. Of the 300 million liter/year production, 85% will be exported until the 
blending mandate is introduced when exports are expected to fall to 20%–25%.
Summary Conclusions
In most countries, the commitment to renewable energy is modest. Thailand is something of an 
exception; there is a long history of promoting renewable energy, a substantial planning effort with 
stretch targets, and a series of interventions that partially support the intent. The effectiveness of 
the policy has been limited by several alterations of policy and withdrawal of incentives with little 
warning. This problem would be alleviated by a law on renewable energy that would be more 
difficult to reverse than administrative decrees. Table 16 summarizes the situation.
Table 16  Summary Conclusions for Renewable Energy
Country
Renewable Energy 
Law and Policy
“Stretch” 
Targets
Feed-in Tariff or  
Other Incentives Blending Mandates
Cambodia No law. The REAP 
was conceived as 
a supplement to 
electrification.
No. No. No.
Lao People’s 
Democratic 
Republic 
No law. There is a 
national strategy to 
2025.
Yes. 30% by 
2025.
Discussed but not in place. No.
Myanmar No law or policy. No. No. No.
People’s Republic 
of China (Guangxi 
and Yunnan)
Well-designed law and 
subsequent regulation.
Yes. Yes. For wind and solar. Aim is 10% biofuels mandate 
by 2020. Nine provinces 
require 10% ethanol blends 
(but not Guangxi or Yunnan)
Thailand No law. Detailed 
strategy.
Yes. 20% by 
2020.
Yes. A well-designed feed-in 
tariff differentiated by 
technology and scale. Plus 
other support. 
Voluntary for ethanol—
market resistance. Mandatory 
for biodiesel, but shortages 
of feedstock. Problems in 
implementation.
Viet Nam No law. The most 
recent strategy is for 
2020 with outlook to 
2050. 
Partially. 5% in 
2020. Very low 
considering the 
potential.
Yes, but tariffs are too low 
to be effective. 
There are production targets, 
but blending mandates have 
been delayed.
REAP = Renewable Electricity Action Plan.
Sources: Various country energy reports.
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Policy for Energy Efficiency
Cambodia
Given the low availability of energy, a main priority is to improve access rather than enhance 
efficiency, but clearly, the two objectives are linked and new access should be created in a manner 
that ensures efficiency. In 1994, the Government of Cambodia developed a policy and plan on energy 
conservation and efficient use of renewable energy sources and created the Energy Efficiency Office 
that has since been involved in a series of projects with the World Bank, Environment and Energy 
Management Agency (ADEME), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), United Nations–
Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (UN–ESMAP), Japan External Trade Organization 
(JETRO), and United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). The ESMAP funding 
from 1997 to 1999 was aimed at capacity building and some audits of garment factories; the JETRO 
support also focused on audits in industry, but the cumulative impact seems to have been limited. 
A new Global Environment Facility (GEF) project was agreed in 2012 to reduce greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions through improved energy efficiency in the industrial sector (GEF 2012). Industry 
in Cambodia uses more energy per unit of output than do other countries in the region and more 
than double that of the developed countries. UNIDO has estimated a potential for 50% savings of 
wood in brick kilns and there are similar savings in the processing of rice and rubber. The obstacles 
to energy efficiency identified by GEF are as follows:
•	 The inadequacy of existing policies, institutions, and regulatory framework to effectively 
promote and support energy efficiency improvements in the industry.
•	 The lack of information and/or knowledge and technical capacity for efficiency, best 
practices, and benchmarking among industry decision makers.
•	 The lack of management’s commitment to implement and promote efficiency, which means 
that efficiency is not a part of process internalization but is considered an optional area.
•	 The scale of operation of the majority of enterprises, which for the most part are small-
scale, family-run units.
•	 The continued use of obsolete equipment and technology.
•	 The lack of competent local suppliers of energy-efficient technologies and after-sales 
services.
•	 Financing and credit constraints faced by private enterprises.
The GEF project will address the technical issues through pilot projects and other means and will 
offer capacity building to government agencies with responsibilities in the area, not only to the 
Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy (MIME), but also to other departments such as the Ministry 
of Agriculture that covers rice and rubber processing, and to local banks.
Lao People’s Democratic Republic
The climate change strategy of the Lao PDR includes the intention to improve energy efficiency in 
industry during the production process. However, no evidence has been found as to the presence 
of implementation instruments such as (i) a published strategy on energy efficiency, (ii) an energy 
conservation law, and (iii) fiscal incentives or public information campaigns. Electricité du Laos 
(EDL) did implement a Demand-Side Management and Energy Efficiency Project as a part of the 
Rural Electrification Phase I Project of the World Bank. The project aimed to determine reasonable 
energy consumption levels for the major energy-consuming ministries and agencies and to address 
the issue of inefficient practices in public sector electricity consumption. It also involved the creation 
of a demand-side management (DSM) cell within EDL with the capacity to audit public sector 
buildings, obtain load profiles, and suggest options for improving efficiency (LaoDSM 2012). Based 
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on the implementation status and results report for the overall project, over 50 energy audits had 
been conducted by the end of 2011 and four pilot energy efficiency programs implemented on 
selected sites. There is, however, no mention of the DSM program in the annual report of EDL 
(EDL 2011). 
Myanmar
There seems to be no systematic policy for energy efficiency in Myanmar. Energy prices are low; 
there is no energy efficiency law or any specialized agency nor any concessionary funding or 
other instrument. There have been occasional programs to substitute for fuelwood, through the 
use of briquetted materials, solar cookers, and promotion of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) as a 
household fuel. 
People’s Republic of China (Guangxi and Yunnan)
The principal legislation is the law on Energy Conservation of the People’s Republic of China in 
1997, which was amended in 2004 and again in 2008. This law includes provisions for energy 
conservation management, rational energy utilization, technological innovation, legal liabilities, and 
some supplementary rules. The law also requires that the State Council and people’s governments 
in provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities should set up energy conservation funds 
(China.org 1997). The law is essentially a framework law that needs elaboration through subsequent 
secondary legislation to be effective.
The impact of the original law was perceived as insufficient and a stronger and more prescriptive law 
was promulgated in 2008 stating that the government “will implement a system of accountability 
for energy conservation targets and a system for energy evaluation whereby the fulfillment of energy 
conservation targets is taken as one part of the evaluation of local people’s governments and their 
responsible persons.” The document further states that “Energy Conservation is a basic policy of 
the PRC. The State implements an energy strategy of promoting conservation and development 
concurrently while giving top priority to conservation” (China.org 1997).
Even so, the results have been variable; enforcement across the country has been variable, generally 
stronger in large cities, and weaker in the periphery. Contradictory broader policies of consumer 
price subsidies have unintended effects of discouraging energy efficiency. The basis of the policy 
has been prescriptive regulation and there are few market-based instruments such as fiscal and 
financial incentives; this is a logical approach if prices are not cost-reflective. Several projects on 
innovative finance for energy efficiency have been implemented, but although there have been 
some successes they do not seem to have been replicated (UNEP–SEFI 2008). Sustained government 
support is needed to make highly prescriptive policies work effectively and that makes training, 
monitoring, reporting, and supervision essential.
A particular challenge in the PRC has been the control of energy use in buildings because of the 
enormous climatic variation across the country. To manage this problem, the country has been 
divided into six different climate zones and building codes developed for each zone, starting with 
the heating zones in the north (Zhou, McNeil, and Levine 2010). The Ministry of Housing and 
Urban–Rural Development creates the codes, but they are enforced by local officials, who often 
contract out the task to independent agencies. In the past, because of a lack of supervision, this 
has not worked well and enforcement has been weak, but recently, it has been much improved as 
penalties have been imposed, including revoking the licenses of inspectors, obliging developers to 
correct faults, and blacklisting developers who infringe regulations. Enforcement is still apparently 
uneven, being more stringent in the large cities, although random inspections are now made across 
the country (Evans et al. 2010).
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The PRC has made a significant effort to develop and enforce standards for appliances. Energy-
efficiency standards were originally required by the Energy Conservation Law of 1998; a major 
driver for their introduction was the dramatic growth in appliance ownership experienced as the 
country developed. A second influence was the emergence of the PRC as a large global producer 
of appliances and consumer electronics—it is obliged to meet high standards in export markets. 
The PRC has implemented minimum energy performance standards (MEPS) for over 30 appliances, 
voluntary energy efficiency labels for 40 products, and a mandatory energy information label that 
covers 19 products to date. There is apparently still room for improvement as many of the standards 
are below international best practice (Zhou 2011).
The 11th Five-Year Plan of the PRC (2006–2010), required government divisions to reduce energy 
intensity by 20% over the period; it seems that this was broadly achieved and most of the Ten 
Key Projects, the Top1,000 Programs, and the Small Plant Closure Program met their targets. The 
12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) aims (i) to cut carbon intensity by 17% by 2015, compared with 
2010 levels; (ii) to reduce energy consumption intensity by 16%, relative to gross domestic product 
(GDP); and (iii) to meet 11.4% of its primary energy requirements from nonfossil sources by 2015.
Japan and the PRC have recently signed an MOU creating a fund to promote energy saving and 
environment conservation through the collaboration of a group of Japanese and Chinese banks led 
by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). The group will provide equity funding to 
venture companies for projects related to energy saving and environment conservation in the PRC 
by leveraging collaboration among leading financial institutions in the PRC and Japan (JBIC 2011).
Thailand
Thailand introduced an energy efficiency law at an early stage, in 1992. This law has some aspects of 
a framework law, but includes also some detailed regulation. It establishes the Energy Conservation 
Promotion Fund (ENCON Fund) financed from a tax on fuels and lays down detailed rules for the 
operation of this fund. It also introduces the concept of designated facilities and defines somewhat 
onerous obligations and reporting requirements. The effects have been generally positive. The 
provisions for the promotion of energy-efficient equipment have underpinned the innovative labeling 
program led by the utility and the energy conservation fund, which has been broadly successful 
(Government of Thailand 1992). The ENCON Fund was allocated an initial capital of $60 million and 
annual revenues of comparable magnitude from a supplementary tax on all pe troleum products 
sold in the country. The fund was initially used in compulsory, voluntary, and complementary 
programs. The compulsory program addressed private factories and buildings and government 
buildings consuming more than 1 MW or a total consumption of more than 20 terajoule (TJ) per 
year of energy use. The owners and/or occupants of these buildings are required to keep regular 
records of their energy consumption, set targets and plans for conservation, audit their operations, 
and report to the Department of Energy Development and Promotion. The voluntary program 
provided finance to approved groups to invest in energy-conserving equipment, or to disseminate 
information. The complementary program created awareness and promoted energy conservation 
to the general public. About 60% of the expenditure went to the compulsory program and about 
20% each to the voluntary and complementary programs. 
An Energy Efficiency Revolving Fund was introduced after the 1997 financial crisis with initial 
capital from the ENCON Fund; money was lent to approved banks at a zero interest rate and then 
on-lent to customers for investment in energy-efficiency projects at a rate capped by government. 
The allocation from the ENCON Fund to the Energy Efficiency Revolving Fund must be repaid in 10 
years. The administration of the Energy Efficiency Revolving Fund was outsourced to the banks and 
this is perceived to have expedited disbursement. The energy efficiency law was revised in 2007 
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without major implication for the funding process (Government of Thailand 2007). An independent 
evaluation of the ENCON Fund prepared for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was 
broadly positive (APERC 2010); it found that the financing model was simple and straightforward 
and was attractive to the government because the main risk is the possibility of project proponents 
defaulting on loans and this risk is borne by the bank and the developer and is not covered by the 
government. It found that the loans had leveraged significant additional investment in the project 
from nongovernment sources. 
The Energy Conservation Program was revised in 2008 with the aim to reduce energy use by 10.8% 
by 2011; it also included a component to promote renewable energy. An Energy Service Company 
(ESCO) Fund was launched in October 2008 as a source of venture capital for ESCOs with an initial 
capital of about $15 million that came from the ENCON Fund. The ESCO Fund provides up to 50% 
of total equity; the identification and appraisal of projects have been outsourced to two-third 
parties organizations. 
There has also been a strong activity in labeling and in the implementation of the MEPS deriving 
from the original Energy Conservation Law. The Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) 
has been running a voluntary energy labeling program for refrigerators and air-conditioners since 
1994, but this is now to be supplemented by voluntary and mandatory MEPS and voluntary High 
Energy Performance Standard. Several institutions are involved, as follows:
•	 Energy Policy and Planning Office (EPPO)—responsible for promoting energy efficiency 
programs for appliances and equipment,
•	 Department of Alternative Energy Development and Efficiency—responsible for setting 
high-efficiency levels for energy-using equipment and for establishing MEPS,
•	 Thailand Industrial Standards Institute—responsible for energy performance test protocols 
and for publishing the MEPS, and
•	 EGAT—responsible for labeling and promotion of electrical appliances. 
The Department of Alternative Energy Development and Efficiency has signed an MOU with the 
Thailand Industrial Standards Institute in 2007 for six MEPS for refrigerators, air conditioners, 
fluorescent lamps, compact fluorescent lamps, 3-phase motors, and LPG stoves; while eight High 
Energy Performance Standard have been introduced (Vongsoasup 2011; APERC 2010).
In 2007, APEC leaders agreed to a common strategy to reduce energy intensity by 25% by 2030 
compared with the 2005 base year. Accordingly, Thailand has developed a 20-Year Energy Efficiency 
Development Plan (EEDP) for 2011–2030, which is intended to achieve that goal and to overcome 
the perception that progress had been limited until now by the absence of a long-term national 
plan, with clear targets and long-term work plans. The main sectors where the EEDP expects gains 
are industry and transport. The measures envisaged are similar to those in place, but with more 
rigorous enforcement and extended scope, including the promotion of energy-efficient vehicles 
through energy labeling, MEPS, and tax measures. Emphasis is placed on partnership with the 
private sector and a greater role for municipalities. Detailed work plans are included within the 
EEDP (MOE 2010).
Viet Nam
Energy efficiency was first addressed by various technical and financial assistance programs in the 
1990s, mainly the European Union (EU), Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
(SIDA), and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The World Bank has maintained since 
1997 a long-standing program of assistance focused particularly on demand-side management 
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in the electricity industry. The Vietnam Demand-Side Management and Energy Efficiency Project 
(DSM-EE Project) during 2003–2010 covered a variety of aspects including (i) the creation of a 
DSM Cell within the Electricity of Vietnam (EVN) to conduct load profiling and DSM programs, 
(ii) development and implementation of a pilot commercial energy-efficiency program and pilot 
market transformation programs with solar water heaters and air conditioners, and (iii) capacity 
building of the Ministry of Industry and Trade’s (MOIT) Energy Efficiency and Conservation Office. 
Preliminary results include the following (World Bank 2010):
•	 Successful transformation of the compact fluorescent lamp market from less than 1 million 
lamps in 2004 to more than 10 million lamps by 2007.
•	 Savings from EVN programs of 500 GWh per year and 91 MW of peak demand.
•	 Implementation of 100 commercial projects with expected savings of 34 GWh per year and 
training of 100 service providers.
During this period, the government also issued a Decree on Efficient Utilization of Energy and Energy 
Conservation (2003) and in 2006, the Prime Minister issued Decision 79/2006/QD-TTg ratifying 
the Vietnam National Energy Efficiency Program for the period 2005–2015, which was prepared 
by MOIT. The program was the first comprehensive plan to improve energy efficiency across the 
economy of Viet Nam; its objective was to save between 3% and 5% energy consumption by 
2010 and 5%–8% by 2015. It covered the legislative framework, education and dissemination of 
information, standards and labels, audits in industry, building management, and more efficient 
transport. A Law on Energy Efficiency and Conservation was approved by the National Assembly in 
2010; ADB provided technical assistance in the formulation of this law. 
The Prime Ministerial Decision authorizes the MOIT to issue guidelines for suppliers to label high-
efficiency electric appliances including electric motors, fans, air conditioners, fluorescent-tube 
lamps, and ballasts. Technical standards for equipment energy are to be developed by the Ministry 
of Science and Technology. Little seems to have been done in this respect. Mandatory standards 
and labeling programs are foreseen in the Law on Energy Conservation, but enforcement seems 
to be an obstacle. The APEC Peer Review was critical of this weakness and recommended a better 
integration of planning and implementation of the MEPS and labeling programs with clearer roles 
and responsibilities of involved agencies and deliverable targets (APERC 2009).
A GEF project approved in 2010 is intended to further promote industrial energy efficiency by 
strengthening the capacity of corporate entities, officials, and service providers (GEF 2010). It has 
three objectives, as follows:
•	 to help formulate Energy Efficiency Action Plans for key industrial sectors and implement 
pilot programs; 
•	 to provide technical assistance to energy service providers to improve auditing skills, evaluate 
possible funding mechanisms, and develop guidelines for energy performance contracting;
•	 to support the capacity building of the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Office under the 
General Directorate of Energy of the MOIT through implementation, and monitoring and 
evaluation of energy efficiency projects, programs, and policies (World Bank 2011d).
Summary Conclusions
Performance across the subregion is variable, in terms of existence of energy conservation laws, 
strategies and/or targets, ENCON Fund, and standards and labels. Thailand has engaged in energy 
efficiency since 1992 with a law, a fund, and voluntary standards. Although the program has met 
with some administrative problems, much has been accomplished and the new 20-year development 
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plan is helpful. Viet Nam is now initiating a comprehensive approach with a new law, reasonably 
demanding targets and some appropriate instruments. More could be done in both countries 
through more sharply defined responsibilities and in the case of Viet Nam, by more substantial 
funding. Enforcement appears to be a difficulty in both cases; regulations on audits, reporting, and 
standards require enforcement and this is administratively demanding. In Cambodia, the Lao PDR, 
and Myanmar, there is only minimal effort devoted to energy efficiency through isolated projects 
and time-limited programs. Table 17 presents the discussion.
Table 17  Summary Conclusions for Energy Efficiency Policy
Energy 
Conservation Law 
Strategy and 
Targets ENCON Fund Standards and Labels
Cambodia No. No, but GEF project 
now agreed will 
partially remedy this
No. No.
Lao People’s 
Democratic 
Republic 
No. No. No. No.
Myanmar No. No. No. No.
People’s Republic of 
China (Guangxi and 
Yunnan)
Yes, from 1997. 
Comprehensive and 
prescriptive.
Yes. Set out in 5-year 
plans.
Included in the original 
law.
Yes—many MEPS and 
labels.
Thailand Since 1992. Yes. Detailed strategy 
and 25% saving target.
ENCON Fund financed 
from a tax on fuels.
Voluntary labels since 
1994. Mandatory 
standards being 
implemented.
Viet Nam Law agreed in 2010. Yes. Objective is to 
save 8% by 2015.
No. Present in early 
drafts of the law, but 
removed.
Law provides for 
standards, but little has 
been done.
ENCON Fund = Energy Conservation Promotion Fund, GEF = Global Environment Facility, MEPS = Minimum Energy Performance Standard.
Sources: Various country energy reports.
Private Finance
Cambodia
A 1994 Law on Investment governs private sector investment and business activities in Cambodia; 
it provides for common conditions for foreign and local investors, except on the issue of land 
ownership (Government of Cambodia 1994). The law and its various sub-decrees set out incentives 
applicable to investors and establish a Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC) chaired 
by the Prime Minister, to oversee policy and strategy concerning foreign investments (CDC 2012).
Several large hydro projects have been undertaken on a build–operate–transfer (BOT) basis by 
Chinese companies with funding from the PRC. In 1999, a Chinese state-owned enterprise, China 
Electric Power Technology Import and Export Corporation, was contracted to rebuild the Kirirom 
I HPP that had fallen into disuse during the armed conflict under a 30-year BOT agreement with 
Electricité du Cambodge (EDC). The 193 MW Kamchay HPP on the Kamchay River in Bokor national 
park was completed by Sinohydro in 2011, with funding from the China Exim Bank; it has a 
40-year build–transfer (BT) concession, the power being sold to EDC. Kirirom III is an 18 MW project 
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operated by the China Electric Power Technology Import and Export Corporation. The Lower Stung 
Russei Chrum HPP that comprises the Upper Stung Russei Chrum and the Lower Stung Russei 
Chrum with total rated installed capacity of 338 MW is being constructed by the China Huadian 
Corporation; work began in 2011 and is expected to be finished in 2013. The Stung Tatay 246 MW 
HPP is being built by the China National Heavy Machinery Co. with a 42-year BOT and is expected to 
be finished in 2015; power will be sold to EDC at $0.0745 per kWh. Stung Atay HPP is 120 MW and 
is being built by Datang Corporation along with Cambodia Hydropower Development Company 
and Cambodia Power Grid Co. BOT finance has also been used to develop the coal resources 
of Cambodia. In December 2011, the Cambodia International Investment Group was awarded a 
33-year BOT contract for a 270 MW coal-fired plant near Preah Sihanouk. Many other hydro plants 
are under consideration, mainly by project developers for the PRC and Viet Nam.
Although private participation may be seen as successful in terms of the volume of forthcoming 
investments, some aspects of the process could be clarified. Criteria for identifying projects and 
selecting bidders are unclear, competitive bidding does not seem to be employed, and details of 
the contractual agreements between the Government of Cambodia and the project developers 
are not disclosed to the public. The basis for monitoring and evaluation is not evident; there 
are no published reports and there are allegations of negative environmental and social impacts 
(International Rivers 2008).
Private finance has been a vital part of the post-conflict provision of electricity distribution 
infrastructure in Cambodia. Small-scale providers were active even before the initial peace 
agreement and continued to establish new ventures even after the resumption of armed conflict 
in 1997. Entrepreneurs were willing to enter the market and mobilize resources rapidly to take 
advantage of suppressed demand and the lack of regulations and licensing requirements (PPIAF 
2004). These small power providers are envisaged to consolidate into local distribution companies 
as transmission is extended across the country.
Interestingly, Cambodia has also managed to involve the private sector in transmission system 
development, often a national monopoly. A 30-year BOT project for power transmission from 
Thailand to meet the demand in the Siem Reap area was partially funded by ADB’s private sector 
operations along with private equity and loans from the Export-Import Bank of Thailand and from 
the local banks of Cambodia.
Lao People’s Democratic Republic
There is significant participation of the private sector in rural electrification where grid access is 
not viable. In these remote areas, the government has promoted decentralized or off-grid delivery 
models through small, local private sector providers.
The Nam Theun 2 HPP is a build–own–operate–transfer (BOOT) project, financed by, among 
others, ADB and the World Bank, with a power purchase agreement (PPA) between the Nam 
Theun 2 Power Company (NTPC) and EGAT. Equity in NTPC is owned by Electricité de France (35%), 
Italian–Thai Development Public Company Limited of Thailand (15%), Electricity Generating Public 
Company Limited of Thailand (25%), and the Lao Holding State Enterprise (LHSE) (25%) (PPIAF 
2011). Since then, several independent power producers (IPPs) have proposed to export to Thailand 
including hydro plants at Nam Ngum 3, Nam Theun 1, and Nam Ngiep 1, and the Hongsa lignite 
thermal power plant. The Government of Cambodia gave the approval to a Cambodian and Thai 
joint venture firm to make a feasibility study for a 1,800 MW coal-fired power plant in Koh Kong 
Province in the southwest of Cambodia. The capacity of the LHSE to manage these arrangements 
has been strengthened by grants from the Public–Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) of 
the World Bank. Nam Ngum 2 Hydroelectric Power Project was constructed under a 25-year BOT 
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given to South East Asia Energy Limited that owns 75% of the Nam Ngum 2 Power Company, the 
remainder being held by EDL. 
Private finance from Viet Nam has been active in the Lao PDR, particularly the Song Da Corporation, 
which is the leading constructor of hydro plants in Viet Nam, and Viet–Lao Power Investment and 
Development Joint Stock Company in which Song Da Corporaton holds a controlling stake. In 
1998, the governments of Viet Nam and the Lao PDR signed a cooperation agreement on electric 
power development to support the implementation of the agreement. Subsequently, with the 
encouragement of the Government of Viet Nam, the Viet–Lao Power Investment and Development 
Joint Stock Company (VLPC) was established, initially to construct Xekaman 3 HPP in the Sekong 
Province of the Lao PDR for export to Viet Nam. Shareholders were EVN (10%), Song Da Corporation 
(60%), and other Vietnamese construction companies. Work on the Xekaman 3 HPP began in April 
2006 as a 30-year BOT. VLPC contributed 100% of the capital and the Government of the Lao 
PDR will buy back 15% upon completion. The plant has a capacity of 250 MW and is located on 
the main branch of Xekaman River—the main tributary of the Sekong River. The project should be 
completed in 2012.
VLPC is also building Xekaman 1 HPP; this plant is located downstream of the Xekaman River on two 
levels and has a total installed capacity of 322 MW. It is being built under a 30-year BOT in which 
VLPC contributes 75% and the government contributes 25%. Based on the project schedule, both 
Xekaman 1 and the lower Xekaman Sanxay HPP will be completed in 2013. Most of the outputs 
will be exported to Viet Nam, but 10% will be available for domestic consumption in the Lao PDR.
The third hydroelectric power plant (HPP) in which VLPC is currently engaged is the Dak E Meule 
112 MW plant on the Nam Emun River. It is implemented through a 30-year BOT in which VLPC has 
a 75% interest and the government with 25%. Construction has begun and should be completed 
in 2014. 
The Song Da Corporation has signed on its own account an MOU in 2008 for the Upper and Lower 
Se Sekong 3 with a combined output of 205 MW that is now under construction and is planned to 
be commissioned in 2015. Song Da Corporation has also signed MOUs for HPPs at Xebanghieng 
1 and 2. 
Although there has been success in developing public–private partnerships (PPPs) in specific cases, 
this has been essentially ad hoc. There is no clear and comprehensive framework of law and policy 
for a PPP that sets out responsibilities, protocols for project preparation, bidding and awards, or 
dispute resolution. 
Myanmar
The foreign investment law in Myanmar dates back from 1988. A new law has been prepared 
and was approved in November 2012. A draft has been circulated in the press that suggests 
foreigners will be allowed either to own companies (100% ownership) or set up a joint venture 
with the citizens or government departments. Foreign investors can also lease land from the state 
or from private citizens who have permission to use land, the law says. The initial lease would be 
for up to 30 years, depending on the type and size of foreign investment, and could be extended 
twice, for up to 15 years on each occasion. The new law also rescinds a requirement that products 
manufactured by foreign firms must be exclusively for export. Various forms of tax relief is made 
available and there is a somewhat opaque discussion of nationalization (Reuters 2012). There 
have also been press reports that the government is considering privatizing some state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), although with conditions on foreign investment in some strategic sectors, such 
as power and energy (Wall Street Journal 2012).
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Despite the absence of a robust legal and regulatory framework, there has been a very strong 
presence of private sector Chinese companies, backed by Chinese state funds to develop 
infrastructure in Myanmar, especially hydropower. The government already supplies power to 
the China Southern Power Grid Company (CSG) from the 600 MW Shweli HPP commissioned in 
November 2009, and from the Dapein HPP to Dehong in Yunnan. Companies from Thailand have 
also shown interest. 
It is estimated that some 45 companies from the PRC have been or are involved in approximately 
63 hydropower projects in Myanmar, including several related substation and transmission line 
projects (ERI 2008). The plants’ sizes range from small plants in the MW range that are intended 
for local use to very large plants intended for export to the PRC. The latter group includes the 
7,100 MW Tasang Dam on the Salween River proposed by Sinohydro Corporation and the Thai 
MDX group for the export of electricity to Thailand. A groundbreaking ceremony was held but the 
project has not apparently progressed further. Another very large plant is the Myitsone dam at a site 
in Kachin State at the head of the Irrawaddy River; this dam is part of the huge Confluence Region 
Hydropower Project, which includes seven dams with a total installed capacity of 16,500 MW 
(Burma Rivers Network 2012a). The suspension by the President of Myanmar of the Myitsone dam 
in September 2011 indicated some intention to reconsider the balance between the benefits of 
power sales and the economic and social costs, but there is also some contrary indication that 
the project may still proceed (DVB 2012). Greater transparency on the financing and sharing of 
benefits for these plants would be helpful to international financial institutions when positioning 
their assistance and support.
The cost of a new power plant in the PRC is somewhat higher than in Myanmar and there is a 
difference in the hydro regime that provides useful diversity of power generation. This is based 
on the results of a power system planning undertaken within the ADB TA-6440, and these factors 
may justify exports of up to 18,900 MW from Myanmar to the PRC by 2025, although specific 
sites were not identified (RTE International 2010a). The same study suggests that the export of 
2,100 MW to Thailand in the same year is likely.
People’s Republic of China (Guangxi and Yunnan)
There is a significant history of PPPs in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and many generating 
plants are nominally IPPs, but mainly the agents are corporatized subsidiaries of SOEs, rather than 
private investors. The legal and regulatory framework is rather unclear and there is a considerable 
bureaucratic burden. For example, under the Township Electrification Program, although contracts 
were awarded by competitive bidding, the main actors were government-affiliated institutions or 
semi-private entities such as spin-off companies from former government institutions. The private 
sector was poorly represented and there was no significant participation from foreign investors 
(IEA 2010a).
In principle, there is strong support to the PPP concept in the PRC because of the contribution 
that it can make to the massive infrastructure need, but there is no specific national-level PPP 
agency. Projects are treated in a similar manner as traditional state infrastructure projects—the 
State Council and its ministries approve PPP projects, and then oversee their management. This is 
likely to work better in large cities than in rural areas (EIU 2011). 
Power companies in the PRC have been active as private developers outside the country. In part, 
this may be because the strict tariff controls on electricity pricing make it hard for companies to 
balance their accounts. Acting as IPPs outside of the regulatory framework of the PRC allows them 
non-regulated revenues with higher profitability.
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Thailand
Although there is some considerable presence of private capital in infrastructure in Thailand, there 
is no specific legislation to govern project finance or PPPs; projects have typically been structured 
as long-term concessions between the relevant government authority and the investor supported 
by conventional project finance. Activities are governed under the Private Participation in State 
Undertaking (PPSU) Act B.E. 2535 of 1992. The act was mainly intended to prevent corruption 
in granting rights to private investors; consequently, there are missing aspects that are normally 
included in PPP legislation. Specifically, there is no mention of how projects are evaluated, what 
methods of procurement are acceptable, and how risks are shared between public and private 
actors. The institutional setup is fragmented, with regulatory power, initiative, and authority resting 
with several agencies (Jaggs and Lui 2010). A new PPP law is being prepared and, in the meantime, 
PPP guidelines were issued in November 2009. ADB assisted in the development of the new law 
and guidelines through a technical assistance that aimed not only to prepare an effective PPP policy 
and a legal and regulatory framework but also to come up with a Project Development Facility for 
designing bankable infrastructure projects and for supporting pilot PPP projects.
Within the energy sector, private participation is confined to generation. It comprises the IPP 
plants that sell under long-term PPAs to EGAT and the small power producer (SPP) plants that sell 
under standardized PPAs to EGAT and the very small power producer (VSPP) plants that sell to the 
Provincial Electricity Authority (PEA) and Metropolitan Electricity Authority (MEA). The estimated 
cost of these projects in 2010 was B363 billion (Jaggs and Lui 2010).
Viet Nam
A Law on Investment No. 59-2005-QH11, which combines previous laws on foreign investment 
in Viet Nam and laws pertaining to domestic investment, was adopted by Viet Nam’s National 
Assembly on November 2005 and came into effect in July 2006. The intention is to create a 
level playing field among investors, in line with international commitments and to improve the 
capacity of state management on investment (Government of Viet Nam 2005). A later Decree No. 
108/2006/ND-CP of 2006 deals specifically with BOT-type contracts, but was superseded by a PPP 
decree of the Prime Minister that became effective on 15 January 2011 and will continue to be 
implemented over the next 3–5 years. After this time, it is intended that they will be replaced by a 
Government Decree on PPP Investment in Viet Nam. Under the regulations, the Ministry of Planning 
and Investment (MPI) is tasked to coordinate and implement activities and has, thus, established a 
PPP Task Force to assist in this. The regulations stress competitiveness, fairness, transparency, and 
economic efficiency, as well as conformity with Viet Nam’s law and international practices, but do 
not contain implementing regulations for guidance (Pinsent Masons 2011).
Despite the apparently supportive legal framework, there has been relatively little activity, except 
in the energy sector, and no recent development. The Mekong Energy Company Ltd owns and 
operates the Phu My 2.2 715 MW combined-cycle power plant in the Ba Ria Vung Tau Province, 80 
kilometers (km) southeast of Ho Chi Minh City. The equity is distributed among EDF International 
(56%), Sumitomo (28%), and TEPCO (16%). The BOT contract is with MOIT, the PPA is with 
the Electricity of Vietnam (EVN), and gas is supplied by Petroleum Viet Nam under a gas supply 
agreement. The project was Viet Nam’s first private power project awarded on the basis of an 
international competitive bidding process; it was funded 25% through equity and 75% through 
loans from ADB, JBIC, the World Bank, and commercial banks. A similar arrangement was made for 
the Phu My 3 BOT Power Co. Ltd., which owns and operates the 716.8 MW gas-fired combined-
cycle power plant at Phu My 3 under a 20-year, take-or-pay basis PPA. The company is jointly held 
by BP Holdings B.V., SembCorp Utilities Pte. Ltd., and the consortium of Kyuden International 
Corporation and Nissho Iwai Corporation. The plant became operational in 2004. 
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Following the plants at Phu My, there was no further IPP project in Viet Nam until AES Corporation 
achieved financial closure on the Mong Duong 2 coal-fired plant in Quang Ninh Province toward 
the end of 2011. AES Corporation owns 51% of the equity in the BOT contract; PSC Energy Global 
Co Ltd, a wholly owned subsidiary of POSCO Power Corp, has a 30% stake; and Stable Investment 
Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of China Investment Corporation, has the remaining 
19%. The PPA is for 25 years and is back-to-back with a 25-year coal purchase agreement from 
Vinacomin. Finance from the project came from a broad syndicate of commercial banks and from 
the Government of the Republic of Korea’s export credit agencies.
The relative lack of activity since the first plants at Phu My may be due to low tariffs and unattractive 
PPAs or to a lack of provision for risk-allocation, weak mechanisms for arbitrating disputes, and 
an underdeveloped capital market. The most recent power development plan recognizes the huge 
capital requirements (estimated to be a total of $123.8 billion) for the power sector in the next 2 
decades, and sets out various policies to attract foreign investment, including increasing tariffs to 
a level that will ensure reasonable returns for the investors. The ADB Country Operations Business 
Plan for Viet Nam, 2012–2014 notes the need to accelerate efforts to help mobilize private sector 
financing for infrastructure projects, including guarantee operations and PPPs, and a technical 
assistance for a PPP Support Facility. 
Summary Conclusions
There is a considerable participation of private finance, but often, it is administered in an ad hoc 
manner and in some countries, with little transparency. In all countries, the legal, regulatory, and 
institutional framework for PPP needs strengthening; in several countries, it would need to be 
developed substantially, taking a cue from lessons of best practices in other parts of the world. 
Stronger incentives and policies for renewable energy would help support private participation in 
grid-connected renewables. The successful involvement of private finance in the distribution and 
retail of electricity in the early stages of rural electrification is relevant to Myanmar. There is little 
private financing for transmission; this can only come when there are clear, transparent, and no 
discriminatory user-system-charges. Table 18 summarizes the private participation found within the 
Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS).
Regional Supply–Demand Prospective
No recent forecast of the energy supply–demand balance for the GMS countries as a group is 
available. The long-term outlook for the supply and demand for energy in the Association of 
Southeast Asian Natons (ASEAN) to 2030 has been studied by the ASEAN Center for Energy with 
the assistance of the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan (IEEJ) and expert teams from each of 
the member countries (IEEJ 2011). Unfortunately, it does not include comparable forecasts for 
Yunnan and Guangxi. The outlook considered two scenarios: the reference scenario took the gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth targets of the 10 member states as an exogenous input; the 
alternative policy scenario is intended to analyze the impact of the energy-saving goals and action 
plans. The demand projections were made using an econometric model fitted to historic data 
from each country; the supply estimates were made using an engineering model, namely the LEAP 
model, developed by the Stockholm Environment Institute. Energy prices were derived from the oil 
price assumption in the International Energy Outlook 2010 of the US Department of Energy. 
The predicted energy supply profiles for the GMS countries are shown in Table 19; expectations 
are extremely variable across the region. Myanmar indicates an intention to depend significantly 
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on hydro; it is not clear if this is practical and a more effective use of the resource than to spread 
it more widely, but this will require an appropriate infrastructure for connectivity. Coal is expected 
to be an important source of supply for Thailand and Viet Nam and it will be used mainly in 
power generation.
Table 18 Summary Conclusions for Private Finance
Large-Scale Generation Small-Scale 
Generation
Transmission Distribution  
and Retail
Cambodia Several plants have long-
term PPAs until now, 
for national use. Interest 
in export projects from 
Vietnamese developers.
Only within context 
of local private sector 
providers.
Innovative ADB- 
financed BOT for a 
transmission line to 
Thailand.
Many small-scale 
operations in towns and 
countryside. Important 
contributor to post-
conflict reconstruction.
Lao People’s 
Democratic 
Republic 
Several IPPs often with IFI 
support, mainly for export 
markets.
Only within context 
of local private sector 
providers.
None. Off-grid delivery models 
through small, local 
private sector providers.
People’s 
Republic 
of China 
(Guangxi and 
Yunnan)
Nominally, but generally as 
private arms of SOEs.
The possibility has 
existed for off-grid, but 
was not much taken up.
None. None.
Myanmar Many plants for local use 
and export to the PRC.
None known. Only possibly as a part 
of export projects.
None known.
Thailand Several IPPs have been built 
and are operating.
Many SPPs and VSPPs 
within well-defined legal 
context.
None. Minor involvement 
through cost contribution 
to rural electrification.
Viet Nam Early interest in IPPs built 
under BOT contracts, 
little recent activity. Strong 
political motivation; 
regulatory and commercial 
context is weak.
Little activity. No 
adequate incentives.
None. Important part of rural 
electrification. Local 
communes selling often 
at high prices; now 
regulated.
ADB = Asian Development Bank, BOT = build–operate–transfer, PRC = People’s Republic of China, IFI = international financing institution, 
IPP = independent power producers, PPA = power purchase agreements, SOEs = state-owned enterprises, SPP = small power producers, 
VSPP = very small power producers.
Sources: Various country energy reports. 
Table 19 Primary Energy Consumption in 2030 by Country (base case)
Coal
Oil and Oil 
Products
Natural 
Gas Nuclear Hydro Others Total
Cambodia 2.6 4.4 – – 2.0 4.2 13.2
Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic 3.3 2.5 – – 1.9 1.0 8.7
Myanmar 0.7 9.7 9.4 – 13.4 2.0 35.2
Thailand 41.8 96.7 36.3 11.4 0.3 61.3 247.7
Viet Nam 103.2 66.6 16.1 12.4 6.4 21.1 225.8
Total 151.6 179.9 61.8 23.8 24.0 89.6 530.6
– = no data.
Source: IEEJ (2011).
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The Greater Mekong Subregion Regional Power Trade
The Regional Power Trade Coordination Committee
Several early studies of power systems interconnection in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) 
were made by ADB in 1995, which led to the formation of the subregional Electric Power Forum, 
the Mekong River Commission in 1996, and the World Bank Power Trade Strategy Study in 1999 
that established the Experts Group on Power Interconnection and Trade (EGP). ADB funded 
an Indicative Master Plan on Power Interconnection in the GMS countries that demonstrated 
considerable benefits from integration and considered, among other options, a 500 kilovolt (kV) 
supergrid linking the power systems of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Thailand, 
and Viet Nam (Norconsult 2002). 
The recommendations in the master plan included a 
i. 230 kilovolt (kV) line between Phnom Penh in Cambodia and Chau Doc in Viet Nam in 2004,
ii. 115 kV line between Thailand and western Cambodia in 2004,
iii. 500 kV line between Roi Et in Thailand and Ha Tinh in Viet Nam via the Lao PDR in 2009,
iv. 500 kV line between Savannakhet in the Lao PDR and Pleiku in Viet Nam in 2010,
v. 230 kV line between Nam Mo in the Lao PDR and Ban Mai in Viet Nam in 2009;
vi. 230 or 500 kV line between Na Bong in the Lao PDR and Udon Thai in Thailand in 2008,
vii. 500 kV line between Tasang in Myanmar and Mae Moh in Thailand in 2012,
viii. 500 kV line between Jinghong of Yunnan Province of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and 
Tha Wung in Thailand in 2013,
ix. 230 or 500 kV line between Malutang in Yunnan Province in the PRC and Soc Son in Viet Nam 
in 2019, and 
x. 230 kV line between Sambor in Cambodia and Tan Dinh in Viet Nam in 2019. 
The recommendations of this study were endorsed by the EGP in 2002. 
An important institutional step forward was taken in November 2002 when an intergovernmental 
agreement (IGA) on Regional Power Trade in the GMS was signed on the occasion of the First GMS 
Summit. The IGA confirmed the commitment of the GMS countries to advance power trade and 
harmonize their power systems’ development based on the principles of cooperation, gradualism, 
and environmental sustainability. The IGA established a Regional Power Trade Coordination 
Committee (RPTCC) with the responsibility to specify the rules that should govern regional power 
trade. At the request of the GMS countries, ADB provided technical assistance (RETA 6100) to 
prepare a regional power trade operating agreement (PTOA) in the GMS; the work was monitored 
by the RPTCC. A final report on the design of the PTOA was submitted in October 2004 and based on 
this proposal, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on the guidelines for the implementation 
of the first stage of the regional PTOA was signed on 5 July 2005 by the Ministers of Energy of the 
six GMS countries. The RPTCC has since met from one to two times a year and most recently in 
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March 2012. Responsibility for organizing venues and meetings rotates among the member states 
and ADB provides the secretariat.
The Regional Power Trade Operating Agreement
The proposal to develop power trade in the GMS is anchored on the principle that integration 
should proceed in four well-defined stages, as follows: 
Stage 1:  Bilateral cross-border connections through power purchase agreements (PPAs); 
Stage 2:  Grid-to-grid power trading between any pair of GMS countries, eventually using 
transmission facilities of a third regional country; 
Stage 3:  Development of transmission links dedicated to cross-border trading; and 
Stage 4:  Most of the GMS countries have moved to multiple sellers–buyers regulatory frameworks, 
so a wholly competitive regional market can be implemented.
The MOU sets out guidelines for the implementation of the first stage of the Regional Power Trade 
Operating Agreement, i.e., when only country-to-country power transactions are possible and before 
a regional transmission network is established, to enable power trading between any pair of member 
countries. During this period, the existing cross-border transmission lines are mostly associated with 
PPAs by which a power plant located in any one country (normally an independent power producer 
[IPP], but not necessarily) sells power to a utility in a neighboring country. However, this is a very 
limited concept of power trade because it is exclusively in one direction. A broader concept of 
trade is envisaged in Stage 1, where exchanges of power between utilities are achieved using the 
excess capacity of existing cross-border transmission lines over and above the transmission capacity 
required for power transfers associated with PPAs. MOU–1 also established two new institutions to 
support the work of the RPTCC—the Focal Group, which will coordinate implementation activities in 
each GMS country; and the Planning Working Group, which will undertake operational and system 
planning to prepare a regional interconnection plan, participate in developing regional performance 
standards, and create a regional database. 
Preparing the Greater Mekong Subregion Power Interconnection Project, Phase I
Following a request from the EGP, ADB provided technical assistance through RETA 6147 for a 
study of 500 kV transmission line from the Lao PDR to Viet Nam that, together with the Nam Theun 
2 transmission line between Thailand and the Lao PDR, would interconnect the grids of Thailand 
and Viet Nam. The study, which was completed in 2005, showed that by interconnecting both 
systems with a capacity of 1,000 megawatts (MW), savings of $190 million per year in investments 
and fuel could be achieved by taking advantage of the different seasonal availability of hydropower. 
The original concept envisaged that excess capacity in the double-circuit 500 kV line from Nam 
Theun 2 to Roi Et could be used to create the Lao PDR–Thai section of the connection and that 
a new line would be built from Ha Tinh in Viet Nam to join the Thai–Lao PDR section. The Nam 
Theun 2 Power Company (NTPC) that owned the section of the transmission line in the Lao PDR 
from the dam to the Mekong crossing point refused to allow the line to be used in this manner. The 
project was, therefore, reconsidered and a more southerly line was investigated toward Ban Soc and 
Pleiku, picking up power also from hydro plants to be built in southern Lao PDR. The completion 
report found that the study was coherent with the development strategy of the Lao PDR and Viet 
Nam, but not with Thailand. It appears that, at least, part of the unease of Thailand was that the 
Vietnamese system was not sufficiently stable and would impose costs on the Electricity Generating 
Authority of Thailand (EGAT) system. ADB expressed concern that the line would not be financially 
viable until there was a clearer schedule of construction for the hydropower plants. The section of 
line from Ban Soc to Pleiku is still in the ADB pipeline.
48
Assessment of the Greater Mekong Subregion Energy Sector Development
Road Map for Implementing a Greater Mekong Subregion Cross-Border  
Power Trading
Recognizing that the MOU-1 does not specify a schedule of dates with which activities should 
comply and against which progress toward achieving objectives of the IGA could be monitored, 
ADB provided technical assistance through RETA 6304, funded by the Agence Française de 
Développement. The assistance comprised four components addressing (i) an Action Plan, 
(ii) institutional development, (iii) capacity building, and (iv) a database for information exchange 
and communication. The action plan developed within the project formed the basis for an MOU on 
the Road Map for Implementing the GMS Cross-Border Trading, which was prepared and signed 
in March 2008 by the GMS Ministers of Energy. The road map, which is attached to the MOU, 
covers the period (2008–2012) required to implement Stage 1 of the regional power trading and 
to prepare for Stage 2. In Stage 2, trading is possible between any pair of GMS countries, using 
transmission facilities of a third regional country. The available cross-border transmission capacity 
is still envisaged to be based on surplus capacity of lines linked to PPAs. The shift from Stage 1 
to Stage 2 depends on enough cross-border transmission capacity to allow power transactions 
among all (or most) of the GMS countries. Trade at this stage is confined to national utilities 
(presumably envisaged as single buyers). The MOU strengthened the high-level commitment 
from the GMS governments and prescribed timelines for establishing the regional power trade. 
How the actual performance compares to the requirements of the road map is discussed in a 
later section.
The Updated Master Plan
One component of the road map was to update the regional indicative master plan every 2 or 3 
years. Under RETA 6440, with funding from the Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency (SIDA), ADB arranged a consulting study to provide an indicative master plan for the GMS 
region for the period 2009–2025, focusing particularly on the cross-border connections that are 
needed (RTE International 2010b). The schedule of generating plants is taken from national plans, 
which to some extent prejudices the outcome of the analysis as transmission lines are inevitably built 
largely to serve these exogenous construction schedules. In the base case, the analysis concludes 
that new interconnections should be developed between or among the following:
•	 the PRC and Myanmar, and Thailand and Myanmar;
•	 Thailand, Lao PDR North, and Viet Nam North;
•	 Lao PDR South and Viet Nam Center; and
•	 to a lesser extent, Cambodia and Viet Nam South. 
The Viet Nam Center to South transmission line is to be upgraded in 2015 from 2,000 MW to 
5,000 MW. 
The resulting trade in electricity in 2020 and 2025 is summarized in Table 20. The overall totals 
are 98,800 gigawatt-hour (GWh) and 163,700 GWh, respectively, which may be compared to 
the 8,475 GWh recorded in 2009. The economic resilience of the different interconnections 
varies rather widely depending on the difference in cost between the importing and exporting 
countries. Exports to the PRC are the most vulnerable because the study calculates only a $13 per 
megawatt-hour (MWh) differential between Myanmar and the PRC, and a $5/MWh differential 
with the Lao PDR. Myanmar to Thailand has the highest differential at around $74/MWh and the 
other connections are from $20–$60 per MWh.
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Table 20 Possible Electricity Trade in 2020 and 2025 (GWh)
Exporter
2020 Cambodia
Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic Myanmar Total
PRC NA NA 45,600 45,600
Thailand NA 24,900 9,800 34,700
Viet Nam 1,800 16,700 NA 18,500
TOTAL 1,800 41,600 55,400 98,800
2025
PRC NA NA 100,000 100,000
Thailand NA 30,200 13,500 43,700
Viet Nam 1,800 18,200 NA 20,000
TOTAL 1,800 48,400 113,500 163,700
PRC = People’s Republic of China, GWh = gigawatt-hour, NA = not applicable.
Source: RTE International (2010b).
Regional Power Coordination Center
A problem in sustaining progress has been the absence of a permanent secretariat to follow up and 
monitor activities. To address this issue, RETA 6440 included a component to develop the concept 
of a Regional Power Coordination Center (RPCC). This has been very actively debated during the 
successive meetings of the RPTCC. The RPCC will take over the work of the RPTCC; the executive 
director will be appointed on rotation basis for a 3-year term. An intergovernmental MOU to 
establish the center is needed. The draft of the MOU discussed at the RPTCC-12 meeting in Vientiane 
on 17–18 May 2012 is ambitious. It affirms a conviction that there is a need to synchronize power 
system operation and to harmonize the regulatory framework governing the electricity sector 
within the GMS. It establishes the RPCC with the principal objective to promote the synchronized 
operation of the national power system operations toward a unified, fair, and transparent regional 
electricity market with the ultimate goal of providing the GMS member states with stable and 
reliable electricity supply at the most economic costs. The RPCC’s functions would include the 
duty to monitor national transmission sytem operators (TSOs), utilities, and other relevant national 
authorities to ensure adherence to common rules across the technical and commercial spectrums, 
and to harmonize planning and operation of the interconnected GMS power systems. RPCC would 
be financed by contributions from member states and from donors where appropriate. The MOU 
was signed by four countries (Cambodia, PRC, Lao, and Viet Nam) at the 18th GMS Ministerial 
Meeting in the PRC in December 2012.
In parallel with the elaboration of the draft intergovernmental MOU, two working groups of the 
RPTCC will be established to start work on regulatory and normative issues. The working group on 
regulatory issues will ensure compatibility in the technical operations of national power systems and 
the functioning of new financial mechanisms at the regional level. The working group on normative 
issues will establish performance standards and grid codes and implement common standards for 
operational security, reliability, and quality of supply of the GMS interconnected system; encourage 
an integrated planning of power system expansion; and ensure nondiscriminatory access to the 
interconnected system for users. The creation of the two working groups is an interim measure 
prior to the establishment of the RPCC. The terms of reference for these groups have not yet been 
fully agreed.
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Ensuring Sustainability of the Greater Mekong Subregion Regional  
Power Development
Integration of the power grids of the GMS countries must be done in a way that is consistent with 
wider strategic issues including (i) environmental, climate change, and social impacts; (ii) energy 
security and diversification of supply; and (iii) energy efficiency and demand-side management 
(DSM). RETA 7764 will address these issues as it contains a strong component of strategic 
environmental assessment (SEA) that continues the work of the GMS Environment Operations 
Center (EOC) in Bangkok and the Mekong River Commission (MRC). In particular, it builds upon 
the Initiative on Sustainable Hydropower of the MRC, including the SEA that was prepared in 
conjunction with the proposals for mainstream dams in the Lower Mekong Basin.
Assessment
The path to a regional power market is marked by retreat from ambition, partial success through 
gradualism, and significant structural obstacles that still need to be dealt with. The original concept 
of a fully synchronized and integrated power market as set out in the original master plan failed to 
advance through the planned interconnection among Thailand, the Lao PDR, and Viet Nam. Since 
then the perseverance of ADB has gradually moved the political process forward to the point that 
the new draft intergovernmental MOU could be signed in order to begin to put the wider concept 
back on track.
Severe structural problems still exist at regional and national levels. The IPPs that have been created 
or are in the process of creation on some of the most favorable hydro sites will lock up generation 
in long-term PPAs for many years to come. The transmission lines that have been built or are under 
construction are predicated on an export-oriented concept of trade and may not be the optimal 
configuration for a less constrained market. There are also obstacles caused by market structures 
that are little adapted to international trade. It is hard to see how the intergovernmental MOU can 
be implemented without a degree of reform in national markets. Thailand is a key market as it is 
large, central, and an important buyer, now and in the future, of power from the Lao PDR; it came 
very close to reforming the power sector, but chose eventually not to continue. It may be helpful to 
explore, within the PRC, the underlying reasons why unbundling has not proceeded and to identify 
the minimum requirements for national markets to operate the MOU. Greater transparency in 
some countries regarding national plans and tendering procedures is also needed. The Lao PDR is 
important in this context because of its “battery” role; the capacity in the Lao PDR to manage the 
process for awarding concessions appears to be limited and may benefit from technical assistance 
under the new GMS framework.
The ASEAN Power Grid
Although it extends beyond the GMS and does not include the provinces of the PRC, the reflections 
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on the most desirable configuration of 
the ASEAN Power Grid (APG) are interesting and relevant. The development of the APG is the 
responsibility of the Heads of ASEAN Power Utilities and Authorities (HAPUA). The APG was 
endorsed by heads of state in their declaration on an ASEAN Vision 2020 published in 1997 and 
has been a prominent aspect of subsequent ASEAN Programs of Action for Energy Cooperation 
(APAEC 2003, 2009). HAPUA completed a first ASEAN Interconnection Master Plan Study (AIMS) in 
2003 (HAPUA 2003). The master plan was updated in 2010 (ASEAN 2011); the analysis found that 
many interconnection projects would be required, some of which would be for import and some 
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for energy exchange. The necessary interconnections within the GMS over and above those already 
existing are shown in Table 21.
Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline
The natural gas business has not been directly addressed by the GMS as historically, regional 
cooperation in this area has been through ASEAN—through the ASEAN Council on Petroleum 
(ASCOPE). There are good reasons for this as the largest gas reserves are in the non-GMS countries 
of South East Asia. A brief account of cooperation is given here, because there may be aspects in 
the future that apply particularly to the GMS.
The vision of the Trans-ASEAN gas pipeline (TAGP) was proposed by the ASEAN–EU Energy 
Management Training and Research Centre (AEEMTRC) in the late 1980s and an outline master 
plan was developed under European Union (EU) funding. The basic idea was to link major load 
centers and sources of natural gas through a gas pipeline from Thailand along Peninsular Malaysia, 
Sumatra, and Java, with a branch to the large fields in Sarawak, Brunei Darussalam, Sabah, and 
East Kalimantan. The concept was adopted by the 17th ASEAN Ministers of Energy Meeting in 
Bangkok in 1999 and entrusted to ASCOPE for further elaboration and development. A task force 
was formed, led by Petronas, to develop and maintain the master plan. An MOU on the project was 
signed by the ASEAN Ministers of Energy in 2002 (ASEAN 2002). 
Eleven bilateral connections have since been established with a total of 3,020 kilometers (km) of 
pipeline connections, and bilateral agreements have been signed between Petronas and Pertamina, 
between Singapore and Malaysia, between Thailand and Malaysia, and between Singapore and 
Indonesia. ASCOPE has also been active in preparing a regulatory framework to manage the 
TAGP. The ASEAN Gas Consultative Council was formed in July 2003 with representatives from 
government and national oil companies to address cross-border issues in gas market integration 
and to facilitate the implementation of the TAGP project. The ASCOPE Gas Center was created in 
Malaysia as a resource for technical and commercial information and capacity building. Model 
agreements for gas sale and purchase and for gas transport have been formulated. Future plans 
include the following:
•	 Form model ASEAN Joint Venture (JV) Gas Pipeline Company (2013).
•	 Adopt common technical standards for construction, operation, and maintenance of 
ASEAN gas pipeline projects (2013).
•	 Adopt a business model for ASEAN gas pipeline ownership and operation (2014).
Table 21  Selected Interconnection Projects, AIMS II
Systems Capacity (MW) Year Comment
Cambodia–Thailand 300 2015 GMS, EEa 
Lao PDR–Thailand 600 2015 GMS, EEa 
Myanmar–Thailand 3,829 2016–2025 GMS
Cambodia–Thailand 100 2017 GMS
Cambodia–Viet Nam 222 2017 GMS
Lao PDR–Thailand 3,521 2017–2023 GMS
a EE indicates that the line is for exchange of energy. 
AIMS II =ASEAN Interconnection Master Plan Study II, GMS = Greater Mekong Subregion, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
MW = megawatt.
Source: ASEAN (2011). 
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•	 Develop and implement a regional safety and security plan for TAGP pipelines and facilities 
(2014).
•	 Optimize Trans-ASEAN gas pipelines (2015).
The business of gas transport will take on a new importance for the GMS as power systems move 
toward natural gas for generation. Given that the huge reserves of gas around the island of Borneo 
are largely preempted and that national reserves within the GMS countries will not support large-
scale expansion, there is quite likely to be a substantial increase in imports of liquefied natural gas 
(LNG). The price of LNG will probably remain at a premium to that of coal, adjusted for efficiency 
because of its good environmental properties. If the power business in the GMS does turn in a 
substantial way to LNG then the TAGP will take on a new significance. By means of the TAGP, 
it may be possible to exploit economies of scale in regasification by sharing output through the 
pipeline. The TAGP will enhance security of supply because in the event of a supply interruption 
at one regasification terminal, supplies may be moved through the pipeline to another; it will 
also allow consuming countries to share storage in depleted gas reservoirs. These new functions 
will have implications for the physical design and control of the pipeline as it will need to provide 
bidirectional transmission. A joint reflection on the optimization of power generation and gas 
importation and the future role of the TAGP might be justified.
Assessment of Connectivity
Regional Power Trade
Most of the cross-border connections, especially those at 500 kV, do not provide true connectivity. 
They simply connect power stations on a foreign territory to the importing grid. Essentially, the grid 
of the importing country is extended onto foreign soil and this is true even if the power line is owned 
by the host country of the power station. The EGAT power system expansion plan actually shows 
the hydropower plants and transmission lines in the Lao PDR as a part of the EGAT system (EGAT 
2010). The power lines concerned do not even allow trade in the very restricted sense allowed in 
Stage 1 of the GMS regional market, which is to allow exchanges of power between utilities using 
the excess capacity of existing cross-border transmission lines over and above the transmission 
capacity required for power transfers associated with PPAs. In the study of an interconnection 
between Thailand and Viet Nam, the Nam Theun 2 Power Company (NTPC) refused access to their 
line from the dam to the Mekong crossing point. It would be possible, in principle, to remove this 
obstacle by legislative reform in the Lao PDR, which obliged third-party access.
The only true cross-border connectivity in the region is where the importing grids are synchronized 
to the exporting grid and exchanges are possible if that is appropriate. This includes the PRC and 
Northern Viet Nam, Cambodia and Viet Nam, Cambodia and Thailand, Thailand to the Lao PDR, 
and the interconnector from Thailand to Malaysia. 
The TransASEAN Gas Pipeline
The TAGP as originally conceived by AEEMTRC in the late 1980s was intended as an alternative to 
the export of natural gas out of the region as LNG. The original logic was that the pipeline would 
shift gas from the production areas, particularly around the island of Borneo, to the potential loads 
in the large cities and industrial areas of ASEAN in the event the commercial logic of LNG was 
irresistible and the great majority of gas that is exported now goes outside the region. The TAGP 
became a more modest venture—essentially a collection of independent pipeline and unconnected 
projects that are roughly aligned geographically. ASCOPE has done good work in establishing 
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construction and operating norms for pipelines across the region, but it is difficult to say that the 
TAGP provides true connectivity. Gas cannot be moved freely around the system and is doubtful 
whether any of the constituent pipelines have the capacity for bidirectional flow.
The concept of the TAGP may become more important and its nature could be changed as 
imported natural gas becomes a main feature of regional energy supply. Single-source dependency 
of individual countries incurs risks that may be partially alleviated by a pipeline system that enables 
gas to be moved around the region as needed. It may also be that the TAGP would permit LNG 
regasification terminals to be shared among two countries with the division of gas being achieved 
through the pipeline. The possible exploitation of coal-bed methane and similar tight sources of 
natural gas could be facilitated by the pipeline infrastructure with appropriate modifications. This 
will most obviously be an option for the coal-bed methane in Sumatra, but parts of Kalimantan 
may also be relevant. The willingness of countries outside the region to pay high prices for gas 
and the financial strength of the counterparties were factors in preferring LNG trade to pipeline 
transport and these may no longer be determinant, although the sunk costs of the liquefaction 
plants will clearly be influential. Lastly, in a region that is dependent on imports, gas storage will 
become necessary. This might be achieved in depleted or semi-depleted fields in proximity to the 
TAGP infrastructure. The TAGP then can serve to make this storage available over a wide area. On 
a longer timescale, the route, if not the infrastructure of the TAGP, could be a basis for a carbon 
dioxide pipeline system—taking carbon dioxide from coal-fired power stations for final disposal in 
depleted gas reservoirs that originally supplied the TAGP.
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The Vientiane Plan of Action for Greater Mekong Subregion 
Development, 2008–2012
Background
The third summit of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) leaders held in Vientiane on 30–31 March 
2008 addressed the need to enhance competitiveness through greater connectivity, noting that
Enhancing economic competitiveness and accelerating our economic and 
social development process through the greater use of improved and expanded 
connectivity will be the key focus of our cooperation in the coming years. Our 
central location in East Asia and the contiguity of our borders position our subregion 
to not only benefit substantially from regional economic integration, but also to 
spearhead the process. Enhancing our competitiveness is essential to fulfilling our 
subregion’s potential to be a hub of development in this part of the world.
The summit affirmed the intent to translate achievements in physical connectivity into full and 
sustainable connectivity to increase trade, investment, and tourism. To this end, it endorsed 
the Vientiane Plan of Action for GMS Development for 2008–2012, covering important areas 
of cooperation including energy. The main goal of the plan in energy was to help establish a 
sustainable and efficient GMS energy supply market. The plan comprised 73 activities in energy and 
was constructed around four main strategic thrusts, as follows:
•	 Broadening GMS energy cooperation—Enhanced efficiency and security, and sustainable 
development of energy resources.
•	 Regional power trade development—Building capacity for power trade operation, 
coordination, and grid interconnection.
•	 Regional power trade development—Implementing key GMS interconnection projects for 
Stage 1 power trading.
•	 Regional power trade development—Developing generation projects for power exports 
under Stage 1.
The Vientiane Plan of Action (VPOA) expires at the end of 2012 and will be replaced by a new 
Regional Investment Framework (RIF) and pipeline under the new GMS Strategic Framework. This 
note attempts to assess the performance of the plan as a guide to future work.
Broadening the Greater Mekong Subregion Energy Cooperation
Table 22 lists the activities that were included within the VPOA, along with a note of the status and 
remarks concerning implementation and follow up. It appears from Table 22 that only two activities 
can be said to have been completed. Developing the GMS Energy Strategy was successfully delivered 
under a technical assistance from ADB and was published as Building a Sustainable Energy Future 
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(ADB 2009a). The study identified seven priority actions for the GMS that were taken into account 
in the Energy Road Map that was endorsed at the 15th GMS Ministerial Conference in June 2009. 
The study also generated estimates of investment need and the savings that could accrue from 
integration and trade. The subregional Strategy for Cooperation in Renewable Energy was not 
strictly completed, but was incorporated into the Energy Road Map.
Table 22   Enhanced Efficiency and Security and Sustainable 
Development of Resources
Project 
Codea Project Status and/or Outputs Remarks
Group 1: Projects that are ongoing or for immediate implementation
1 Developing the GMS Energy Strategy
(All GMS countries)
Completed. Published as Building a 
Sustainable Energy Future. Identifies 
seven priority actions for the GMS. 
Estimates investment need of $585 
billion by 2025; integration and trade 
can save $200 billion in investment and 
operating costs during that period.
Made under RETA 6301. High 
degree of consultation.
Proposals were incorporated in 
the Energy Road Map.
2 Subregional Strategy for Cooperation 
in Renewable Energy (RE)
(All GMS countries)
Completed. Included within the GMS 
Energy Road Map (endorsed at the 15th 
GMS Ministerial Conference in June 
2009).
Focus is on enhancing the policy 
and institutional framework, 
promoting biofuels and biomass, 
and strengthening of information 
networking. See Activities 4 and 
6 below.
3 Promoting Greater Interaction 
between the Subregional Energy 
Forum (SEF)/ Regional Power 
Trade Coordination Committee 
(RPTCC), and the Working Group on 
Environment (WGE)/ Environment 
Operations Center (EOC)
(All GMS countries)
Ongoing. The main activities of EOC 
have been bilateral: two SEAs have been 
completed for power development in 
Viet Nam with support from the EOC, 
including an SEA of Master Plan VII; 
training has been conducted in the Lao 
PDR.
RETA 7764 is relevant. See 
Activity 10 on next page.
4 Improving Energy Efficiency (EE) 
through Demand-Side Management 
(DSM) and Energy Conservation (EC) 
in the GMS
(All GMS countries)
Ongoing. Combined with Activity 
6 under the RETA 7679 “GMS: 
Promoting RE, Clean Fuels (CF) and 
EE in the GMS.” The inception report 
was presented at the 5th SEF meeting 
in Ho Chi Minh, Viet Nam on 11 
November 2011.
The intended impact is to 
increase the share of RE and 
CF in the total energy supply of 
GMS to about 10% by 2015, and 
to double the amount of energy 
saved through DSM and EC 
measures from 2010 to 2015 by 
technology transfer and sharing of 
best practice. 
Complements several national 
projects.
5 Study on Promoting Carbon-Neutral 
GMS Economic Corridors (included 
in the EOC work program)
(All GMS countries)
Pending. It is to be covered under the 
project on “Promoting Low-Carbon/
Climate-Resilient Economies in the 
GMS”; this has been merged with 
“Climate-Friendly Bioenergy” and 
will now be implemented in 2014. 
Includes technical assistance and loans. 
The project preparatory TA for the 
combined project is in the pipeline for 
2013. 
Note that an “Environment-
Friendly and Climate-Resilient 
GMS Economic Cooperation 
Program” is the expected 
outcome of TA 7987 covering 
the Core Environment Program 
and Biodiversity Conservation 
Corridors Initiative in the Greater 
Mekong Subregion, Phase 2.
continued on next page
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Project 
Codea Project Status and/or Outputs Remarks
6 Promoting the Development of 
Renewable Energy (RE) and Clean 
Fuels (CF) in the GMS
(All GMS countries)
Ongoing. Combined with Activity 4 
under the RETA “GMS: Promoting RE, 
Clean Fuels (CF) and EE in the GMS.” 
The inception report was presented at 
the 5th SEF meeting in Ho Chi Minh, 
Viet Nam on 11 November 2011.
See Activity 4.
6A GMS Renewable Energy (RE) 
Development II
(All GMS countries)
Pending. This is a firm project in the 
pipeline for 2014.
7 Coordination Between SEF and the 
Working Group on Agriculture 
(WGA) on the Rural Renewable 
Energy (RRE) Project (renamed GMS 
Climate-Friendly Bioenergy Project)
(All GMS countries)
Ongoing. The Climate-Friendly 
Bioenergy Project has been merged 
with Project 5 and is to be implemented 
in 2014. The role of SEF is unclear—it 
should be clarified by a preparatory 
technical assistance in the pipeline for 
2013.
The “Climate-Friendly Bioenergy 
Project” aims in part at upgrading 
the production technology of 
biofuels and is important.
A part of TA 6521 on 
“Accelerating the Implementation 
of the Core Agriculture Support 
Program” is relevant.
8 Sharing of Methodology and Analysis 
for Developing Each GMS Country’s 
Economy and Energy Development 
Plan
(All GMS countries)
Ongoing within both the RPTCC and 
SEF.
A more systematic basis for 
sharing would be useful.
9 Coordination between the RPTCC 
and EOC, e.g., Conduct of Strategic 
Environmental Assessments (SEAs) for 
the Power Sector, and Environmental 
Impact Assessments (EIAs) for Energy 
Projects (Cambodia and the Lao PDR)
Ongoing in the Lao PDR. 
There seems to be no activity in 
Cambodia.
Training on SEA for the energy 
sector has been conducted in 
the Lao PDR and is continuing. 
Inclusion of Cambodia is 
important given the future 
intentions for hydropower.
10 Promoting 
EnvironmentallySustainable Power 
Trade Planning, Coordination, and 
Development in the GMS (renamed 
“Ensuring Sustainability of GMS 
Regional Power Development”)
(All GMS countries)
Ongoing under RETA 7764. The 
consultant presented the inception 
report at the RPTCC 12 meeting on 18 
May 2012 in Vientiane.
RETA 7764 integrates in the 
process the GMS Power Master 
Plan—an SEA to address 
environmental, climate change, 
and social externalities; energy 
security and energy efficiency 
measures; and economic pricing 
of indigenous fossil fuels.
11 Sharing of Best Practices in 
Development/Propagation of the Use 
of Natural Gas in Transport
(All GMS countries)
Ongoing within the RPTCC and the 
SEF.
Thailand’s experience in tax 
incentives and a revolving fund 
for natural gas in vehicles was 
discussed in the knowledge-
sharing session of the RPTCC-8 
meeting in Luang Prabang, Lao 
PDR in November 2009.
Group 2: Projects for later implementation
12 Study on the Development of the 
GMS Energy Efficiency (EE) Network
(All GMS countries)
Ongoing. Included in the RETA 7679 
“GMS: Promoting RE, Clean Fuels (CF) 
and EE in the GMS.” See Activity 4.
See Activity 4.
13 Implementing Public Awareness 
Campaign for Energy Conservation 
(EC) Particularly in the Residential 
Sector
(All GMS countries)
Proposed. No information available.
continued on next page
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Project 
Codea Project Status and/or Outputs Remarks
14 Energy-Efficient Transport Modal Mix 
(All GMS countries)
Proposed. No information available.
15 Improvement of Transport System 
Efficiency
(All GMS countries)
Proposed. No information available.
16 Study for Promoting the Use of 
Electric Cars in GMS Countries
(All GMS countries)
Proposed. No information available.
17 Regional Energy Efficiency Program
(All GMS countries)
Ongoing. Included in the RETA 7679, 
“GMS: Promoting RE, Clean Fuels (CF) 
and EE in the GMS.” See Activity 4.
See Activity 4.
18 Regional Framework for RE 
Development
(All GMS countries)
Ongoing. Included in the RETA 7679 
“GMS: Promoting RE, Clean Fuels (CF) 
and EE in the GMS.” See Activity 4.
See Activity 4.
19 Small-Scale Clean Generation Fund
(All GMS countries)
Proposed. Further refinement of project 
concept needed; to be done 
under the SEF.
20 Renewable Energy (RE) Resource 
Assessment Studies
(All GMS countries)
Ongoing. Included in the RETA 7679 
“GMS: Promoting RE, Clean Fuels (CF) 
and EE in the GMS.” See Activity 4.
See Activity 4.
21 Sharing Best Practices in Biofuels
(All GMS countries)
Pending. To be covered under the 
project on “Promoting Low-Carbon/
Climate-Resilient Economies in the 
GMS” now merged with “Climate-
Friendly Bioenergy” for 2014. 
22 Biomass Generation Project
(PRC, Lao PDR, and Viet Nam)
Ongoing. Will be covered under RETA 
7833 for “Capacity Building for the 
Efficient Utilization of Biomass for 
Bioenergy and Food Security in the 
GMS,” and also included in “Climate-
Friendly Bioenergy” for 2014.
23 Training on Biodiesel at the 
Community Level
Pending. Will be included in “Climate-
Friendly Bioenergy” for 2014.
24 Study on Networking for Propagating 
GMS-Appropriate RE Technology
(All GMS countries)
Ongoing. Included in the RETA 7679 
“GMS: Promoting RE, Clean Fuels (CF) 
and EE in the GMS.” See Activity 4.
See Activity 4. Includes website 
for sharing of best practice.
25 Renewable Energy Advocacy Program 
for the GMS
(All GMS countries)
Ongoing. Included in the RETA 7679 
“GMS: Promoting RE, Clean Fuels (CF) 
and EE in the GMS.” See Activity 4.
See Activity 4. 
26 GMS Energy Database Development, 
Publications, and Networking
(All GMS countries)
Ongoing. Included in the RETA 7679 
“GMS: Promoting RE, Clean Fuels (CF) 
and EE in the GMS.” See Activity 4.
See Activity 4. 
27 Training Needs Analysis and Capacity 
Building Program for Energy 
Initiatives in the Road Map
(All GMS countries)
Proposed. Awaiting consideration of SEF.
28 Study on Accreditation Schemes for 
Energy Managers/Technical Personnel 
in the GMS
(All GMS countries)
Proposed. Awaiting consideration of SEF.
Table 22 continued
continued on next page
58
Assessment of the Greater Mekong Subregion Energy Sector Development
Project 
Codea Project Status and/or Outputs Remarks
29 Study on Initiative for Energy 
Stockpiling and Strategic Reserves for 
Enhanced Energy Security
(All GMS countries)
Proposed. Awaiting consideration of SEF.
30 Sharing of Knowledge and Experience 
in Nuclear Energy Development
(All GMS countries)
Proposed. Awaiting consideration of SEF.
31 Regional Project Preparation Technical 
Assistance Facility (PPTAF)
(All GMS countries)
Proposed. Awaiting consideration of SEF.
32 Development of Decentralized 
(Off-Grid) Energy Systems for 
Integration of Isolated Areas
(All GMS countries)
Ongoing under national projects. National efforts to promote 
off-grid electrification are 
ongoing in all GMS countries and 
supported by ongoing technical 
assistance in the Lao PDR and 
Cambodia.
33 Piloting of Smart Subsidies for the 
Use of RE Technologies in Off-Grid/
Grid Systems
(All GMS countries)
Ongoing. Included in the RETA 7679 
“GMS: Promoting RE, Clean Fuels (CF) 
and EE in the GMS.” See Activity 4.
See Activity 4. 
34 Review of Prospects for Promoting 
Identified GMS Segments of the Trans-
ASEAN Gas Pipeline (TAGP); Other 
Possible Segments
(Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, 
Thailand, Viet Nam)
Proposed. No progress; there is no 
activity on oil and gas in the Regional 
Cooperation Operations Business Plan 
(RCOBP) for 2012–2014.
Project is overseen by ASCOPE 
at ASEAN level. Rationale for 
particular consideration of GMS 
segments needs discussion with 
ASEAN institutions.
35 Sharing of Experience and Best 
Practices on Regulatory Issues and 
Legal Framework (Oil and Gas)
Proposed. No progress; there is no 
activity on oil and gas in the RCOBP for 
2012–2014.
36 Coordination of Efforts to Enhance 
Energy Market Integration in ASEAN 
(Oil and Gas)
Proposed. No progress; there is no 
activity on oil and gas in the RCOBP for 
2012–2014.
Essentially an ASEAN-level 
project.
37 Studies on Safety and Security of Oil/ 
Gas Pipelines and Their Environmental 
Risk Mitigation
(All GMS countries)
Proposed. No progress; there is no 
activity on oil and gas in the RCOBP for 
2012–2014.
38 Abated Clean Coal Generation
(Viet Nam)
Proposed. No progress; there is no 
activity on coal in the RCOBP for 
2012–2014.
Further refinement of project 
concept needed; to be done 
under the SEF.
39 Coal Liquefaction and Carbon 
Neutrality Technical Assistance
(PRC and Viet Nam)
Proposed. No progress; there is no 
activity on coal in the RCOBP for 
2012–2014.
Further refinement of project 
concept needed; to be done 
under the SEF.
40 Monitoring Carbon Capture and 
Storage (CCS) Technologies for Coal 
Power Plants in the GMS
(All GMS countries)
Proposed. No progress; there is no 
activity on coal in the RCOBP for 
2012–2014.
Further refinement of project 
concept needed; to be done 
under the SEF.
ASCOPE = ASEAN Council on Petroleum, ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations, PRC = People’s Republic of China, GMS = Greater 
Mekong Subregion, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic, RETA = regional technical assistance, SEA = Strategic Environmental 
Assessment, TA = technical assistance. 
a Reflects project codes in the Vientiane Plan of Action (VPOA).
Source: ADB (2008c).
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Several of the projects identified as “ongoing” have slipped from their original schedule. Work 
on energy efficiency, clean fuels, and renewable energy only began in November 2011. Work on 
the promotion of environmentally sustainable power trade has also only just begun; the inception 
report was presented to the RPTCC in May 2012. 
Of the projects listed in Group 2 of the Vientiane Plan of Action (VPOA), many related to biomass, 
renewable energy, and energy efficiency have been incorporated either into RETA 7679 “GMS: 
Promoting RE, Clean Fuels (CF) and EE in the GMS” that has recently begun, or into the proposed 
project created by merging the two earlier projects: “Promoting Low-Carbon/Climate-Resilient 
Economies in the GMS” with “Climate-Friendly Bioenergy” for 2014. The merged project is now 
rescheduled to begin in 2014.
There are many other activities in this group where little or no progress has been made, including 
projects on (i) energy-efficient transport, (ii) electric cars, (iii) public awareness, (iv) training needs 
analysis, (v) accreditation of energy managers, (vi) stockpiling and strategic reserves, (vii) nuclear 
energy, (viii) promoting the TAGP, (ix) sharing of experience in the regulation of oil and gas, (x) 
safety of oil pipelines (xi) clean coal generation, (xii) coal liquefaction, (xii) and carbon capture and 
storage (CCS). The list is consistent with the motivation behind the creation of the GMS Subregional 
Energy Forum (SEF), which was to oversee the expansion of cooperation to other energy subsectors 
as requested by the GMS countries. Despite this apparent coherence with the rationale of the SEF, 
many of the activities proposed beyond the power sector have not been followed up. In part this 
is because the limited resources of time and money do not permit coverage of the entire range of 
issues across the energy sector. In part it may also be that the SEF, at its first meeting in Bangkok 
in December 2004, began the construction of an expanded Energy Sector Road Map that to some 
extent took precedence over the VPOA in the wider field.
Regional Power Trade Development: Building Capacity
Table 23 lists the activities of the VPOA in the strategic thrust 2, with a note of outcomes and 
comments on implementation and follow up. All activities within the VPOA that were scheduled 
for ongoing or for immediate implementation have been completed within the period of the plan. 
The activity of the Regional Power Trade Coordination and Development was undertaken within 
RETA 6304 and was in most part successful. The completion report notes that implementation 
of the initial Regional Power Trade Agreement was not fully achieved, partly because of a lack of 
firm government agreement, and partly because of the impact of the financial crisis in 2007–2009 
on investments in generation and transmission. The sustainability of the capacity building of the 
institutions created to coordinate and develop the Regional Power Trade Agreement was limited by 
the transitional character of these groups and lack of a permanent institution dedicated to work 
with the regional power trade.
The activities in the Facilitating Regional Power Trading and Environmentally Sustainable 
Development of Electricity Infrastructure in the Greater Mekong Subregion was implemented 
under RETA 6440. The project met its objectives: (i) the road map for regional power integration 
was updated, (ii) a methodology for evaluating benefits from cross-border trading was prepared 
but is not yet in use, (iii) a proposal to establish a regional coordination center (RCC) to manage 
regional power trade was agreed, and (iv) a regional power system database was established.
Although the activities of the VPOA have been successfully achieved within this strategic thrust, it is 
questionable how far they have taken the GMS countries along the road to a competitive, modern 
power system fully integrated and serving to support the competitiveness of the economy at large; 
enhanced access to energy among poorer communities; and improved the quality, reliability, and 
security of the energy supply in the GMS. An assessment of progress by a consulting team engaged 
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on behalf of Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), concluded that so far, 
the activities undertaken within the Regional Power Trade Coordination Committee (RPTCC) have 
not adequately laid out the concrete tasks that need to take place, both domestically and regionally, 
in order for a regional power market to be developed (SIDA 2011). This issue is discussed elsewhere 
in this paper in more detail.
Implementing Key Interconnection Projects
Table 24 lists the activities specified in the VPOA. Implementation of key interconnection projects 
has not been met as originally planned. Only two projects have been completed, although the 
220 kV link between Kampot and Sihanoukville is nearly finished and should be completed by the 
end of the plan period. Projects have been constantly rescheduled. A loan for the Nabong 500 kV 
Table 23  Building Capacity for Operation, Coordination,  
and Grid Interconnection
Project 
Codea
Project Status/Outputs Remarks
Group 1: Projects that are ongoing or for immediate implementation
41 GMS: Regional 
Power Trade 
Coordination and 
Development
(All GMS countries)
Completed under RETA 6304. Final report 
presented to RPTCC-7 in Ho Chi Minh City 
on 20 November 2008. 
Many of the issues were elaborated in the 
subsequent RETA 6440.
Outputs: Action Plan on Regional Power 
Trade Development; Concepts for Institutions 
to Coordinate and Develop Regional Power 
Trade; Capacity Building; Platform or 
Database for Information Exchange and 
Communication. Funded by the Agence 
Française de Développement (AFD).
42 Establishment of 
Regional Power 
Database and 
Website
(All GMS countries)
Completed. This was first accomplished 
under RETA 6304 and the PRC accepted 
to host the database, but as acknowledged 
in the completion report of ADB, it never 
became operational. A second database was 
constructed under RETA 6440 (see below).
43 Facilitating Regional 
Power Trading and 
Environmentally 
Sustainable 
Development 
of Electricity 
Infrastructure in the 
GMS
(All GMS countries)
Completed under RETA 6440. A regional 
power master plan was updated in July 2010 
and discussed at the PWG/FG/RPTCC-9 
meeting in Shenzhen in October 2010. The 
road map for regional power integration 
was updated, a methodology for evaluating 
benefits from cross-border trading was 
prepared but is not yet in use, proposal to 
establish a regional coordination center 
(RCC) to manage regional power trade was 
agreed, and regional power system database 
established.
Funded by the Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA),
details of the location, structure, governance, 
powers, and duties of the RPTCC are still 
under discussion.
In addition to the intended outputs, terms of 
reference (TORs) for two working groups on 
(i) regulation and (ii) performance standards 
and grid codes were prepared.
Group 2: Projects for later implementation
44 Facilitating Regional 
Power Trading and 
Environmentally 
Sustainable 
Development 
of Electricity 
Infrastructure in the 
GMS, Phase 2
Pending. This is a standby project for 2014 in 
the RCOBP for the GMS, 2012–2014.
PRC = People’s Republic of China, FG = focal group, GMS = Greater Mekong Subregion, PWG = Planning Working Group, RCOBP = Regional 
Cooperation Operations Business Plan, RETA = regional technical assistance, RPTCC = Regional Power Trade Coordination Committee.
a Reflects project codes in the Vientiane Plan of Action (VPOA).
Source: ADB (2008c). 
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Table 24  Implementing Key Interconnection Projects for Stage 1 
Power Trading
Project 
Codea Project Status/Outputs Remarks
Group 1: Projects that are ongoing or for immediate implementation
46 GMS Nabong–
Udon Thani Power 
Transmission and 
Interconnection
(Lao PDR and Thailand)
Pending. A loan for the Nabong 500 kV 
Substation and Transmission Facility Project 
was originally scheduled for 2008, but 
deferred in 2009 to 2012 as a consequence of 
delays in the associated generation projects. 
It was dropped in the RCOBP for 2011–
2013, but reintroduced in the RCOPB for 
2012–2014 as a firm project for 2012. Board 
approval for the loan is expected in February 
2013. 
This is a first step to establishing a national 
EHV transmission network. The line is for 
exporting about 2,000 megawatts (MW) 
from four HPPs in the Lao PDR: Nam 
Ngum 2, Nam Ngum 3, Nam Ngiep 1, and 
Nam Theun 1. Nam Ngum 2 is operational, 
Nam Ngum 3 is under final negotiations, 
and Nam Ngiep 1 is also being negotiated. 
A preparatory study under an ADB 
technical assistance proposed a 100% EDL- 
owned special purpose vehicle (SPV) to act 
as a TSO and collect use-of-system charges 
from the owners of the hydro plants. This 
would be an important innovation.
47 GMS 500 kV Lao 
PDR–Viet Nam 
Interconnection  
(Ban Sok–Pleiku)
(Lao PDR and Viet Nam)
Pending. The Lao PDR–Viet Nam Power 
Interconnection Project was originally in 
the pipeline as a firm project for 2010, then 
rescheduled to 2012, then moved to 2013 in 
the RCOPB for 2012–2014. Board approval 
for the loan is expected by March 2013.
Project preparation was undertaken under 
RETA 6481: Preparing the Ban Sok–Pleiku 
Power Transmission Project in the GMS; 
it included recommendations for cost 
recovery through payment of wheeling 
charges to EDL.
48 GMS Northern Power 
Transmission
(Lao PDR)
Ongoing. Originally programmed for 
2009 then rescheduled to 2010. Recently 
implemented; bid documents for engineering, 
procurement, and construction are expected 
by mid-2012.
The PPTA was approved in July 2006 and 
completed in July 2008. It covers rural 
electrification and a 115 kV transmission 
line from Paklay to the Lao PDR–Thailand 
border near Kenthao for interconnection 
with EGAT. It is intended to stimulate 
trade based on seasonal availability of 
hydropower.
49 GMS Northern 
Power Transmission 
II (replaced by GMS 
East–West Corridor 
Power Transmission
(Lao PDR)
Proposed. Loan was first scheduled for 2012; 
in the lending program for 2011–2013, it was 
replaced by the GMS East–West Corridor 
Power Transmission for 2012, and that project 
was dropped from the pipeline in the RCOBP 
for 2012–2014. 
Originally intended to extend the115 kV 
transmission across the northern provinces 
and to contribute to rural electrification 
and promote trade with Thailand.
50 Viet Nam–PRC 
(Yunnan) 500 kV 
Power Interconnection
(PRC and Viet Nam)
Proposed. This interconnection is under 
discussion between SCP and EVN and 
has been on that status for some time. No 
intended loan or technical assistance has ever 
appeared in the ADB pipeline. 
51 Cambodia: GMS 
Power Trade Project
(Cambodia)
Dropped. Funded by the World Bank. The 
project was intended to construct 115 kV 
transmissions from Viet Nam–Border to 
Kampong Cham and from the Lao PDR–
Border to Stung Treng. The Government of 
Cambodia requested full cancellation of the 
grant on 4 October 2011.
The objective of the GMS Power Trade 
Projects of the World Bank is to enhance 
power trade and bring affordable grid-
based electricity to selected provinces in 
Cambodia through import of power from 
the Lao PDR and Viet Nam. It operates 
over the three countries.
52 Transmission Line–
220 kV Link between 
Takeo and Kampot
(Cambodia)
Completed. The line appears to have been 
completed in 2011.
EDC received financing from the KfW, 
Germany via on-lending through the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance of the 
Government of Cambodia.
continued on next page
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Substation and Transmission Facility Project was originally scheduled for 2008, deferred twice, 
dropped, and now is expected to be approved in 2013. It is a somewhat similar story for the 500 kV 
Lao PDR–Viet Nam Interconnection (Ban Sok–Pleiku). The impact of the World Bank GMS Power 
Trade Project has been restricted by the withdrawal of Cambodia. The rescheduling of transmission 
projects appear to be occasioned by the unpredictable nature of the generation projects that have 
been delayed by the withdrawal of developers and sometimes by local opposition—as discussed in 
the next section.
Project 
Codea Project Status/Outputs Remarks
53 Transmission 
Line–220 kV Link 
between Kampot and 
Sihanoukville
(Cambodia)
Ongoing. Funded by ADB under the Second 
Power Transmission and Distribution Project. 
The 230 kV transmission line and substations 
will be completed by the end of 2012.
The link will allow EDC to import 
lower-cost electricity from Viet Nam to 
meet demand in Phnom Penh, Takeo, 
Kampot, and Sihanoukville. Medium- 
and low-voltage distribution systems are 
established along the 230 kV transmission 
corridor.
54 Lao PDR: GMS Power 
Trade Project
(Lao PDR)
Partially completed. The cross-border 
transmission component was truncated by 
Cambodia’s withdrawal (see Activity 51). 
The dispatch center was cancelled as the 
Government of Lao PDR found alternative 
funding.
See note under Activity 51. 
55 Study on the Lao 
PDR–Cambodia–
Viet Nam Power 
Interconnection 
and Transmission 
Improvement 
(Cambodia, Lao PDR, 
and Viet Nam)
Partially satisfied by RETA 6440. An updated 
master plan was developed with a conceptual 
design for a GMS transmission system, 
including broad specifications of links between 
countries. 
56 Shweli 1–Yunnan 
Interconnection
(PRC and Myanmar)
Completed. In April 2009, the Yunnan Power 
Grid (a subsidiary of CSG) commissioned the 
link from Yunnan to Shweli. 
85% of electricity from Shweli 1 is 
exported to the PRC. 
Group 2: Projects with no definite timeline
57 PRC–Thailand Power 
Transmission through 
the Lao PDR
(PRC, Lao PDR, and 
Thailand)
Pending. A 500 kV HVDC transmission line 
with 3,000 MW capacity that would link the 
Jinghong and Nuozhadu hydro projects in the 
Yunnan Province, PRC to Thailand has been 
discussed; there is some indication that a 
feasibility study may restart soon.
58 Nam Mo–Ban Mai 
Interconnection 
Project (including 
possible extension)
(Lao PDR and Viet Nam)
Pending. The project is still under negotiation 
between the Lao PDR and Viet Nam. It 
involves a 230 kV line to transfer power from 
Nam Mo hydropower in the Lao PDR to 
Northern Viet Nam. The project was included 
in the original GMS Indicative Master Plan for 
2004–2007.
ADB = Asian Development Bank, PRC = People’s Republic of China, CSG = China Southern Power Grid, EDC = Electricite du Cambodge, 
EDL = Electricite du Laos, EGAT = Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand, EHV = extra high voltage, EVN = Electricity of Vietnam, 
GMS = Greater Mekong Subregion, HPP = hydropower plant, HVDC = high-voltage direct current, KfW = Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, 
kV = kilovolt, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic, PPTA = preparatory technical assistance, RCOBP = Regional Cooperation 
Operations Business Plan, RETA = regional technical assistance, TSO = transmission system operator.
a Reflects project codes in the Vientiane Plan of Action (VPOA).
Source: ADB (2008c). 
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This relatively unsatisfactory outcome does not give a full picture of the buildup of transmission 
across the region. Other cross-border transmission lines that were not included in the plan have 
been built. ADB brought to fruition an innovative build–operate–transfer (BOT) project for power 
transmission from Thailand to Cambodia to meet demand in the Siem Reap area. Cross-border 
power lines associated with specific export projects have also been constructed including the 500 kV 
transmission from Nam Theun 2 to Roi Et, completed in 2009; the 500 kV line from Nam Ngum 
2 to Udon Thani, completed in 2010; and the 230 kV line from the Theun Hinboun extension to 
Nakhon Phanom, completed in 2012. 
A limitation on the impact of these lines associated with specific export projects was noted by 
the SIDA review team. Transmission lines that go across borders to a single plant do not improve 
regional connectivity; it is simply a means by which the importing country moves its grid into the 
territory of the exporter. Another difficulty posed by the construction of dedicated export projects is 
that the generation is tied up in power purchase agreements (PPAs) for 20–30 years and, therefore, 
actually impedes the transition to a competitive and liberalized market.
Some of the transmission projects within the VPOA are designed simultaneously not only to support 
trade but also to enhance axis to energy along the transmission corridor. This is important because 
the benefits to the people living in the vicinity of high-voltage transmission lines are limited if 
associated local electrification projects are not implemented in parallel. It is disappointing that 
the GMS Northern Power Transmission project, which was of this type, was implemented some 
2–3 years late and the GMS East–West Corridor Power Transmission project that replaced the GMS 
Northern Power Transmission II appears to have been dropped entirely from the plan.
Developing Generation Projects for Power Exports under Stage 1
Table 25 lists the activities that were included within the VPOA along with a note of the status and 
remarks concerning implementation and follow up. The performance is similar to that noted for 
transmission projects, not surprisingly because the two aspects are closely related. Only two projects 
have been completed during the period. Nam Ngum 2 (Lao PDR) 615 MW HPP has been operating 
since the autumn of 2010 and Jinghong HPP on the mainstream of the Mekong was completed in 
2009. Some other projects have had complex histories. Xe Kaman 1 was originally negotiated by the 
Government of Tasmania’s Hydro Electric Commission in 1997, but then passed on at privatization to 
a company called Anstran, based in Malaysia. It was cancelled in 2005 and a new memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) was signed with South East Asia Energy Limited; completion is now expected 
by 2013. The site at Nam Ngiep was first identified in the 1990s; an MOU was signed with a US 
company, but cancelled in 1996. A feasibility study was then financed by the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA). The consultant that performed the feasibility study then took on the 
project proper, but later withdrew from the consortium that was changed again subsequently; the 
plant is now expected by 2018.
Projects are negotiated each in a unique way, without any adherence to a long-term plan or 
direction from fundamental principles in published guidelines. The main ordering principle seems 
to derive from the planning of the importing countries, which through their subsidiaries or national 
companies, place certain plants within their long-term planning and then work to see that they 
are duly constructed in time. Even this is not entirely a guarantee, as demonstrated in the case of 
Nam Theun 1, where Electricity Generating Public Co. Ltd. of Thailand (EGCO) led the consortium 
and signed a PPA with the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT), but the project still 
fell through. This unstructured approach may be manageable for the importers, but it is unlikely to 
deliver an economically, socially, and environmentally optimal solution for the host country. These 
issues are discussed in more detail elsewhere within this paper.
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Table 25  Developing Generation Projects for Power Exports  
under Stage 1
Project 
Codea Project Status/Outputs Remarks
Group 1: Projects that are ongoing or for immediate implementation
59 Xe Kaman 1 (Lao PDR) 
290 MW Hydropower 
Project
(Lao PDR and Viet Nam)
Ongoing. Comprises two power 
plants—the 290 MW Xekaman 1 
and the 32 MW Xekaman Xanxay. 
Of the power, 80%will be exported 
to Viet Nam; 20% will go to Lao 
PDR. MOU for FS signed in 2006; 
a 30-year project concession 
agreement signed in February 2011; 
completion is expected in 2015.
Xekaman 1 Power Company is wholly owned by 
Viet–Lao Power Investment and Development 
Joint Stock Company. (VLPC). Shareholders of 
VLPC are all Vietnamese entities including EVN 
(10%), Song Da Corporation (60%), and other 
Vietnamese construction companies.
A concession agreement was originally signed in 
November 1997 with Anscan International, Ltd. 
based in Malaysia and cancelled in 2005. 
60 Nam Ngum 2 (Lao PDR) 
615 MW Hydropower 
Project
(Lao PDR and Thailand)
Completed. The project reached 
financial closure in 2006 and 
initial operation began in 2010. 
Commercial operation is expected 
in March 2013.
Nam Ngum 2 Power Company is owned 75% by 
South East Asia Energy Limited and 25% by EDL. 
61 Nam Ngum 3 (Lao PDR) 
440 MW Hydropower 
Project
(Lao PDR and Thailand)
Ongoing. The plant will be 
developed under a 27-year 
concession agreement with the 
Government of the Lao PDR and 
will sell exclusively to EGAT. It is 
expected to be completed in 2017.
Nam Ngum 3 Power Company is owned by: 
GMS Lao Company Limited (27%), Ratchaburi 
Electricity Generating Holding Public Limited 
Company (25%), Axia Power Holdings B.V. 
(25%), and Lao Holding State Enterprise (23%). 
62 Xe Kaman 3 (Lao PDR) 
250 MW Hydropower 
Project
(Lao PDR and Viet Nam)
Ongoing. The VLPC began work 
on the project in 2006. It is 
structured as a 30-year BOT. VLPC 
contributed 100% of the capital and 
the Government of the Lao PDR 
will buy back 15% on completion, 
expected in 2012. 
Shareholders of VLPC are all Vietnamese entities 
including EVN (10%), Song Da Corporation 
(60%), and other Vietnamese construction 
companies. 
63 Jinghong (PRC) 
Hydropower Project
(PRC, Thailand, and 
Viet Nam)
Completed. The Jinghong 
Hydropower on the mainstream 
of the Mekong (Lancang) began 
construction in July 2003 and was 
completed in 2009. It has a capacity 
of 1,750 MW.
Originally conceived in part for export to 
Thailand, but the rapid growth in demand from 
Guangdong preempted the output. Any future 
sale of power to Thailand will not be from a 
power plant, but from the Southern Power Grid 
Company.
64 Nam Ngiep 1 (Lao PDR) 
261 MW Hydropower 
Project
(Lao PDR and Thailand)
Pending. The developers and EGAT 
have agreed on a tariff MOU. PPA, 
construction contract, and loan 
agreement are being negotiated. 
Construction may begin in 2012; 
COD is expected in 2018. EGAT 
will take 370 MW; EDL will take 
40 MW.
The site was identified in the 1990s; an MOU was 
signed with a US company, but cancelled in 1996. 
A feasibility study was then financed by JICA. 
Shareholders are KANSAI (45%), EGATi (30%), 
and LHSE (25%).
65 Theun Hinboun 
Expansion (Lao PDR) 
280 MW (220 MW 
downstream + 60 MW 
upstream) Hydropower 
Project
(Lao PDR and Thailand)
Ongoing. The project includes an 
upstream 60 MW HPP on the Nam 
Gnouang River; 230 MW expansion 
of the existing HPP downstream. 
Output from the downstream power 
plant will be sold to EGAT and from 
the upstream powerhouse to EDL. 
Completion is expected by 2012.
Shareholders of the Theun Hinboun Power 
Company include Electricite du Laos (EDL) at 
60%, Statkraft SF at 20%, and GMS Lao Company 
Limited at 20%.
continued on next page
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Project 
Codea Project Status/Outputs Remarks
Group 2: Projects for later implementation
66 Xe Pian–Xenamnoy 
(Lao PDR) 390 MW 
Hydropower Project
(Lao PDR and Thailand)
Pending. A tariff MOU was signed in 
August 2009; the BOT concession 
is for 27 years. EGAT will take 370 
MW and EDL, 40 MW. Financial 
closure is expected at the end of 
2012 and completion is expected 
in 2018. 
The joint operating company is owned by 
Ratchaburi Electricity Generating Holding 
Plc (25%), the Republic of Korea-based SK 
Engineering and Construction (26%), Korea 
Western Power
(25%), and Lao Holding State Enterprise
(24%).
67 Lower Se San 1 
(Cambodia) 90 MW 
Hydropower Project
(Cambodia and Viet Nam)
Pending. In 2007, EVN signed an 
MOU for a feasibility study and EIA 
of Lower Sesan 1 and Lower Sesan 
2 dams. In January 2011, the MPI in 
Viet Nam licensed EVN to invest. 
The Lower Se San 2 project appears 
to have priority for the developer, 
but has met considerable opposition.
The project is implemented by the Cambodia–
Vietnam Hydropower Company, a joint company 
of EVN International—a subsidiary of Electricity 
of Vietnam—which holds 51% and the Royal 
Group of Cambodia, with 49%.
68 Nam Theun 1 (Lao PDR) 
523 MW Hydropower 
Project
(Lao PDR and Thailand)
Pending. A tariff MOU with EGAT 
was signed in December 2006 by 
a consortium led by EGCO and 
Gamuda; a 27-year PPA was signed 
and the EPC contract awarded, but 
the arrangements failed. In March 
2012, a new MOU was signed by 
Phonesack Group for a feasibility 
study.
The participants in the original consortium 
were Lao Holding State Enterprise (LHSE) with 
20%, Gamuda (Malaysia) with 40%, and EGCO 
(Thailand) with 40%. Phonesack is a wholly Lao 
PDR-owned group.
Group 3: Projects with no definite timeline
69 Xe Kong 4 (Lao PDR) 
300 MW Hydropower 
Project
(Lao PDR and Thailand)
Pending. A project development 
agreement was signed in June 2008. 
A tariff agreement was signed with 
EDL in 2010 for 10% of the output; 
an agreement with EGAT for the 
rest is under negotiation. A draft 
concession agreement has been 
prepared.
The main developer is Region Oil (a Russian 
Federation company) through a wholly owned 
subsidiary Region Hydro Power Stations Lao Co 
Ltd. (80%); LHSE has 20%. Korea Western Power 
Co., Ltd. has also reportedly expressed interest in 
joining the consortium. 
70 Lower Se San 2 
(Cambodia) 420 MW 
Hydropower Project
(Cambodia and Viet Nam)
Pending. In 2007, EVN signed an 
MOU for a feasibility study and an 
EIA of Lower Sesan 1 and Lower 
Sesan 2 dams. In January 2011, the 
MPI in Viet Nam licensed EVN to 
invest. The Lower Se San 2 project 
appears to have priority for the 
developer, but has met considerable 
opposition.
The project is implemented by the Cambodia–
Vietnam Hydropower Company, a joint company 
of EVN International—a subsidiary of Electricity 
of Vietnam—which holds 51% and the Royal 
Group of Cambodia, with 49%.
71 Nam Kong 1 (Lao PDR) 
75 MW Hydropower 
Project
(Lao PDR and Thailand)
Pending. A project development 
agreement was signed in June 2008. 
A tariff agreement was signed with 
EDL in 2010 for 10% of the output; 
an agreement with EGAT for the 
rest is under negotiation. A draft 
concession agreement has been 
prepared.
The main developer is Region Oil (a Russian 
Federation company) through a wholly owned 
subsidiary Region Hydro Power Stations Lao Co 
Ltd. (80%); LHSE has 20%; Korea Western Power 
Co. has reportedly shown interest to join the 
consortium. 
Table 25 continued
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Project 
Codea Project Status/Outputs Remarks
72 Xe Kong 5 (Lao PDR) 
330 MW Hydropower 
Project
(Lao PDR and Thailand)
Pending. A project development 
agreement was signed on June 2009. 
A tariff agreement was signed with 
EDL in 2010 for 10% of the output; 
an agreement with EGAT for the 
rest is under negotiation. A draft 
concession agreement has been 
prepared.
The main developer is Region Oil (a Russian 
Federation company) through a wholly owned 
subsidiary Region Hydro Power Stations Lao Co 
Ltd (80%); LHSE has 20%; Korea Western Power 
Co. has reportedly shown interest to join the 
consortium. 
73 Nam Mo (Lao PDR) 
105 MW Hydropower 
Project
(Lao PDR and Viet Nam)
Pending. Electricity International 
Joint Stock Company signed an 
MOU for a feasibility study in March 
2010 that should be completed by 
the end of 2012.
The Government of the Lao PDR reportedly has 
selected the Vietnam–Laos Economic Cooperation 
Corporation as the main investor in the Nam Mo 
hydroelectric power projects.
BOT = build–operate–transfer, PRC = People's Republic of China, COD = commercial operation date, EDL = Electricite du Laos, 
EGAT = Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand, EGCO = Electricity Generating Public Co. Ltd., EIA = Energy Information Administration, 
EPC = engineering procurement and construction, EVN = Electricity of Vietnam, FS = feasibility study, GMS = Greater Mekong Subregion, 
JICA = Japan International Cooperation Agency, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic, LHSE = Lao Holding State Enterprise, 
MOU = memorandum of understanding, MPI = Ministry of Planning and Investment, MW = megawatt, PPA = power purchase agreement, 
VLPC = Viet–Lao Power Investment and Development Joint Stock Company.
a Reflects project codes in the Vientiane Plan of Action (VPOA).
Source: ADB (2008c). 
Overall Assessment of the Vientiane Plan of Action
A wide range of activities were initially proposed that were not followed up. There is a natural 
tendency to seek to solve all problems, but there has to be selection of issues where the GMS 
institutions can make an impact and there have to be clear criteria for making that choice. This 
stringency does not seem to have been applied and, to some extent, the same diffuse approach is 
visible in the Road Map for Expanded Energy Cooperation discussed in the next section. 
The activities of the Vientiane Plan of Action (VPOA) concerned with building the capacity for 
regional power trade have been formally completed, but there is some doubt over the effectiveness 
as a consequence of the changing representation within the RPTCC; this difficulty will be relieved 
by the creation of the RPCC that should have a more stable staffing.
The implementation of the key infrastructure projects has been repeatedly delayed because of 
delays and cancellation of the supporting generating plant. The origin of the delays varies from 
case to case, but can include (i) the failure of the developer to find finance, (ii) a decision by the 
importing country that the project was not needed or should be delayed, and (iii) opposition from 
local people affected by the development. 
It may be that concessional finance from ADB is better employed at strengthening national networks 
than in funding connections to specific investments that are likely fundable by the developer and 
whose timing is beyond the control of ADB and the government. Technical assistance from ADB to 
support activities that would help implement more rational guidelines for developing cross-border 
power projects is also a priority.
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The Road Map for Expanded Energy Cooperation
Achievements
Following a request from the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) countries to seek to extend the 
scope of cooperation in the energy sector, the Subregional Energy Forum (SEF) was created to 
prepare and oversee such a program; it met for the first time in Bangkok in December 2004. With 
some technical assistance from ADB, a Road Map for Expanded Energy Cooperation was prepared 
and presented to the SEF–2 in Ho Chi Minh City in November 2008, then on the basis of comments 
received from countries, it was finalized at a special SEF meeting in Bangkok in March 2009 and 
subsequently endorsed at the 15th GMS Ministerial Meeting held in Thailand in June 2009. 
The road map identifies four main strategic objectives that were later subsumed into the GMS 
Strategic Framework as the objectives of the expanded cooperation in the energy sector up to 
2022, as follows:
•	 Enhance access to energy for all sectors and communities, particularly the poor in the GMS, 
through promotion of best energy practices in the subregion;
•	 Develop and utilize more efficiently indigenous, low carbon, and renewable resources, 
while reducing the subregion’s dependence on imported fossil fuels;
•	 Improve energy supply security through cross-border trade while optimizing the use of 
subregional energy resources; and 
•	 Promote public–private partnership (PPP) and private sector participation, particularly 
through small and medium enterprises (SMEs) for subregional energy development.
The work plan for 2009–2015 contained within the road map is ambitious and wide-ranging. It 
has the following components:
New and Renewable Energy Sources
•	 Enhancing the policy and institutional framework for the development, financing, and 
private investment in new and renewable energy (NRE).
•	 Promoting the utilization of biofuels and biomass.
•	 Strengthening of information networking, particularly in GMS-appropriate NRE technology.
Energy Efficiency and Conservation
•	 Promoting information sharing and/or dissemination and networking of best practices in 
the GMS context.
•	 Expanding private sector involvement through enhanced energy management in industrial 
and commercial sectors.
•	 Promoting energy efficiency (EE) in the transport sector.
•	 Expanding financing for EE initiatives.
Regional Energy Planning, Policy, and Program Coordination
•	 Strengthening the energy policy and planning; and program management, coordination, 
and networking in the GMS (including oil stockpiling and nuclear energy).
•	 Ensuring sustainable financing and support for initiatives under the road map for expanded 
GMS energy cooperation.
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Power
•	 Establishing the policy and regulatory framework for power trade in the GMS (including 
building capacity for power trade operation, coordination, and grid interconnections).
•	 Developing the grid interconnection infrastructure and power generation projects for 
export (long list of priority interconnections).
•	 Expanding power coverage to all (rural electrification).
•	 Promoting environmentally sustainable development of electricity infrastructure.
Oil and Gas
•	 Supporting the realization of GMS segments of the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline (TAGP).
•	 Promoting the development of oil and natural gas logistics and network in the GMS.
•	 Mitigation of environmental risks in construction and/or operation of pipelines.
Coal
•	 Promotion of energy efficiency, clean coal technologies, and reducing carbon emissions 
from coal plants.
•	 Strengthening of policy and institutional framework to enhance GMS trade and private 
investments in the coal subsector.
Arrangements for implementing the road map are specified. A GMS member country will assume 
the “lead” role in the development of specific projects included in the road map and will be 
responsible for formulating the assigned project, and coordinating with development partners for 
financing and technical support and project management. The Subregional Energy Forum (SEF) 
meeting at least once a year, will monitor the progress of the road map and serve as the vehicle for 
information sharing in GMS energy cooperation.
At the SEF-4 meeting in Shenzhen in October 2010, ADB presented the RETA 7679: Promoting 
Renewable Energy, Clean Fuels and Energy Efficiency in the GMS, cofinanced by the Asian Clean 
Energy Fund and Multi-Donor Clean Energy Fund under the Clean Energy Financing Partnership 
Facility, which constituted the first substantial step in the accomplishment of the road map. The 
technical assistance is to be implemented under the auspices of the SEF, and the SEF will be the 
vehicle for disseminating knowledge and experiences that are accumulated through the project. 
The aims of the technical assistance are as follows:
•	 To strengthen the SEF as a forum for networking among partners and with the private 
sector on renewable energy, clean fuels, and energy efficiency.
•	 To establish a regional database of best practices and technologies on renewable energy, 
clean fuels, and energy efficiency.
•	 To create subregional performance targets for the use of renewable energy and clean fuels, 
and energy efficiency savings.
•	 To create renewable energy and clean fuels resources, and energy efficiency potential map 
for all GMS countries, with a technology- and cost-based ranking of various options.
•	 To construct business models for the deployment of selected energy efficiency, renewable 
energy, and clean fuels technologies based on local conditions, and at least five pilot project 
proposals identified for financing by ADB and other financing agencies.
The Inception Report of RETA 7679 was presented to SEF-5 in Ho Chi Minh City in November 
2011. The Inception Report of RETA 7764 on Ensuring Sustainability of Greater Mekong Subregion 
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Regional Power Development was also discussed during this meeting, but within the framework of 
the Regional Power Trade Coordination Committee (RPTCC).
Assessment
The idea of extending cooperation among GMS countries to a wider spectrum of energy activities 
has merit; any regional project needs a representative regional steering group and the SEF can 
provide that function along with potentially a degree of institutional stability and memory. In each 
case, it is necessary to be clear about what is the particular added value of conducting the activity 
at the level of the GMS rather than at national level or at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) level. This condition is required by the GMS Strategic Framework, as discussed below. 
It is not apparent that the Extended Road Map conforms to this condition. There is no evident 
added value in addressing oil-related issues in the GMS. Oil is an international business; there is 
a quite satisfactory working arrangement within ASEAN around the ASEAN Council on Petroleum 
(ASCOPE) and it is difficult to see what the GMS countries can do better. It is also not clear what 
value the SEF can add in terms of promoting unrealized sections of the TAGP; the construction 
of pipeline segments will be determined by gas discoveries and commercial negotiations among 
national oil companies. There may be some aspects of the TAGP that do bear on energy policy 
within the GMS—the possibilities are analyzed later—but even then, it may be more appropriate 
for the GMS countries that are also a part of ASEAN to promote such projects within the ASEAN 
framework. Other areas where the added value from GMS level projects needs to be better justified 
are energy efficiency in transport (that seems more appropriate at the ASEAN level and in all 
economic corridors), and nuclear safety.
The principal areas that seem suitable for GMS-level analysis are given in Table 26, with reasons as 
to why they merit the subregional approach. 
The practicality of the arrangements to implement the program may also need to be reviewed. 
The financing arrangements are unconvincing. They are consistent with the recommendation of 
Table 26  Examples of a Greater Mekong Subregion-Level Value Added
Topic Justification of a Subregional Approach
Creation of a subregional power market 
by developing all of its requisite aspects.
Common vision, rules, protocols, and subregional institutions are indispensable 
for a subregional market. This should include also a shared vision of infrastructure 
development.
Benchmarking and upgrading of national 
capacity for power system planning and 
procurement
A regional market can only be developed and sustained if it is widely recognized to bring 
national benefit. A prerequisite for this is that all countries have adequate capacity to 
plan and control national development.
Energy efficiency There is considerable scope for benchmarking, a good degree of cultural homogeneity, 
and practice.
Renewable energy Same as above.
Biofuels Same as above. There is also a strong case for pilot plant development of second-
generation technologies, and costs and risks can be pooled.
Clean coal (maybe) Normally this might be better done at the ASEAN level, but the presence of the People’s 
Republic of China in the Greater Mekong Subregion may create added value.
Energy policy capacity building It is necessary for regional planners to have a regional strategy based on good evidence; 
this is not at present produced on a regular basis.
Social and environmental analysis The benchmarking and cultural arguments apply, but there is also a need for common 
environmental rules to avoid unfair competition on the market and many important 
assets are held in common (river basins) and need common treatment.
Source: Author.
70
Assessment of the Greater Mekong Subregion Energy Sector Development
the mid-term review of the previous strategic framework of the GMS that member states take 
on more responsibilities (ADB 2007), but they seem unlikely to work. It seems unlikely that any 
country will be able to find funding for any of these projects as they are too vague. Also, it seems 
unlikely that a country in dialogue with a potential donor will promote a regional project before 
national projects.
It is also doubtful that the program can be satisfactorily managed under the arrangements foreseen. 
Project management is a complex business and needs continuity that the proposed arrangements 
are unlikely to provide; it will always be a low priority in the agenda of the national host institution 
and likely to be passed from one project officer to the next with no continuity and little commitment. 
Furthermore, by outsourcing to the countries, all the synergies of managing the projects will be 
lost—accounting, monitoring, and reporting. 
Lastly, the actions listed in the work plan cannot be monitored in their present form because there 
are no objectively verifiable indicators of success.
These doubts over the implementation of the work plan receive some support from the observation 
that the only perceptible success of the road map at this half-way stage is the conduct of the largely 
standard regional technical assistance (RETA) on energy efficiency, renewable energy, and biofuels, 
in which there is only the minor institutional novelty that the SEF serves essentially as a steering 
group.
There are strong arguments in favor of focused cooperation in energy under the auspices of the 
SEF, but it does not seem to be working at the moment and there are persuasive structural reasons 
why this is so. The issue is discussed in more detail in the concluding sections of this report with 
some suggestions for change.
Road Map for Implementing the Greater Mekong Subregion  
Cross-Border Power Trading
The memorandum of understanding (MOU) on the Road Map for Implementing the GMS Cross-
Border Power Trading was prepared and signed in March 2008 by the GMS Ministers of Energy; 
it covers the period from 2008 to 2012—the time required to implement Stage 1 of regional 
power trading and to prepare for Stage 2. Seven milestones are identified and a set of activities 
are specified along with dates by which they should be completed. After discussion within the 7th 
RPTCC meeting, the TOR of RETA 6440, that had been developed prior to the signing of MOU-2, 
were slightly modified to match the requirements of the road map. Table 27 reproduces the road 
map, along with a commentary on the extent to which the expectations were met, largely by 
RETA 6440.
Based on the achievement of RETA 6440, the consultants proposed an amended road map wherein 
the completed studies would be adopted and the remaining issues treated through new work. 
Outstanding topics include the following:
•	 Complete the Performance Standards with coordinated in-depth network studies (transient 
stability studies).
•	 Complete the study on power trade rules, including resolution mechanisms for disputes.
•	 Complete the study on a GMS Grid Code.
•	 Implementation of Prerequisites for the GMS Market (price reform, synchronous operation 
where feasible, and transformation of PPAs to contracts for differences (CFDs).
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Table 27  Assessment of the Cross-Border Power Trade Road Map
Activities Schedule Comment
Timelines to fully achieve Stage 1
Milestone 1: Complete the Indicative Power Interconnection Master Plan and select priority new 
interconnection projects for undertaking feasibilitystudies
Complete the GMS Indicative Master Plan for power 
development
2008 An Indicative Master Plan was delivered by RETA 6304 in 
2008.
Update of the GMS Indicative Master Plan was completed 
in RETA 6440.
(September 2010)
Select priority interconnection projects identified in 
the master plan
2009–2010 The updated master plan contains a list of priority 
projects:
•  Myanmar–PRC
•  Myanmar–Thailand
•  Lao PDR North–Thailand
•   Lao PDR South – Viet Nam South  
(through Viet Nam C)
•  Lao PDR North–Viet Nam North
•   Cambodia–Viet Nam South
(September 2010)
Develop feasibility studies of selected priority 
projects.
2009 
onward
None appears to be available.
Update the regional indicative master plan Every 2 to 
3 years
Schedule is on track. A new update will be delivered 
from RETA 7764 incorporating a strategic environmental 
assessment to address environmental, climate change, and 
social externalities.
Milestone 2: Complete the study on performance standards
Complete the study on GMS Performance 
Standards and consider for adoption the suggested 
GMS Performance Standards on new regional 
interconnections and for the synchronized operation 
of interconnected grids
2010 Partially completed under RETA 6440
(September 2010)
Consider for adoption the proposed transitional 
arrangements to achieve GMS Performance Standards
2010 Partially completed under RETA 6440
(September 2010)
Milestone 3: Complete the study on transmission regulations
Complete the study on transmission regulations 2010 Deliverables of RETA 6440 include:
•  Completion of the GMS transmission
•  Regulations
•  Assessment of potential for synchronous operation
•  HVDC vs. DC interconnection
Consider for adoption the findings of the study to 
coordinate the operation and power flow control in 
grid-to-grid interconnections synchronization and 
operation
2010 Awaiting decision of RPTCC
Milestone 4: Complete the study on standard regional metering arrangements and power trade rules
Complete the study on standard regional metering 
arrangements and communications system in grid-
to-grid interconnection for implementation during 
Stage 1; consider for adoption the findings of the study
2010 Deliverables of RETA 6440 included a report on metering
(September 2010)
The findings do not appear to have been adopted by the 
RPTCC
Complete the study on power trade rules, including 
resolution mechanisms for disputes outside existing 
PPAs for implementation during Stage 1; consider for 
adoption the findings of the study
2010 Not available.
continued on next page
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Activities Schedule Comment
Timelines to prepare for Stage 2
Milestone 5: Undertake the study to identify the regulatory barriers to the development of power trade 
and implementation of next stage
Complete the study to identify the regulatory barriers 
to development of power trade
2012 Completed within RETA 6440. Deliverables include:
•  Review of GMS Regulatory Framework
•  Review of international experiences
•  Conceptual design of the GMS market
•   Proposed implementation of the conceptual design for  
 the GMS market
(September 2010)
Consider for adoption the measures and institutional 
arrangements to address regulatory barriers
2012 Awaiting decision of RPTCC
Milestone 6: Complete the study on a GMS Grid Code (Operational Procedures)
Complete the study on a GMS Grid Code and 
consider for adoption the findings of the study, which 
include:
•  GMS Performance Standards;
•   Coordination procedures between System 
Operators to schedule and control cross-border 
flows, management of deviations;
•  Metering and communications;
•   Sharing of power reserves and support during  
emergencies
2010–2012 Not yet available
Milestone 7: Complete the study on Stage 2 Transmission Regulations to allow third-party access, 
including Stage 2 power trade rules, and dispute resolution mechanisms
Complete the study on Stage 2 Transmission 
Regulations
After 2012 Not yet available
Consider for adoption the findings of the study to 
include development of payment agreements and/
or tariffs for third-party use, to compensate countries 
that host flows linked to third parties’ trading
After 2012 Not yet available
Develop and consider for adoption of power trade 
rules for short-term cross-border trading
After 2012 Not yet available
Develop and consider for adoption power trade rules 
for settlement of deviations to scheduled power trade 
in grid-to-grid interconnections
After 2012 Not yet available
PRC = People's Republic of China, DC = direct current, GMS = Greater Mekong Subregion, HVDC = high-voltage direct current, 
Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, PPA = power purchase agreement, RETA = regional technical assistance, RPTCC = Regional 
Power Trade Coordination Committee.
Source: RTE International (2010a). 
The practices and standards proposed by the consultants do not appear to have been adopted by 
the RPTCC; the SIDA review team expressed the view that this may have been because of a low 
sense of ownership of the results and that this should be improved by the establishment of the 
RPCC to which the countries will contribute financially.
Energy Sector Strategy Study
In 2009, ADB published the results of a 3-year study of the energy future of the GMS. The study 
was supported by a technical assistance grant and was conducted in a very inclusive fashion that 
Table 27 continued
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involved close consultation with the GMS countries. The strategy was supported by modeling using 
the MESSAGE model, in which the energy industries are represented as a reference energy system 
and investment and operation is optimized using mixed-integer programming (ADB 2009a). 
Results of the exercise showed very strong financial and strategic benefits from integration of the 
energy sectors. Regional cooperation reduces the stream of discounted costs by 19%, or $200 billion 
over 2 decades as compared to a non-integrated scenario and will reduce import dependence 
by 5.5%. Moreover, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions would grow more slowly. The analysis 
demonstrates that $585 billion of investment will be needed during the period if infrastructure 
availability is not to be a constraint on economic growth. The integration of environmental and 
social costs into the model indicates that some 11 gigawatts (GW) of off-grid solutions would 
be cost-effective, out of the 238 GW of new capacity that will be required. The study comes to 
several more strategic conclusions among which the following are especially relevant to the work of 
the SEF:
•	 Improvements in policy regimes and sector reforms are often easier to effect in a regional 
context and need to be pursued in a time-bound fashion.
•	 GMS has a high and increasing dependency on oil imports; actions have to be taken to 
reduce oil use and to find substitutes, such as biofuels.
•	 Collective action is needed to promote private–public participation and innovative solutions.
•	 Convergence to a sustainable path will require strategic planning at the level of institutions 
and energy systems; creating institutional and human capital is perhaps the biggest 
challenge.
Seven specific priority actions were proposed to strengthen cooperation and to progress toward a 
better energy future for the GMS. They are as follows:
•	 Mobilize political will for cooperation in all energy sectors.
•	 Improve energy efficiency.
•	 Pursue a time-bound program of sector reform on a GMS-wide basis.
•	 Reduce oil dependency.
•	 Review transport modal mix.
•	 Promote regional private sector participation.
•	 Create institutional capital and human capability.
These are all important, but the first is of special relevance to the SEF. The measure of success 
of the SEF will be if it manages to change policy. This will only happen if it can effectively and 
persuasively lobby at the political level. It is a real challenge and is addressed in the closing sections 
of this report.
The model used in the study was offered to the GMS countries for maintenance and future use, but 
no partner was willing to adopt it, which is unfortunate as the human capacity and the extensive 
database are then lost.
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Post-Kyoto Mechanisms
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) was introduced to provide a mechanism by which 
developing countries could participate in mitigation and also by which the great potential for 
mitigation in developing countries could be harnessed. The scheme will end in 2012 although 
projects registered before the end of that year will continue to receive credits. Although the 
CDM represented an enormous step forward in the attempt to find an equitable procedure for 
distributing the costs of mitigation, practical problems, especially in the interpretation of baseline 
conditions and additionality, have limited its effectiveness. 
Although the CDM is likely to continue, it may be a less effective source of finance than in the past 
as the European Union (EU) will revoke the Bridging Directive that was an important support for the 
carbon price. There is some support for the provision credit for Nationally Appropriate Mitigation 
Actions (NAMAs), such as specific policies (e.g., energy efficiency standards), investments, or the 
implementation of new domestic emission trading systems in developing countries. The Cancun 
Agreements reached under the 16th Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 16), recognize 
two types of NAMAs—“unilateral” and “supported.” Unilateral NAMAs are voluntary undertakings 
by developing countries that are cost-effective in their own right and do not require financial 
support from developed countries—these would be not be subject to rigorous monitoring and 
reporting, indeed, maybe none at all. Supported NAMAs will require technical cooperation with 
developed countries and/or financial transfers and would normally be appropriate when the costs 
of the actions exceed the financial benefits. It is not yet clear whether financial support could 
be offered through carbon markets or whether it would be confined to conventional financial 
instruments. 
The policy of the EU in this respect is influential as it is the largest buyer by far of Certificates of 
Emission Reduction. The revised European Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) Directive (Article 
11a) will exclude all except least-developed countries from selling CERs on the ETS. For the GMS, 
only projects in Cambodia, Myanmar, and the Lao PDR will be able to use CDM credits after 2012 
on the EU ETS. The ETS may be open to other developing countries through the sectoral crediting 
mechanism that is intended to reward greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions from a specified 
sector measured against a target level below business-as-usual (BAU) level. The crediting baseline 
may be expressed as a volume of emissions or as a specific intensity of emissions; if emissions 
fall below the crediting threshold then CERs would be recorded; no penalties for exceeding the 
target. Revenues would probably go to the government. The eventual development of these 
ideas is unclear, but it is important that the GMS be aware of the options and organizes its 
activities accordingly.
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Sustainable Energy for All
In December 2010, the United Nations General Assembly declared 2012 as the International Year 
of Sustainable Energy for All, recognizing that “… access to modern affordable energy services in 
developing countries is essential for the achievement of … the Millennium Development Goals and 
sustainable development” (UN 2011). 
In response, the UN Secretary-General, with support from the UN-Energy and the United Nations 
Foundation, created a new global initiative—Sustainable Energy for All (SE4A)—to engage 
governments, the private sector, and civil society partners globally (UN Secretariat 2011). The vision 
proposes three linked objectives to underpin the goal of achieving sustainable energy for all by 
2030, as follows:
•	 Ensuring universal access to modern energy services.
•	 Doubling the rate of improvement in energy efficiency.
•	 Doubling the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix.
Sources of financing—including multilateral institutions, bilateral assistance, national development 
banks, the private sector, and carbon markets—are insufficient and not well coordinated and 
small-scale renewable energy and energy efficiency projects can be particularly difficult to finance 
because of their high transaction costs relative to their size. New business models are needed that 
are commercially viable and innovative financing mechanisms will be necessary to support them.
At the opening of the Rio+20 UN Conference on Sustainable Development, the UN Secretary-
General reported that more private investors have pledged to invest more than $50 billion to reach 
the program’s goal of doubling renewable energy production and energy efficiency gains while 
providing all people access to modern electricity services by 2030. Viet Nam was one of the first 
countries to partner with the initiative and is developing a national energy action plan to support 
capacity development and innovative financing mechanisms (SE4A 2012). 
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Mekong River Commission
The Mekong River Commission (MRC) was formed in 1995 from an earlier institution, the Mekong 
Secretariat, to help the governments of the Lower Mekong Basin (Cambodia, the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic [Lao PDR], Thailand, and Viet Nam) manage the water and related resources 
of the basin. One of its functions is to ensure that decision makers have timely and accurate 
information and as a part of that objective, it publishes occasional State-of-the-Basin Reports. The 
2010 report notes the declining catches and smaller average size of fish caught; the reasons for this 
cannot be conclusively demonstrated but it is possible that the construction of dams, weirs, and 
other infrastructure; abstraction of water for other uses; clearing of flooded forest; deforestation 
of catchments; and local pollution all play a role (MRC 2011).
According to the MRC, in 2009, there was 2,612 megawatts (MW) of hydropower capacity installed 
on lower Mekong tributaries and a further 3,574 MW was under construction. The dams are all 
located on tributary systems from the mainstream reach in northern Lao PDR to the mainstream reach 
above Kratie in Cambodia. Some plants are in cascade on the same tributary systems. Viet Nam has 
developed most of its available tributary hydropower potential in its Mekong subbasins; Thailand 
has additional development potential on Mekong tributaries, but does not propose at present 
to pursue it. The main activity is in Cambodia and the Lao PDR, especially the latter. The MRC 
notes that this rapid pace of development will create cumulative impacts, including impacts on 
stream-flow, fish passage, water quality, and sediment flow. The cumulative impact need to be 
assessed and recognized in decision making. Some strategic environment assessments (SEAs) and 
cumulative impact assessments (CIAs) have been made. A CIA for the basin was prepared for the 
Government of the Lao PDR as part of the decision-making procedure for Nam Theun 2 in 2005. 
A pilot SEA is being prepared for the Sesan, Sre Pok, and Sekong (3-S) tributary system shared by 
Viet Nam, the Lao PDR, and Cambodia to consider the cumulative impacts of the 41 potential dam 
developments in the 3-S basin.
On the mainstream, there are several dams in the Upper Basin in the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) and the effects downstream are now discernible in the dry season between Chang Saen in 
Thailand and Luang Prabang in the Lao PDR. MRC models suggest that the primary impacts on the 
Lower Mekong Basin (LMB) will be flood flows in the wet season, a shift in the timing of the peak 
flood, and higher river flows in the dry season. Eleven of the proposed dams in the LMB would span 
at least part of the mainstream channel. Some of the dams in the Lao PDR would form reservoirs 
up to 100 kilometers (km) in length within the existing channel and some would also inundate 
outside the mainstream channel, especially around the tributaries that intersect the reservoirs. The 
two proposed projects in Cambodia (Stung Treng and Sambor) would inundate land extensively 
outside the channel. 
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Strategic Environmental Assessment of Hydropower  
on the Mekong Mainstream
Responding to the concerns expressed in the State-of-the-Basin Report, the MRC commissioned 
an SEA of hydropower development on the mainstream of the Mekong. The objective was to 
identify potential opportunities and risks and to assess alternative mainstream Mekong hydropower 
development strategies, including the regional distribution of development costs and benefits. The 
SEA began in 2009 and the final report was submitted in September 2010. 
The report concluded that the Lao PDR was likely to be the main recipient of export revenues 
with many implications for economic growth and the ability to fund development; Viet Nam and 
Thailand would be the main importers and would benefit from a lower cost supply of electricity. 
Mainstream projects would have significant net negative impacts on fisheries and agriculture and 
would widen development gaps as the benefits would be felt mainly by wealthier people connected 
to electricity grids, and the costs would fall upon poor riparian communities. At the country level, 
Thailand and the Lao PDR will experience the main benefits while Cambodia and Viet Nam will 
experience the heaviest costs. For the environment, the projects are likely to result in serious and 
irreversible damage through losses in long-term health and productivity of natural systems, and 
losses in biological diversity and ecological integrity. 
The SEA team recommended that decisions on mainstream dams should be deferred for a period of 
10 years with review every 3 years to ensure that other activities specified in the recommendations 
were being pursued diligently, including a comprehensive assessment and fast-tracking of tributary 
projects that the SEA team considered feasible and ecologically sustainable (ICEM 2010).
Expert Monitoring of Nam Thuen 2
From its inception, the Nam Theun 2 (NT2) hydroelectric power project was perceived to carry a 
range of social and environmental impacts and to trigger the safeguard policies of the World Bank 
and ADB that are designed to prevent and mitigate undue harm to people and their environment in 
the development process. Consequently, at the insistence of the international financial institutions 
(IFIs), the Concession Agreement for Nam Thuen 2 requires expert monitoring. The World Bank is 
advised by an International Advisory Group (IAG) and the Government of the Lao PDR has engaged 
an Environment and Social Panel of Experts (POE). Their reports and assessments are shared between 
the government and the World Bank, and with the public.
The POE is a standing body established for the period of the concession; it is required to assess the 
extent to which NT2 meets the requirements of the safeguard policies concerning environment, 
indigenous peoples, and resettlement. The most recent report is that of July 2011 (McDowell, 
Scudder, and L 2011). The report shows some indications of concern, indicating for example that 
the original NT2 Social Development Plan envisaged that
…by this time the income and sustenance of the Nakai resettlers would be largely 
derived from well-established agricultural crops on new and partially irrigated (for 
dry season cultivation) plots plus livestock raising, from dividends earned by the 
processing and sale of Village Forestry Association timber and—though with less 
confidence—from the harvesting of reservoir fish. In reality the main sources of 
income at the moment appear to be from illegal and unsustainable collection of 
rosewood from the reservoir and the watershed, with reservoir fishing a second 
source. Some serious rethinking on income sources is called for. 
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The implication is that even in this model project, very visible and closely monitored, some aspects 
of resettlement are not proceeding satisfactorily. This finding lends credence to the allegations of 
nongovernment organizations (NGOs) active elsewhere, claiming wide-scale social damage from 
similar, less visible projects that are not properly monitored at official level. Some of the claims are 
illustrated in the next section.
The mandate of the IAG is to provide guidance to the World Bank on how it can improve its 
handling of environmental and social issues, among others, in the NT2 project and to make specific 
recommendations on addressing these issues. The most recent report of the IAG from April 2010, 
has a slightly different emphasis from that of the POE, concluding that life is better for villagers but 
the benefits have been unevenly spread and their sustainability is still unclear. 
Land has suddenly gone from being an infinite resource, bounded only by spirits 
and cultural rights, to a scarce commodity to be husbanded, fenced, managed 
and fed with nutrients and water. The margin for error in subsistence livelihoods 
is now of a different and unfamiliar quality. The adaptation to new livelihoods will 
take a generation. The change will continue, for better or for worse, long after 
Nam Thuen Power Company has met its obligations (IAG 2010).
It is not possible here to fully convey the detail and minutiae of the reports from the two groups, 
but it is very clear from their perusal that they constitute an important vehicle by which concerns 
of affected people can be conveyed to officials, documented, and remedies monitored thereafter, 
as they contribute positively to the chronic problem of poor enforcement. They also permit 
experienced people to contribute to solving problems as they arise and, given that the problems of 
such ventures can never be fully anticipated, this is a very important contribution.
It might be useful for the Regional Power Trade Coordination Committee (RPTCC) to propose that 
similar arrangements of similar authority and independence be included as an obligation within all 
future concession agreements across the GMS.
Reports by Academia and Civil Society
The socioeconomic impacts of energy developments have been monitored by a wide range of 
organizations. Normally, the reports that are produced are extremely critical, but there is some 
theoretical basis for believing that private sector developers will attempt to meet their resettlement 
obligations in the cheapest possible way and that this could be damaging to those resettled; there 
is also evidence from the monitoring of NT2 that even very visible and closely monitored projects 
experience difficulties that need constant attention, and there is much evidence from all over the 
world that unless such processes are closely monitored, there will be abuses. It is difficult, therefore, 
to dismiss these criticisms entirely. A few examples are given in Table 28.
The activities of these groups reveal a commitment and interest in the prevention of social and 
environmental damage from development that should be engaged rather than rejected. The 
attitude of these NGOs is in general combative, but also there is evidence that their inputs are 
consistently ignored by decision makers. Experience over the last few decades has shown that 
the contrary positions of NGOs sometimes can be important indicators of the direction of social 
change. It is better to engage than to reject such actors; they can usefully serve as interlocutors with 
affected people if there is a genuine commitment on both sides.
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Means should also be found to absorb and assess basic scientific research. For example, recent 
study by scientists from the Princeton University suggests that dams on the tributaries are in some 
ways more damaging than dams on the main stream (Ziv 2012). The Princeton University study 
alleges that the most damaging dam is that on the Lower Sesan 2 that might reduce fish biomass 
by 8% in the flood plains of Cambodia and Viet Nam. The study presents a Pareto frontier between 
loss of yield from fisheries and electrical generation. Whether the calculations of the study are 
correct is one thing, but certainly the presentation of results in this form represents a step forward. 
There will be a trade-off and it is important to determine where it lies and who, at that point, 
loses and who gains. The Princeton University study suggests that beyond 30 terawatt-hour (TWh) 
per year of electrical output, there is a very rapid fall off in fish yields; the form of this argument 
is theoretically persuasive; there is certainly a trade-off between fish yields and electricity and it is 
likely that at some point the marginal utility of further increments of electricity falls rapidly. It is not 
appropriate to take a view in this paper on the technical detail of the debate, but it is important to 
be confident that the scientific basis for decisions is sound. This is a significant challenge because 
the scientific basis may be complex and is constantly evolving, but if the resources of the Mekong 
are to be deployed optimally among the various important social services that it provides, then it 
must be done. 
The GMS Environment Operations Center
The GMS Environment Operations Center (EOC) was established to mainstream sound environmental 
management across all GMS Economic Cooperation Program sectors and corridors. The GMS Core 
Environment Program and Biodiversity Conservation Corridors Initiative (CEP–BCI) was launched in 
2006 and has been funded by ADB ($1.6 million) and cofinanced by the following: The Netherlands 
($14 million), Sweden ($10 million), United Kingdom ($0.55 million), Finland ($4.9 million), the PRC 
($0.5 million), and in-kind contributions from GMS countries ($1.2 million). The program consists 
of three components: Strategic Environmental Assessments (SEAs), the Biodiversity Conservation 
Corridors Initiative (BCI), and Environmental Performance Assessments. 
Table 28  Nongovernment Organizations Active in Social  
and Environmental Impacts of Energy
Project Issues and/or Content Reference
Xayaburi HPP Low-quality resettlement, poorly built housing. No jobs. No new 
land. No mechanism for redress.
(International Rivers 2012)
Irrawaddy Myitsone Dam No environmental protection law in place. Threats to historical 
and cultural sites. Poor quality of EIA.
(International Rivers 2012)
Shwe gas pipeline to the PRC
dams on the Shweli river
Corruption. Forced resettlement. Loss of livelihoods. (Palaungland 2012)
Sesan, Srepok, and Sekong (3S) 
rivers
Community network, aiming to strengthen capacity to engage 
in advocacy, dialogue, information collection, research, 
monitoring, information awareness activities, and capacity 
building.
(3SPN 2012)
Dams in Myanmar Displacement, lack of compensation, loss of culture, disease, and 
human trafficking.
(Burma Rivers Network 2012)
Salween River Potential damage to fish stocks, biodiversity, traditional culture 
and settlements.
(LivingRiverSiam 2005)
PRC = People’s Republic of China, EIA = Energy Information Administration, HPP = hydropower plant. 
Sources: References are shown on the 3rd column of the table.
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The main activities of EOC in the energy sector have been bilateral: two SEAs have been completed 
for power development in Viet Nam with support from the EOC, including an SEA of Master 
Plan VII; training has been conducted in the Lao PDR. The EOC has built partnerships with national 
universities, institutes, and other organizations to strengthen science and policy linkages for climate 
change initiatives and has prepared a concept for an innovative low-carbon sector intervention—
Carbon Neutral Transport Corridors—that is now ready for piloting. The work under the Biodiversity 
Conservation Corridors Initiative is relevant to energy connectivity because large areas of low 
population are attractive corridors to use for power transmission and this will conflict with their 
value in conservation. The EOC should help countries identify and resist these threats.
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Greater Mekong Subregion Strategic Framework, 2012–2022
GMS Strategic Framework, 2012–2022 establishes the broad guidelines for the development of 
the GMS over the next decade and was endorsed by the GMS Summit of Leaders in December 
2011 (ADB 2011g). The principles that should govern the next moves toward economic integration 
are set out in this framework and are important discriminators among options for taking forward 
energy cooperation. They are set out in full below:
•	 First, there needs to be a more effective focus on the software aspects of the program to 
complement the continued focus on hardware. This will require not only greater progress 
on the policy and institutional dimensions of infrastructure development (e.g., transport 
and trade facilitation or power market integration), but also an increased emphasis on 
knowledge generation and management related to program initiatives and cross-country 
coordination.
•	 Second, there should be more selectivity and prioritization of focus areas within sectors, 
including less emphasis on information sharing and a greater focus on decision making 
on issues that are clearly regional in nature. This should lead to more tangible results and 
greater impact.
•	 Third, the program should be more closely linked to the broader regional integration 
agenda, leading to more clarity on which regional issues should be covered by the GMS 
program and which ones are better left to other regional organizations.
•	 Fourth, it is important that the program focuses more attention on the linkages across 
different sectors (e.g., among energy, agriculture, food security, and the environment) 
and recognizes climate change as a broader development issue as well as an environment 
issue.
•	 Fifth, there is scope for some rebalancing of attention and resources without changing the 
broad sector focus of the program and bearing in mind organizational capacities and the 
potential for achieving real results across the sectors.
•	 Finally, the GMS program will focus more strongly and effectively on monitoring results 
and on other improvements in program implementation that will help enhance its overall 
effectiveness and impact.
Based on principles, the framework endorses the strategic objectives of the energy sector set out in 
the Road Map for Expanded Energy Cooperation. In terms of program content, the framework is 
somewhat more focused than the road map itself and identified the following as software priorities:
•	 Promoting environmentally sustainable regional power trade planning, coordination, and 
development.
•	 Improving energy efficiency through demand-side management and energy conservation.
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•	 Promoting the development of renewable energy resources and clean fuels, such as 
compressed natural gas.
•	 Promoting a policy framework for facilitating renewable energy development and energy 
efficiency.
In terms of infrastructure, the master plan reiterates the need to develop the grid, to connect power 
systems, and to support the realization of GMS segments of the Trans-ASEAN gas pipeline (TAGP) 
and clean coal technologies, noting the need for GMS countries to rely substantially upon coal for 
future power generation. It confirms that the Subregional Energy Forum (SEF) will be responsible 
for overseeing the program and specifically confers on it the duties to
•	 ensure that social and environmental factors are integrated into energy planning, 
•	 ensure that high levels of private financing are mobilized for major energy projects,
•	 identify a lead country for specific projects,
•	 coordinate with development partners for funding and technical support,
•	 monitor regularly the progress of the Road Map for Expanded Energy Cooperation, and
•	 serve as the vehicle for information sharing on GMS energy cooperation. 
ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint
Guidelines for regional cooperation in energy are given within the ASEAN Economic Community 
Blueprint (ASEAN 2008). The blueprint notes the importance of energy security and recognizes the 
role of biofuels. Regional collaboration in the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline (TAGP) and the ASEAN Power 
Grid (APG) will allow the optimization of the energy resources of the region for greater security and 
quality of supply. Policies must be sustainable and should contribute to the abatement of global 
climate change. Efforts in renewable energy are essential to help manage declining resources of 
fossil fuels; open trade and cooperation in renewable energy are important as well as investment in 
the necessary infrastructure. The third ASEAN Programs of Action for Energy Cooperation (APAEC) 
is designed to support the energy component of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint, 
2015 and repeats the same themes (APAEC 2009).
Master Plan for ASEAN Connectivity
The Master Plan for ASEAN Connectivity elaborates on some potential investments that match 
the ambitions of the blueprint; in particular it lists 16 possible electrical cross-border connections 
identified by the Heads of ASEAN Power Utilities and Authorities (HAPUA) as technically possible; 
among the set are the links from Pekan Baru to Melaka and from Sarawak to West Kalimantan. The 
master plan recognizes the need to adapt the TAGP to the advent of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and 
acknowledges that there will be financial and legal obstacles to overcome, along with complications 
in synchronizing national technical and security regulation requirements, and differences in the 
supply, distribution, and management procedure of natural gas across the countries (ASEAN 2011).
The master plan addresses the need to ensure a good alignment of the GMS initiative in the 
subregional trade of electricity with ASEAN connectivity and the AEC Blueprint; it recognizes that 
ensuring coherence may not be easy since the APG and the GMS subregional trading initiative have 
been pursuing parallel efforts that may not be completely compatible and such incompatibility may 
be difficult to eliminate. Evidently, ASEAN is the superior legal entity as it is established by a treaty, 
which takes priority over the intergovernmental agreement establishing the GMS subregional 
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power trade. On the other hand, the GMS is much further advanced in the movement toward a 
subregional market, for the simple reason that it is easier to connect across the long land borders 
than in the archipelagic territories of the non-GMS countries, and it is scarcely desirable or practical 
that progress toward common rules and practices in the GMS should be impeded by a need to 
consult in detail with other partners. It is understandable that utilities not directly involved should 
feel some concern, but it is also not uncommon in the development of regional power markets that 
they are built out from a nucleus. The master plan correctly proposes a continuous, detailed, and 
careful analysis of the specific protocols of both initiatives to ensure alignment.
The Long-Term Strategic Framework of ADB
ADB priorities for the period 2008–2020 are set out in its Long-Term Strategic Framework (ADB 
2008a); they are encompassed in three strategic agendas: inclusive growth, environmentally 
sustainable growth, and regional integration and these are based upon five drivers of change, as 
follows: 
•	 Private sector development and private sector operations, 
•	 Good governance and capacity development,
•	 Gender equity,
•	 Knowledge solutions, and 
•	 Partnerships.
Private capital has been an important driver of hydro expansion in Southeast Asia because of the 
considerable rents associated with hydro sites. In an all-thermal power system, there are few rents; 
there are some particularly good sites and sometimes rents can be created by changes in relative 
fuel prices, but on the whole, only a risk-adjusted return on capital can be achieved. This is not 
true of hydro developments the costs of which may be much lower than the marginal thermal 
plants. This has led to a very great interest from private developers in sites in Cambodia, the Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Myanmar, and Sarawak. In the case of Myanmar and 
Sarawak, much of the interest is from Chinese contractors and power companies; in the Lao PDR, 
Thai developers including companies with a strong presence of the Electricity Generating Authority 
of Thailand (EGAT) have been very successful, but many other foreign interests are present; in 
Cambodia, Vietnamese companies are active. The regulation of these developments is often poor 
in several respects and need strengthening, in particular, to assure transparent, nondiscriminatory 
awards of concessions; to improve assessment and management of environmental and social 
impacts; and to guarantee revenue transparency.
The mechanism by which private capital is mobilized through independent power producers (IPPs) 
is well-established and has been widely used throughout the region. The main active constraint 
is the legal, regulatory, and institutional framework that needs strengthening and, in several 
countries, must be built from scratch. The most difficult area for private finance is transmission. 
Where the transmission line simply brings power from a remote source, it is clearly linked to a 
reliable revenue stream and is treated as an intrinsic part of the generation project that has to 
be funded if the project is to be built. Where a transmission line interconnects two networks, 
the problems are more complex. ADB has funded one private sector project in Cambodia as a 
build—operate–transfer (BOT) project. It would be helpful to launch a debate on the merits and 
possibilities of private finance of interconnectors in the region. 
Good governance and capacity development is very relevant to the energy sector; performance 
varies across the subregion. Some countries still need support in basic sector planning; there is 
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much scope in improving regulatory practice in design and enforcement. Policy analysis could be 
strengthened in most countries. Furthermore, there is no mechanism to create a convincing vision 
of an energy future across the subregion that simultaneously takes care of the environmental and 
social dimensions while observing the constraints imposed by the international energy markets and 
global climate change. There is also a need to upgrade the process of awarding concessions and 
managing whole river basins, both at national and regional levels.
Gender equity has much relevance to energy policy, particularly with respect to extended access. 
Enhancing modern energy access reduces the use of fuel wood for cooking, which has been found 
hazardous to women’s health. Electrical machines can relieve women’s manual labor and create 
more time that they can use in more profitable occupations. Equal access of women and girls to 
education becomes important, not only for ethical reasons, but to enhance the value creation from 
the extra time available. 
The fourth driver of the strategy is knowledge solutions. This could be applied to many aspects 
of energy policy, but one that appears exceedingly suitable is the adoption of new technologies 
for the use of biomass. The subregion is favorably endowed with biomass as a consequence of 
good rainfall and high levels of insulation. Biotechnology is rightly seen as a possibly contributor 
to sustainable energy supply, but the first generation technologies practiced in the region today 
conflict with food security. This conflict might be avoided by a shift toward second-generation 
technologies using agricultural, forest, and municipal wastes. In this case, it will be necessary also 
to establish new biomass value chains that can increase rural employment and incomes and help 
to close development gaps. ADB can support pilot projects in specific circumstances of the GMS 
and disseminate the experience acquired on local feedstocks, value chains, and suitable technology.
The importance given in the ADB strategy to partnerships is especially resonant in the creation of 
stable, inclusive energy policy within the subregion. Several countries recognize in principle the 
need to involve actors from the civil society and to consult widely in the preparation of policy, but 
in practice, it is never done. Indeed, nongovernment organizations (NGOs) are regarded almost 
with hostility. Partnerships with NGOs and community-based organizations are useful mechanisms 
to gauge the social value of impacts that have no market value. There are many international 
organizations concerned with different environmental and social aspects of energy development 
that are very forceful in their approach and many policy makers find them difficult to engage with, 
but who nevertheless have information and experience to bring. A stronger engagement with these 
actors is desirable. 
Regional Cooperation Operations Business Plan
The proposed lending program for 2012–2014 involves $2.2 billion of ADB financing, spread over 
28 investment projects. The energy projects are summarized in Table 29; they account for 12% of 
the total funding.
The Nabong–Udon Thani Power Transmission and Interconnection project has a long history; it was 
included as a firm project for 2008 in the 2008–2010 Regional Cooperation Operations Business 
Plan, then postponed several times and finally dropped in 2011–2013. It was reinstated in 2012–
2014 as firm for 2012. The Ban Sok–Pleiku 500 kV line is intended to evacuate power from a set of 
hydropower plants in Cambodia to market in Viet Nam; the project was originally prepared in 2008, 
but delays in the construction of the power plants have deferred the need for the transmission line 
and final agreement on tariffs took some time to reach. The technical assistance projects are not on 
the ADB databases, so there is no easily available information on the likely content.
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Table 29  Summary of Energy Activities in the 2012–2014  
Regional Cooperation Operations Business Plan
Project Country Status Total Cost ADB Government Cofinance
Nabong 500 kV Substation 
Transmission Facility Project 
Lao PDR 2012  
Firm
95.0 89.0 6.0 –
Ban Sok–Pleiku 500 kV Line Lao PDR, 
Viet Nam
2013
Firm
38.0
40.0
30.0
30.0
8.0
10.0
150.0a
50.0a
Green, Low-Carbon GMS  
Value Chains Project 
Cambodia.
Lao PDR,
Vet Nam
2014
Firm
55.0
5.0
115.0
55.0
5.0
105.0 10.0
55.0b
Preparing the Green, Low-Carbon 
GMS Value Chains (PPTA)
Cambodia,
Lao PDR,
Thailand,
Veit Nam
2013
Firm
1.5 – – 1.5c
Developing of GMS Coordination 
Centre for Regional Power Trade 
(CDTA)
Greater 
Mekong 
Subregion
2013
Firm
3.0 – – 3.0d
GMS: Renewable Energy 
Development (Phase 2) (PATA)
Greater 
Mekong 
Subregion
2014
Firm
2.0 – – 2.0e
Facilitating Regional Power Trading 
and Environmentally Sustainable 
Development of Electricity 
Infrastructure in the GMS (Phase 2) 
(PATA)
Lao PDR 2014
Standby
1.0 – – 1.0f
– = no data, ADB = Asian Development Bank, CDTA = capacity development technical assistance, kV = kilovolt, Lao PDR = Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, PATA = policy and advisory technical assistance, PPTA = project preparatory technical assistance.
a To be determined.
b Nordic Development Fund.
c Asian Clean Energy Fund.
d Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA).
e Unspecified trust fund.
f Agence FranÇaise de Developpement (AFD).
Source: ADB (2009c). 
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Energy Networks
Power
The review of the regional power trade commissioned by the Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency (SIDA) concluded that although some progress has been achieved, the regional 
power market is no closer than when the intergovernmental agreement (IGA) was signed in 2002. 
The review team attributed this to the lack of transmission infrastructure in the smaller countries, 
and the absence of a legal and regulatory framework in some member states. All the countries, 
it surmised, are not necessarily ready to proceed in the direction of a free electricity market (SIDA 
2011). One might go further and note that independent power producers (IPPs) create obstacles in 
that they forbid third-party access (TPA) to their dedicated transmission lines. Thus, the associated 
power purchase agreements (PPAs) will need somehow to be renegotiated if the public–private 
partnerships (PPPs) are to participate in a regional market.
Market Concepts and Rules
Although RETA 6440 has delivered some proposals for basic rules and standards, these do not 
appear to have been agreed yet by the Regional Power Trade Coordination Committee (RPTCC) and 
there are important aspects of the market that have not yet been defined; a Grid Code also is still 
lacking. Part of the difficulty is that progress with a regional market is difficult unless there has been 
a minimum level of unbundling and liberalization in national markets. This is not the case in some 
member states; in such cases, the countries concerned are unlikely to be interested in a liberalized 
market at regional level.
Experience from around the world suggests that utilities rarely, if ever, seek market liberalization; 
they are normally obliged to conform under political instruction and they frequently resist. The 
political level in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) (as also in the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations [ASEAN]) has always been in favor of the regional market, but the political affirmation of 
the importance of a regional market has always been in such general terms that it is unclear as to 
what precisely is required. Progress is likely to be slow until there is a more specific and detailed 
political intervention. 
The link between the political process and the technical work of the RPTCC is weak. Normally 
in an administration, a permanent secretariat attached to the executive branch of government 
will develop detailed legislative proposals based on political instruction that are then refined and 
developed according to a defined political process and then agreed by the legislature. The regional 
power market of the GMS has no such mechanism behind it. 
The decision to create the Regional Power Coordination Center (RPCC) is certainly a step forward. 
The work necessary to take the concept forward was defined under RETA 6440 and presented 
as an amended road map; this can serve as the basis for a work program for the RPCC once 
it is established. Priorities for the work of the RPTCC include the elaboration of a grid code, a 
transmission expansion plan designed on a regional basis, and rules for charging for the use of 
the transmission systems. Technical studies are, however, unlikely to be sufficient; there will come 
a point where difficult political decisions must be made. A closer and more effective oversight by 
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political decision makers will be needed if the inability of the RPTCC to resolve technical disputes 
becomes an obstacle to implementation.
Electrical Connectivity
As has been noted earlier, there is in reality very little connectivity in the power systems of the 
GMS; there are simply power lines that run from power stations in host countries to substations in 
importing countries. The grid of the importing country is effectively expanded on to foreign soil. 
The intervening transmission line cannot be used for TPA because it is connected to nothing else 
and according to the SIDA review, the PPAs anyway forbid the use of TPA. 
A consequence of this form of development is that it makes relatively little contribution to the 
national grid of the host country. The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) is a very good 
example; the hydropower sites in its territory are essentially being divided among geographically 
linked (monopoly purchasers) monopsonies in Thailand, Viet Nam, and the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC). Consequently, the exporting country could not obtain better prices it could have 
otherwise obtained in a competitive market. The rent thus flows to the developer and not to the 
exporter. A similar situation is developing in Cambodia, where the connection of hydro sites to 
Pleiku will create a monopsony for Viet Nam.
The transmission investments that could actually change the dynamics of the regional power 
markets are, for different reasons, the creation of a 500 kV backbone in the Lao PDR and an 
interconnection of the systems of Thailand and Viet Nam. The creation of the 500 kV backbone in 
the Lao PDR would enable the country to offer power from a favorable hydro site to a wider variety 
of prospective buyers and obtain a better price. In the long run, in the context of a liberalized 
market, the strongly interconnected system in the Lao PDR would be an important element; the 
Lao PDR is, as is often said, the “battery” of the system. In an interconnected market, it can offer 
valuable services in terms of peaking power, voltage, and frequency regulation to the countries 
around, provided that the system is strong enough. The idea should be pursued in parallel with 
the mooted PRC–Lao PDR–Thai 500 kV link, but should not be dependent upon the success of that 
initiative.
The connection between Viet Nam and Thailand would be a step change in the regional market 
in a different way. These are the two largest systems (setting aside the PRC that, not being within 
ASEAN, has a slightly different status). Connection of the two systems would enable practical 
experience of the benefits to be acquired and assessed. Ideally, the two systems should be 
synchronized and connections built across central Lao PDR and southern Lao PDR, more or less 
on the alignments studied under TA 6147 and described earlier. This may not yet be acceptable, 
in which case, a high-voltage direct current (HVDC) connection on the southern alignment would 
be a modest substitute. This would then give the Electricity of Vietnam (EVN) and the Electricity 
Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) the practical experience of operating an interconnection 
and permit an assessment of the benefits that would lend reality to the as yet somewhat theoretical 
activities of the RPCC.
If the power systems of Viet Nam, the Lao PDR, and Thailand were optimized as a single unit, it 
would be easy to justify investment in both the 500 kV backbone and the East–West connectors 
between Thailand and Viet Nam. 
Gas Connectivity
The Trans-ASEAN gas pipeline (TAGP), as originally conceived by the ASEAN–EU Energy Management 
Training and Research Centre (AEEMTRC) in the late 1980s, was intended as an alternative to the 
export of natural gas out of the region as liquefied natural gas (LNG). The commercial logic of LNG 
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was irresistible and the great majority of gas that is exported now goes outside the region. The 
TAGP became essentially a collection of independent pipeline and unconnected projects that are 
roughly aligned geographically. The concept of TAGP may become more important and change its 
nature as imported natural gas becomes a main feature of regional energy supply. Single-source 
dependency of individual countries incurs risks that may be partially alleviated by a pipeline system 
that enables gas to be moved around the region as needed. It may also be that the TAGP will allow 
LNG regasification terminals to be shared between two countries with the division of gas being 
achieved through the pipeline. The possible exploitation of coal bed methane and similar sources 
of natural gas could be facilitated by the pipeline infrastructure with appropriate modifications. 
Lastly, in a region that is dependent on imports, gas storage will become necessary. This might be 
achieved in depleted or semi-depleted fields in proximity to the TAGP infrastructure. The TAGP then 
can serve to make this storage available over a wide area. On a longer timescale, the route, if not the 
infrastructure, of the TAGP could be a basis for a carbon dioxide (CO2) pipeline system taking CO2 
from coal-fired power stations for final disposal in depleted gas reservoirs that originally supplied 
the TAGP. 
A broad scoping study of the future of the TAGP in this new gas world is desirable and it should 
take into account the changing relationship with the electrical supply system. Gas is an important 
fuel for electricity supply, not only because gas turbines can provide the rapid response that will be 
needed on power systems with substantial renewable inputs. It is doubtful whether the GMS is the 
correct level on which to conduct such work; it is essentially a problem to be analyzed at the ASEAN 
level because much of the infrastructure lies outside the GMS as does the coal bed methane, and 
much of the potential reservoir storage. The GMS, through the Subregional Energy Forum (SEF), 
might lobby for this to be done by ASEAN and might wish to participate as a GMS grouping that 
would enable differences of opinion within GMS countries to be resolved more easily.
Development Gaps Remain Very Large
Table 30 shows the percentage of the population below the national poverty line for four of the 
GMS members; no data could be found for Yunnan and Guangxi provinces or for Myanmar. There 
is a marked contrast between Thailand and Viet Nam, which have managed to reduce poverty levels 
rapidly over the period, and Cambodia and the Lao PDR where progress has been less. Reduction 
of poverty seems not necessarily to be correlated with income; the Lao PDR has a per capita income 
not much less than Viet Nam, but higher poverty levels.
Table 30  Population Below the National Poverty Line  
and Per Capita Income, 2010
1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2006 2007 2008
Per Capita  
Income ($)
% Nominal PPP
Cambodia 30.1 – – – 34.7 – 30.1 – 760 2,040
Lao PDR 38.6 – – 27.6 – – – 27.6 1,010 2,300
Thailand 17.5 21.0 14.9 – 11.2 9.6 8.5 9.0 4,210 8,240
Viet Nam 37.4 – 28.9 – 19.5 16.0 – 14.5 1,100 2,910
– = no data, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic, PPP = purchasing power parity.
Sources: Millennium Indicators Data Base, United Nations, and the World Bank.
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Clearly, the effort to bridge the development gap needs to be sustained fully and in the case 
of the energy sector, this means principally extending access to modern energy and also to 
modern efficient uses. It means assuring also that access to energy is associated with economic 
development by verifying that flanking policies of urban infrastructure, credit, training, health, and 
telecommunications are in place. The SEF might review where extending access has been successful 
in the GMS and what made it successful and develop guidelines for new projects. 
Electrification rates in Myanmar are very low and much effort will be needed to remedy the 
deficiency; the experience of the GMS countries that have successfully extended access in a manner 
conducive to economic development will be of great value.
There Is Much to Be Done for Energy Efficiency
RETA 7679 addresses this issue, but it does so at a preponderantly technical level, aiming at 
feasibility studies for thermal generation efficiency improvements in existing power plants and/
or power transmission system upgrades for reduced system losses, and efficient lighting, heating, 
or cooling programs in households. As important as the identification of technical options, if not 
more so, is the implementation of effective policy that will motivate actors across the economy to 
behave more efficiently. There is considerable acquired experience of the available instruments and 
of their efficiency and effectiveness.
A political commitment that might be proposed by the SEF is that countries should adopt specific, 
measurable targets for energy efficiency improvements over a precise period that can be monitored 
against a well-defined baseline. The Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) member countries 
have already made such a commitment and it would be a good start if the non-APEC member 
countries adopted the same target. The countries might then agree to prepare National Energy 
Efficiency Action Plans on a common basis. These plans should
•	 establish business-as-usual (BAU) trends for energy consumption on a sectoral level;
•	 establish targets for energy efficiency on a sectoral level below BAU, based on measurable 
indicators; and
•	 define clearly the measures that will be implemented and the impact of the individual 
measures, realistically assessed through plausible modeling.
Several countries have such plans that would be adaptable to the possibly stricter format proposed. 
Implementation should be carefully monitored by the SEF. ADB can supply assistance to those 
countries that may require it.
These plans will be of immediate value to countries, not only as an instrument of policy, but also 
because they can form the basis of negotiation with industrialized countries concerning post-Kyoto 
instruments such as the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) and sectoral trading 
and crediting. 
An agreement within the GMS to develop such plans according to agreed norms would foster a 
spirit of common engagement and provide an incentive for the timely production of high-quality 
strategies. The norms might be as follows:
•	 A common timescale—to 2025
•	 Common delivery date—mid-2013 should be feasible
•	 Common format and coverage
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To do this would require a political commitment that the SEF would not be able to undertake. 
In this as, in other aspects, it is necessary to develop stronger links to the political process if the 
technical studies undertaken within the SEF are really to have fruitful policy results.
Renewable Policy Needs to Be Strengthened
RETA 7679 addresses this issue, but the limitations are the same as for energy efficiency. The 
scope is preponderantly technical, aiming at feasibility studies for small-scale, community-based, 
isolated renewable energy/clean fuels (RE/CF) energy systems (mini-, micro-hydro, biomass, solar, 
and wind). Much work has been done on this topic (IPCC 2011; IEA 2010b) and such systems have 
been a prominent factor in the electrification programs in rural areas in the Lao PDR (World Bank 
2012); it is unlikely that the outputs of such work will lead to the adoption of stronger renewable 
energy polices. Moreover, the regional added value is not obvious. A process for energy efficiency, 
such as the one described above, may also be more appropriate. The countries might agree to 
prepare National Renewable Energy Action Plans on a common basis. These plans should
•	 establish BAU trends for renewable energy;
•	 establish targets for renewable energy, based on measurable indicators; and
•	 define clearly the measures that will be implemented and the impact of the individual 
measures, realistically assessed through plausible modeling.
The commentary given for energy efficiency applies here also. Several countries have plans that 
could be adapted; implementation should be monitored by the SEF; ADB can supply assistance 
to those countries that need it; the plans can form the basis of negotiation with industrialized 
countries concerning post-Kyoto instruments, such as NAMAs; and sectoral trading and crediting. 
The difficulty is mainly in linking the technical level, represented by the SEF, with the political level. 
This is a difficult undertaking even with the implementation of national projects, where it is often 
hard to get good political direction and feedback, but in a subregional project where the political 
direction can only come from an occasional Ministerial meeting, it is especially hard. Until some 
way is found to create a more flexible relationship between the technical work and political decision 
making, the work of the SEF on wider cooperation in energy policy is likely to be limited in its 
impact.
Biofuels Need Second Generation Technologies
First generation biofuels are produced from cereal crops (e.g., cassava), oil crops (e.g., rapeseed, 
palm oil) and sugar crops (e.g., sugar cane) using established technology. Bioethanol can be 
made from fermentation of sugar from sugar cane or from starch; the starch is usually hydrolyzed 
enzymatically to sugar, followed by fermentation to bioethanol. The manufacture of biodiesel from 
the esterification of fatty acids obtained by hydrolysis of vegetable and animal fats is a purely chemical 
procedure. Second-generation biofuels are those biofuels produced from cellulose, hemicellulose, 
or lignin. These three materials are more difficult to convert than starch. A variety of methods has 
been explored to treat these feedstocks; they divide into two main categories: biochemical and 
thermo-chemical. Biochemical conversion routes begin by hydrolysis of the lingo-cellulosic material 
through a variety of enzymes that break the cellulosic material into sugars that are fermented and 
distilled. In thermo-chemical conversion, the feedstock is gasified at high temperature and the 
synthesis gas is transformed into liquid or gaseous fuel by chemical processes that are very well 
known from fossil fuel conversion. 
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First-generation technologies inevitably engender some conflicts with food production as the land 
and sometimes the crops could be used for food. Second-generation technologies do not create 
such an acute conflict, moreover, they offer the opportunity to create new value chains for farmers 
through the operations of collecting, transporting, and preprocessing agricultural waste materials. 
GMS countries should explore the possibilities as they apply to subregional agricultural practice, 
through one or more pilot plants evaluating technologies and value chains. This would fit well with 
the strategic priority of ADB to adopt “knowledge solutions.” The possibility should be explored by 
implementing this project as a PPP with a biotechnology company.
Arrangements for Private Sector Financing Still Need Attention
Investment in infrastructure provides essential support for the manufacturing and services sectors 
that drive productivity and maintain long-term economic growth. This is clearly articulated by the 
GMS countries in all the strategy documents concerning the development of the subregion. Such 
investments are expensive, may offer relatively low returns, and require continuous expenditure to 
maintain it. The public sector has been the traditional provider, but there are severe constraints on 
public finance and it is generally accepted that a greater resort to private capital is necessary to 
avoid limits to growth imposed by restrictive infrastructure. 
The private sector has been very active in hydropower investment in the GMS, attracted by the large 
rents and high returns. It has also contributed, to a varying extent, to the delivery of conventional 
power plant through the build–operate–transfer (BOT) mechanism and its derivatives. The private 
sector has an important role to play in renewable energy. Given the correct incentives through feed-in 
tariffs, or other means, the private sector has demonstrated in many countries its willingness to 
invest (IPCC 2011). The constraint in the GMS has been the nonexistence or low level of incentives. 
Transmission lines linking hydropower plants to a substation are often privately owned, but in 
general there has been little attempt in the GMS to attract private finance to invest in networks more 
broadly. The BOT project to construct a local transmission and distribution network in Cambodia, 
financed by ADB, is a notable (and apparently successful) exception. There has been some effort 
in India where guidelines for private sector participation in the transmission sector were issued in 
January 2000; they envisaged two possibilities—either a joint venture or an independent private 
transmission company. The International Finance Corporation was active with the Maharashtra 
State Electricity Transmission Company in developing a risk-sharing contractual framework that 
successfully attracted reputable transmission developers to take up contracts worth around 
$1.5 billion (ESMAP 2012). Despite this, the initiative has been difficult to replicate elsewhere in 
India (Government of India 2010). 
An ADB-commissioned report into the capacity of countries in the Asia–Pacific region to carry out 
sustainable public–private infrastructure partnerships found that experience had been mixed and 
that fiscal limitations, poor feasibility assessments, and regulatory barriers had delayed the execution 
of projects, and that concerns about financial viability, oversight, and poor service delivery have 
arisen once contracts had been signed. The report concluded that to ensure success, public sector 
project planning and selection, as well as implementation capacity, should be improved (EIU 2011). 
A detailed review of the legislative and regulatory frameworks in use through the subregion, 
experience of implementation, benchmarking, and proposals for best practice in different parts of 
the energy sector might be prepared by the SEF. Given its importance and complexity, a separate 
review of the options for incorporating private capital into transmission system expansion might 
also be prepared.
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Socioenvironmental Management and Enforcement
The impacts of power plants and transmission lines on natural resources and on communities 
dependent upon those resources can be severe. There is evidence that even when developments 
are closely monitored, the resettlement of people is problematic, not always given priority, and 
beset with unexpected consequences that need a degree of attention that may not be forthcoming. 
Many developments are scarcely monitored at all. ADB has demonstrated good practice at the Nam 
Theun 2 site through the imposition of independent monitoring. This should be a requisite for all 
developments. The SEF may like to propose this as an obligation to be included in all concession 
agreements and to develop guidelines on how it should be done.
The Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) has proved to be a useful tool in the Mekong. RETA 
7764 will follow up the initiative to integrate an SEA into the GMS Power Master Plan along with 
issues of energy security and energy efficiency measures (ADB 2012a). This will be a useful exercise. 
It is now important to extend the technique to address other river systems, particularly in Myanmar. 
Very large hydro developments are foreseen in this country and there seems to have been little 
or no environmental assessment. Detailed studies of a similar nature to that performed for the 
Mekong should be a priority.
The scientific appraisal and evidence base is also evolving. Some studies suggest that dams on 
tributaries have a greater impact on fish yields and biodiversity than do dams on the main stream 
(Ziv 2012); these are very complex and important issues and the scientific debate needs to be 
properly absorbed into investment decisions and policy. The Mekong River Commission is the 
appropriate body to channel science into decision making and a close cooperation with the SEF 
is desirable.
Clean Coal
As noted earlier, the countries of the GMS envisage a large shift to coal in the future, especially 
for power generation. Coal-fired power plant produce large volumes of CO2 and therefore this 
shift will have implications for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. There is a variety of technical 
approaches to this problem that involve either improving the efficiency of generating plants to 
reduce the emissions of CO2 per kilowatt-hour (kWh), or capturing and sequestering the emissions, 
normally in deep geological structures—this is known as carbon capture and storage (CCS). It is 
quite possible to combine the approaches. The improved generating technologies are super-critical 
steam plant and integrated gasification combined-cycle plant (IGCC). Neither IGCC nor CCS is a 
proven technology and neither seems likely to be adopted by GMS countries in the near future. 
All the elements of CCS have been separately proven and deployed, although not always at the 
necessary scale. Carbon capture in amine solutions is used commercially to remove acid gas 
impurities from process gas streams, but up-scaling to the large volumes of gas flow from a power 
plant is a challenge. Injection of CO2 into underground reservoirs is widely used in the oil industry 
to enhance oil recovery from mature oil fields and geological disposal has been demonstrated. 
Around 1 million tons of CO2 has been stored each year at the Sleipner project since it started 
operating in 1996. Transport of CO2 by pipeline has also been proven.
There is now a substantial effort in several countries to demonstrate fully integrated, large-scale 
CCS systems fitted to commercial-scale power stations. Preferred formations are coal seams, deep 
saline aquifers, and depleted oil and gas reservoirs. The formations may be offshore or onshore. 
The storage of CO2 in coal seams may be associated with the recovery of coal bed methane and 
93
Gap Analysis
the CO2 is absorbed preferentially on the surface of the coal and displaces methane; it may not 
be widely applicable in the GMS, but could be of value elsewhere in Southeast Asia where there 
are substantial resources of coal bed methane, often in proximity to coal mining and mine-mouth 
power stations. There are also many oil and gas reservoirs in the region that may eventually be 
candidates. 
The largest potential for storage on a global scale is in saline aquifers, but it is the least well-
characterized option. The project at Otway in south–western Victoria in Australia has demonstrated 
storage of CO2 in a depleted gas reservoir. A second stage of the project to investigate storage in 
deep porous rocks containing formation water has begun and data acquired (CO2CRC 2012). The 
technology is at a very early stage, but eventually it will be of interest in the GMS because such 
formations are very widely distributed and do not impose a constraint on siting power plants.
There are several options to improve combustion efficiency. Integrated gasification combined cycle 
(IGCC) plants convert coal to synthesis gas or syngas in a gasifier and then use the gas to drive a gas 
turbine combined cycle. Carbon can be removed pre-combustion with the advantage that smaller 
volumes of gas are involved. Using pure oxygen for combustion reduces the volume further. An IGCC 
demonstration has found it hard to achieve acceptable levels of reliability and availability and such 
plants are significantly more expensive than standard plants. The European Union (EU) is making 
€1.5 billion available for demonstration plants covering, among others, IGCC with pre-combustion 
capture, post-combustion capture on existing plant, integrated supercritical coal-fired power plant 
with an oxy-fuel CO2 capture solution, and CO2 geological storage (EU 2012). IGCC cannot be said 
to be a proven technology that the GMS countries could adopt in the medium term. 
The alternative higher-efficiency coal plant is super-critical plant and this is an established technology 
that should be the basis for future generation from coal in the GMS. There is considerable experience 
and the generating efficiencies are substantially higher than for conventional plant; the 400 MW 
plant at Nordjyllandsværket in Denmark, for example, achieves 47% efficiency on a lower heating 
value basis, albeit with cooling from the cold waters of the North Sea (IEA 2007). There is a case 
to be made for a project dealing with the experience of super-critical plant in the GMS and its 
future prospects, but it may well be that such a study should be at the ASEAN level because other 
Southeast Asian countries will also make large use of coal and Indonesia is an important producer.
Capacity for Regional Prospective Studies Is Needed
It is difficult for the SEF to make informed judgments about the future of cooperation without 
a clear quantitative framework to indicate how the subregional energy system will develop with 
and without intervention, especially cooperative interventions. The prospective study carried out 
for the GMS and published in 2009 used data from 2005. Much has changed since then in our 
understanding of climate change, in international fuel prices, in expectations of domestic resource 
potential, and in technology. The time horizon for the original study was set at 2025 and that 
is now close. A large-scale prospective study needs to be conducted every 5 years. If the human 
capacity and computing software were available to make such studies and if the necessary data 
were compiled then even more frequent use of such a facility would develop to investigate specific 
issues. Modern evidence-based policy making normally requires quantitative evidence of impacts of 
all interventions; if the GMS is to develop as a real focus of cooperative policy then policy makers 
will have recurrent resort to modeling of subregional scope.
Consideration needs to be given to whether such work should be done at the ASEAN level or at 
the GMS level; there are arguments in favor of both. It is probably desirable that for different 
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purposes and at different times, modeling will be needed for the GMS, Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-
Philippines East Asian Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA), Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle 
(IMT-GT), ASEAN, and maybe at the national level. The closing argument is probably that the 
GMS has an immediate need for this kind of analysis to guide its work and has perhaps a better 
institutional framework through the SEF to manage it.
The SEF may wish to consider creating a PPP to deliver this work. A basic contract could be 
established with a competent institution, through competitive tender, to deliver specified outputs, 
for example, the GMS. The costs of providing the human capacity and software would be shared, 
the institution accepting to contribute resources on the understanding that it would also be able to 
deliver services to other clients at market prices. The alternative would be to establish a permanent 
competence in a regional quasi-governmental institution, but that appears to be, in all respects, a 
less attractive option.
Implications of the Opening Up of Myanmar 
There are several important implications of the opening of Myanmar. The country has very good 
chances of revenues from the energy sector through the sale of gas and hydropower to the PRC 
and Thailand, maybe later across Thailand to Viet Nam. It is clearly important that the revenues be 
used effectively to promote development. Support from ADB to introduce a transparent process of 
accounting for energy sector revenues and possible creation of a sovereign wealth fund is desirable.
It is also important that the developments do not destroy the natural environment and that hardship 
to indigenous peoples is avoided. The planning system in the country is not strong and it is probable 
that avoidable social and economic damage will be incurred from the infrastructure investments 
that are being considered. Support from ADB (and the experience of other countries of the GMS) 
is necessary to strengthen the planning system in legal and regulatory terms and to transfer the 
tools of effective environmental management. The Environment Operations Center (EOC) should be 
strongly involved in this process.
The national grid is relatively weak, the area around Mawlamyine is isolated from the main grid and 
has a poor and unreliable electricity supply. From a national perspective, the connection of that part 
of the country to the main grid through a 500 kV link might be considered. The improved power 
supply would be beneficial to the economy of Mawlamyine and could support improved access to 
electricity in the surrounding areas.
The need to extend access to modern energy in Myanmar is acute. One model that may be helpful 
is to undertake rural electrification in the country from nodes on the Chinese and Thai borders, in 
the same fashion as Thailand and Viet Nam have contributed to the electrification of Cambodia. 
Thailand and the PRC have helped to supply power to border areas of the Lao PDR, and the PRC 
supplies power to Northern Viet Nam. The practical possibilities appear to be from Mae Sot and 
Mae Chan where there are already 115 kV lines from the main Thai network. 
The second model would be to extend the Thai electrical network to some reasonably close center 
of economic activity in Myanmar as part of a bigger exercise to create an economic corridor. Mae 
Sot might be a possible starting point with the intention to connect to the isolated grid around 
Mawlamyine, where the power supply is at present unreliable and inadequate. The transmission 
expansion plan of the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) (EGAT 2010) shows 
that a second 115 kV circuit is already planned between Tak and Mae Sot so if that were brought 
forward it could provide initial power. No great deal of economic activity is apparent along that 
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alignment, so such a proposal would need to be carefully analyzed and should be seen as part 
of a combined infrastructure project covering power, roads, and urban infrastructure with the 
intention of extending the East–West economic corridor to Mawlamyine. It is unclear whether this 
is compatible with the 500 kV extension within Myanmar to link the national grid to Mawlamyine, 
identified earlier as an option. It would be difficult to connect the two lines because of the 
implications for the stability of the EGAT system. A high-voltage direct current (HVDC) back-to-
back converter would be needed and the financial viability is not obvious. If the economic corridor 
were considered worthwhile, then another option would be to ensure electrical supply from both 
ends without connection.
A third model is to combine extended access with the export projects to the PRC and Thailand. In 
this model, between 10% and 20% of the power output from an export project would be reserved 
to extend access around the exporting plant; some of the benefits from the sale of generation 
could be incorporated into a favorable supply tariff and, with concessional finance, it may be 
possible to create a local network. Whether this is feasible would depend on there being some 
prospective load around the exporting plant. None of the plants foreseen by EGAT seems to fulfill 
this condition; Hutgyi and Tasang are mainstream dams on the Salween. The lignite prospect at 
Mai Khot is also remote, but it is planned to bring the power to Mae Chan, which could serve 
as a node for building out the network into Myanmar, if there is sufficient demand to justify 
the investment.
ADB may wish to consider a feasibility study of extending the East–West energy corridor to 
Mawlamyine as part of a concerted and planned extension of the East–West economic corridor, 
with and without the connection of Mawlamyine to the main grid.
Implementation of the Program through  
the Subregional Energy Forum
As noted earlier, the management arrangements envisaged in the Road Map for Extended 
Cooperation do not seem to have worked. It was proposed that countries would take the lead in 
certain areas and be proactive in designing projects, seeking finance, managing, and monitoring 
implementation. No examples of this seem to be happening; instead, the SEF is serving as a steering 
committee for conventional ADB technical assistance projects. This is a sensible function for the SEF, 
but there may be more that could be done. As a steering committee, it may improve the quality of 
deliverables, but it is not going to change subregional policy.
The top action proposed in the conclusions of the Energy for a Sustainable Future was that it was 
necessary to “mobilize political will for cooperation in all energy sectors.” This is easy to say and 
highly desirable, but difficult to achieve, especially at subregional level where access to the political 
institutions is complex. The SEF potentially provides this opportunity, in that acting as a community, 
it can create consensus within its members and lobby for effective regional policies within its 
national governments and at the energy ministers’ meetings. If it takes up this challenge, then it 
will need more resources. Funding for regional institutions is not an activity in which most donors 
wish to participate, although the EOC in Bangkok appears to be an exception. Donors are normally 
more interested to fund program activities undertaken by the institution once established. 
If such an institution were put in place, then it could function as a subregional think tank preparing 
proposals for subregional policy initiatives. One of the weaknesses of the GMS is that it has no 
permanent secretariat preparing proposals on a regular basis for consideration by people with 
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legislative powers and without this there can only be limited progress. ADB does a good job 
of sustaining GMS activities, but it does this over and above its normal functions and, in any 
case, there would be more ownership if the activities were performed by the member states. It is 
tempting to suggest that the Regional Power Coordination Center (RPCC) assumes this role, but it 
would be outside of its terms of reference and it would not be technically equipped to handle such 
responsibility. The first step in developing this institutional capacity would be a feasibility study to 
scope the activities and to sound out donor and country interest.
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and Results Framework
Table 31 summarizes the potential activities indicated by this paper. It lists the areas needing further 
support and assesses them against a set of criteria describing whether they (i) match the ADB 
strategy, (ii) are consistent with regional objectives, (iii) have regional added value, (iv) contribute 
to the strengthening of the economic corridors, and (v) contribute to closing development gaps. 
Table 32 provides a simplified results framework.
continued on next page
Table 31 Potential Activities and Selection Criteria
Activities
Matches ADB 
Strategy
Consistent with 
Subregional 
Objectives
GMS  
Added Value
Contributes to 
Strengthening 
Economic 
Corridors
Contributes 
to Closing 
Development 
Gaps
1. Support to 
RPTCC in the 
completion of 
performance 
standards, grid 
codes, market 
rules, and 
subregional 
transmission 
expansion plan
If done correctly, 
consistent 
with all three 
strategic agenda: 
inclusive growth, 
sustainable growth, 
and regional 
integration.
Described in the 
Connectivity 
Master Plan as 
“well in line 
with the ASEAN 
Connectivity and 
AEC Blueprint.” 
Also in GMS 
Framework 
Strategy, MOUs, 
and IAGs for GMS.
Yes. Stimulates 
regional trade. 
Cannot be done 
bilaterally. Needs 
common market 
principles.
Indirectly by 
strengthening the 
capacity of national 
systems to supply 
corridors.
Not directly, but 
can underpin 
associated policies 
of extending access.
2. Design and 
funding of 
backbone 
grid for the 
Lao People’s 
Democratic 
Republic  
(Lao PDR)
Can support 
inclusive and 
sustainable growth 
in the Lao PDR 
by facilitating the 
creation of access. 
Stimulates regional 
integration in the 
medium term.
Complex. 
Consistent with the 
spirit of ASEAN 
Connectivity and 
AEC Blueprint. 
Also with GMS 
Framework 
Strategy, MOUs, 
and IAGs for GMS. 
Not explicit in 
these texts.
Yes. In the medium 
term, will enable 
the Lao PDR to 
make high value-
added services from 
its hydro plants 
available to all 
states.
Indirectly, by 
strengthening the 
capacity of national 
systems to supply 
corridors.
Positive. Should 
support energy 
access and rural 
development within 
the Lao PDR.
3. Reinvestigation 
of the Thailand 
–Viet Nam 
interconnection
Consistent with, 
sustainable growth 
and regional 
integration.
Consistent with 
texts cited in 1 and 
2 above. Selected 
in original GMS 
Master Plan, but 
not in Update nor 
in the AIMS II.
Yes. Would 
represent a step 
change in the 
creation of the 
regional power 
market.
Would fall within 
existing corridors, 
but unclear what 
direct contribution 
it would make.
No.
4. Scoping study 
of the future of 
the TAGP
Coherent with 
good governance, 
capacity 
development, and 
regional integration 
in the ADB strategy.
Specified in the 
Master Plan on 
Connectivity. A 
major contribution 
to energy security.
Yes. Fundamentally 
a regional project. 
Cannot be done in 
any other way. 
Maybe should be 
at ASEAN-level. 
Needs big input 
from ASCOPE.
No direct link. 
High-capacity 
gas transmission 
does not stimulate 
economic 
development along 
the route.
Indirectly, as it 
contributes to 
energy security 
that impacts poor 
communities also.
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Activities
Matches ADB 
Strategy
Consistent with 
Subregional 
Objectives
GMS  
Added Value
Contributes to 
Strengthening 
Economic 
Corridors
Contributes 
to Closing 
Development 
Gaps
5. Development 
of guidelines 
for successful 
extension of 
access (on- and 
off-grid) with 
economic 
development
Consistent with 
inclusive growth, 
sustainable growth, 
good governance, 
and capacity 
development.
GMS SF explicitly 
requires enhanced 
access to energy 
particularly by 
the poor, through 
promotion of best 
practices in the 
subregion.
Benchmarking has 
clear value added.
Yes. Corridors only 
stimulate growth 
if there is energy 
access, and energy 
access needs other 
inputs.
Very strong and 
direct support.
6. Continued 
projects 
in rural 
electrification 
on- and 
off-grid
Consistent with 
inclusive growth, 
sustainable growth, 
good governance, 
and capacity 
development.
GMS SF explicitly 
requires enhanced 
access to energy 
particularly by 
the poor, through 
promotion of best 
practices in the 
subregion.
Not strongly. Most 
projects will be 
bilateral.
More added value 
for cross-border 
projects.
Yes. Corridors only 
stimulate growth 
if there is energy 
access, and energy 
access needs other 
inputs.
Very strong and 
direct support.
7. Design of and 
lobbying for 
coherent EE 
action plans 
across the 
subregion
Coherent with 
good governance 
and capacity 
development.
Strongly coherent 
with the second 
principle of GMS 
SF; move from 
information sharing 
to decision making.
Yes. The common 
practices and 
culture permit 
effective sharing, 
benchmarking, and 
peer review.
No direct link. Increases energy 
availability, reduces 
costs. Access to 
energy should also 
include access to 
energy efficiency.
8. Design of and 
lobbying for 
coherent RE 
action plans 
across the 
subregion
Coherent with 
good governance 
and capacity 
development.
Strongly coherent 
with the second 
principle of GMS 
SF; move from 
information sharing 
to decision making.
Yes. The common 
practices and 
culture permit 
effective sharing, 
benchmarking, and 
peer review.
No direct link. Increases energy 
availability, reduces 
costs. Access to 
energy should also 
include access to 
energy efficiency.
9. Project to 
demonstrate 
second-
generation 
biofuel 
technologies 
and associated 
biomass value 
chains
Coherent with 
search for 
knowledge 
solutions.
(ADB strategy and 
GMS SF)
Directive from 
the 26th ASEAN 
MEM to foster 
cooperation in 
promoting biofuels 
produced in a 
sustainable manner.
Yes. Cost-sharing; 
risk-sharing in pilot 
plant development. 
Similar crops and 
farming practices.
Biomass value 
chains will 
need energy 
and transport 
connectivity.
Positive. Biomass 
value chains 
will boost rural 
employment and 
incomes.
10. Review of 
legislative and 
regulatory 
frameworks 
for PPP in the 
subregion, 
experience of 
implementation, 
benchmarking, 
and proposals 
for best practice
Coherent with 
good governance 
and capacity 
development. 
Private sector 
development is 
the first guiding 
principle of ADB 
strategy.
Need for better 
articulation with 
private finance is a 
constant theme of 
the GMS SF.
Also coherent with 
incitement to move 
from knowledge 
sharing to decision 
making.
Yes. The common 
practices and 
culture permit 
effective sharing, 
benchmarking, and 
peer review.
Relevant to all 
infrastructure 
investment. 
Widely used as 
a tool in rural 
electrification. 
Table 31 continued
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Activities
Matches ADB 
Strategy
Consistent with 
Subregional 
Objectives
GMS  
Added Value
Contributes to 
Strengthening 
Economic 
Corridors
Contributes 
to Closing 
Development 
Gaps
11. Strengthening 
of the use of 
environmental 
management 
tools and 
rollout to 
Myanmar
Environment and 
climate change 
identified as ADB’s 
comparative 
advantage in 
Strategy 2020. Also 
underpins inclusive 
and sustainable 
growth.
Fifth thrust of GMS
SF is ensuring that 
environmental 
concerns are 
addressed and 
integrated into 
development.
Not very obvious. 
Could be bilateral, 
but major 
developers are from 
Thailand and the 
PRC–maybe useful 
to include them.
Relevant to all 
infrastructure 
investment. 
Yes. Poor people 
invariably pick up 
the costs of social 
and environmental 
damage, often 
severely.
12. Proposal for 
mandatory 
independent 
monitoring of 
dam projects
Inclusive and 
sustainable 
growth is often 
threatened by dam 
projects. ADB has 
helped establish 
good practice. 
Should be better 
disseminated.
GMS SF requires 
that equitable 
and sustainable 
environment and 
social interests be 
fully respected in 
the GMS program.
Regional because 
it avoids distorted 
competition and 
creates solidarity.
Not directly. Yes. Poor people 
invariably pick up 
the costs of social 
and environmental 
damage, often 
severely.
13. Improved and 
timely access 
to scientific 
evidence
Coherent with 
the search for 
knowledge 
solutions.
GMS SF asks for 
high-quality analytic 
work, discussion, 
and consensus 
building around 
the complex links 
among energy, food 
security, and the 
environment.
Yes, because science 
does not stop at 
borders and many 
issues detected will 
cross frontiers. The
MRC or EOC is 
probably the better 
host.
Not directly. Yes. Poor people 
invariably pick up 
the costs of social 
and environmental 
damage, often 
severely.
14. Guidelines for 
the selection 
and design of 
supercritical 
coal plant
Coherent with 
the search for 
knowledge 
solutions.
Promoting clean 
coal technologies is 
a priority regional 
initiative of both 
the GMS SF and the 
Road Map.
Not so obvious. 
Some advantages 
to a regional 
approach, but 
ASEAN is the more 
logical level.
No. No direct impact.
15. Strengthening 
of capacity for 
prospective 
studies (maybe 
through PPP)
Knowledge 
solutions and 
better governance. 
Strongly coherent 
with Energy Sector 
Strategy: Mobilize 
political will for 
cooperation in all 
energy sectors.
Coherent with 
incitement to move 
from knowledge 
sharing to decision 
making.
Yes. Can only be 
done at regional 
level; ASEAN level 
is a possibility, but 
greater coherence 
of GMS suggests 
it would be more 
effective at that 
level.
Possibly indirect. Possibly indirect.
16. Conventional 
rural 
electrification 
programs in 
Myanmar
Consistent with 
inclusive growth, 
sustainable growth, 
good governance, 
and capacity 
development.
GMS SF explicitly 
requires enhanced 
access to energy 
particularly by the 
poor, through the 
promotion of best 
practices in the 
subregion.
Largely bilateral, 
but see next project 
in the next page.
Yes. Corridors only 
stimulate growth 
if there is energy 
access, and energy 
access needs other 
inputs.
Very strong and 
direct support.
Table 31 continued
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Activities
Matches ADB 
Strategy
Consistent with 
Subregional 
Objectives
GMS  
Added Value
Contributes to 
Strengthening 
Economic 
Corridors
Contributes 
to Closing 
Development 
Gaps
17. 500 kV 
link from 
Mawlamyine to 
the main grid
Consistent with 
sustainable growth.
In the long term, 
can be consistent 
with regional 
integration.
Little regional 
implication in the 
short term although 
it brings the 500 kV 
system closer to the 
Thai frontier.
No direct link. Indirectly, 
can support 
improved access 
in and around 
Mawlamyine.
18. Extension 
of access in 
Myanmar 
from nodes in 
Thailand (and 
the PRC)
Consistent with 
inclusive growth, 
sustainable growth, 
good governance, 
and capacity 
development.
GMS SF explicitly 
requires enhanced 
access to energy 
particularly by the 
poor, through the 
promotion of best 
practices in the 
subregion.
Genuine regional 
initiative, building 
on previous 
experience 
elsewhere in the 
GMS.
Yes. Corridors only 
stimulate growth 
if there is energy 
access, and energy 
access needs other 
inputs.
Very strong and 
direct support.
19. Feasibility 
study of 
extending the 
E–W energy 
corridor to 
Mawlamyine 
as part of a 
concerted 
and planned 
extension 
of the E–W 
economic 
corridor.
Consistent with 
inclusive growth, 
sustainable growth, 
good governance, 
and capacity 
development.
GMS SF explicitly 
requires enhanced 
access to energy 
particularly by the 
poor, through the 
promotion of best 
practices in the 
subregion.
Genuine regional 
initiative, building 
on previous 
experience 
elsewhere in the 
GMS.
Yes, very strong. 
Would essentially 
create new 
economic corridor.
Very strong and 
direct support.
20. Permanent 
institutional 
support for the 
SEF
Consistent with 
good governance 
and capacity 
development.
Strongly coherent 
with the second 
principle of GMS 
SF; move from 
information sharing 
to decision making.
Yes–informal 
intergovernment 
agreements are no 
threat to ASEAN 
and can spur action 
in the wider arena.
Not directly. Not directly, but 
better decision 
making could 
contribute.
21. Strengthening 
of links of the 
SEF to the 
political level
Consistent with 
good governance 
and capacity 
development.
Strongly coherent 
with the second 
principle of GMS 
SF; move from 
information sharing 
to decision making.
Yes–informal 
intergovernment 
agreements are no 
threat to ASEAN 
and can spur action 
in the wider arena.
Not directly. Not directly, but 
better decision 
making could 
contribute.
ADB = Asian Development Bank, AEC = ASEAN Economic Community, AIMS = ASEAN Interconnection Master Plan Study, ASCOPE = ASEAN 
Council on Petroleum, ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations, PRC = People’s Republic of China, EE = energy efficiency, 
EOC = Environment Operations Center, GMS SF = Greater Mekong Subregion strategic framework, IAG = international advisory group, 
IGA = intergovernment agreement, kV = kilovolt, MEM = Ministry of Energy and Mines, MOU = memorandum of understanding, 
MRC = Mekong River Commission, NOC = national oil company, PPP = public–private partnership, RE = renewable energy, RPTCC = 
Regional Power Trade Coordination Committee, SEF = Subregional Energy Forum, TAGP = Trans-ASEAN gas pipeline, TPA = third-party access.
Source: Author.
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Table 32 Simplified Results Framework for the Tentative Proposals
Intervention Outcome Output Risks and Assumptions
1. Support to RPTCC 
in the completion of 
performance standards, 
grid codes, market 
rules, and subregional 
transmission expansion 
plan
Functional regional market 
with genuine exchanges of 
electricity. Improved reliability 
and quality, lower costs.
Clear basis for regional market 
comprising agreed rules and 
agreed indicative planning of 
interconnections.
There is genuine commitment 
to a regional market.
Political will is sustained.
Infrastructure is built.
2. Design and funding of 
backbone grid for the 
Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic (Lao PDR)
National grid in the Lao PDR 
can move power across the 
country and provide high 
value-added services across 
the GMS.
North–South 500 kV line 
completed.
Cost allocation rules can be 
designed to permit finance of 
the lines.
The Government of Lao PDR 
agrees.
3. Reinvestigation of the 
Thailand–Viet Nam 
interconnection
Step change in the 
development of the regional 
market. Reduced reserve, 
lower costs, and enhanced 
confidence in the regional 
market.
Interconnectors through the 
Lao PDR. One or both of 
Nam Thuen 2 and Ban Sok as 
candidates.
All three governments agree.
Cost allocation can be agreed.
NTPC agrees or the 
Government of Lao PDR 
introduces mandatory TPA.
4. Scoping study of the 
future of the TAGP
TAGP becomes a major asset 
for the future.
Concept agreed for the 
deployment of TAGP in the 
future. Critical investments 
identified.
NOCs are amenable to 
the study. Commercial 
confidentiality is not 
insuperable.
Probably best done by 
ASCOPE at ASEAN level.
5. Development of guidelines 
for the successful 
extension of access 
(on- and off-grid) with 
economic development
Practice in rural electrification 
improved, especially in 
Cambodia, the Lao PDR, 
and Myanmar. Economic 
impacts of rural electrification 
increased.
Lessons from past practice 
quantified and factors 
improving or diminishing 
impact clearly identified. 
Principles of good planning 
and monitoring demonstrated. 
Subsidies clearly identified. 
Role of private sector clarified.
Baseline data and proper 
survey evidence from past 
practice exists.
Utilities make available staff for 
the review of ex ante and ex 
post survey data.
6. Continued projects in 
rural electrification,  
on- and off-grid
Improved welfare and stimulus 
to economic development in 
deprived areas. 
Grid extension according to 
sound selection principles. 
Off-grid projects implemented 
where grid extension is not 
feasible.
No high risks.
Probably best seen as bilateral 
projects.
7. Design of and lobbying for 
coherent EE action plans 
across the subregion
Stronger and better-targeted 
actions in energy efficiency. 
Energy efficiency increases 
relative to baseline. NAMAs 
successfully established.
National Energy Efficiency 
Action Plans prepared using 
a common format. Proposals 
for the negotiation of NAMAs 
agreed at political level and 
monitored by SEF.
Agreement to the action at 
ministerial level.
Ministerial meeting confirms 
agreement to content.
8. Design of and lobbying for 
coherent RE action plans 
across the subregion
Stronger and better-targeted 
actions in renewable energy.
Deployment of RE increases 
relative to baseline. NAMAs 
successfully established.
National Renewable Energy 
Action Plans prepared using 
a common format. Proposals 
for the negotiation of NAMAs 
agreed at political level and 
monitored by SEF.
Agreement to the action at 
ministerial level.
Ministerial meeting confirms 
agreement to content.
9. Project to demonstrate 
second-generation 
biofuel technologies and 
associated biomass value 
chains
Upgrading of biofuel 
technology; reduced conflicts 
with food security. Increased 
rural incomes from novel 
biomass value chains.
Pilot plant(s) built under a PPP 
framework. Financial targets 
met. Successful demonstration. 
Value chains created.
Second-generation 
technologies are sufficiently 
mature.
Private partners can be found.
continued on next page
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Intervention Outcome Output Risks and Assumptions
10. Review of legislative and 
regulatory frameworks 
for PPP in the 
subregion, experience 
of implementation, 
benchmarking, and 
proposals for best practice
Legal and regulatory 
frameworks for PPP brought 
up to best-practice levels 
across the region.
Best practice for PPP in the 
power sector identified. 
Compared to practice in the 
GMS. Guidelines prepared for 
improvement.
No obstacles to 
implementation.
Ministerial approval is a risk.
11. Strengthening of the 
use of environmental 
management tools and 
rollout to Myanmar
Improved environmental 
management of river basins 
in Myanmar. Strengthened 
planning and concession 
framework.
Conduct of SEA in Myanmar; 
transfer of tools; capacity 
building. Review of planning 
process; recommendations for 
improvement.
Data collection is challenging. 
Needs cooperation of many 
actors throughout the country.
Approval of the Government of 
Myanmar.
12. Proposal for mandatory 
independent monitoring 
of dam projects
Monitoring of social and 
environmental impacts of dam 
construction and operation 
brought up to best-practice 
levels across the region.
Best practice identified. 
Compared to practice in the 
GMS. Guidelines prepared for 
improvement.
No obstacles to 
implementation.
Ministerial approval is a risk.
13. Systematic assessment 
of evolving scientific 
evidence base
Better environmental 
management.
Procedures to ensure timely, 
comprehensive, and accurate 
incorporation of new scientific 
evidence into decision making.
Countries are committed to 
evidence-based policy.
14. Guidelines for the 
selection and design of 
supercritical coal plant
Adoption of the best available 
technology for coal firing 
consistent with GMS context.
Regularly updated database 
of best practice in coal-fired 
power generation, especially 
supercritical steam plant.
None.
15. Strengthening of capacity 
for prospective studies 
(maybe through PPP)
Better regional policy making 
in all facets of the energy 
sector.
Sustainable capacity for high-
grade energy modeling and 
analysis created under a PPP, 
and regular analyses delivered.
Competent private partner can 
be found.
Private partner is convinced 
of potential commercial 
prospects.
16. Conventional rural 
electrification programs in 
Myanmar
Improved welfare and stimulus 
to economic development in 
deprived areas. 
Grid extension according to 
sound selection principles. 
Off-grid projects implemented 
where grid extension is not 
feasible.
No high risks.
Probably best seen as bilateral 
projects.
17. 500 kV link from 
Mawlamyine to the main 
grid
Lower costs and improved 
reliability of power supply 
especially around Mawlamyine.
Connection of isolated grid at 
Mawlamyine to main grid.
Financial return is acceptable. 
Essentially a bilateral project.
18. Extension of access in 
Myanmar from nodes in 
Thailand (and the PRC)
Improved welfare and stimulus 
to economic development in 
deprived areas.
Grid extension from the Thai 
(and the PRC) border using 
generation plant in Thailand 
and the PRC. Building on the 
experience in Cambodia, the 
Lao PDR, and Viet Nam.
That there are suitable sites.
That the concerned 
governments agree.
19. Feasibility study of 
extending the East–West 
energy corridor to 
Mawlamyine as part of a 
concerted and planned 
extension of the East–
West economic corridor.
Improved welfare; significant 
stimulus to economic 
development along western 
extremity of East–West 
corridor.
Concerted planned extension 
of corridor including 
energy, transport, and urban 
infrastructure.
Financial (economic) 
calculations are favorable.
Governments agree.
Coordinated planning is 
possible.
Table 32 continued
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20. Permanent institutional 
support for the SEF
Improved design, finance, and 
management of the SEF energy 
sector program.
Creation of secretariat that 
would support SEF through 
position papers, analysis, 
proposals for communication 
to political institutions, 
dialogue with donors, and 
monitoring.
Financing for the secretariat 
may be problematic. Staffing 
either through secondment 
recruitment may be difficult.
21. Strengthening of links of 
the SEF at the political 
level
Improved and accelerated 
decision making in regional 
energy policy.
Principle agreed that SEF 
should design and submit 
regional policy initiatives to 
the political institutions where 
appropriate.
Political institutions are in 
agreement.
SEF can muster the secretariat 
support to make plausible 
proposals.
ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASCOPE = ASEAN Council on Petroleum, PRC = People’s Republic of China, GMS = Greater 
Mekong Subregion, EE = energy efficiency, kV = kilovolt, NAMA = nationally appropriate mitigation action, NOC = national oil company, 
NTPC = Nam Theum 2 Power Company, PPP = public–private partnership, RE = renewable energy, RPTCC = Regional Power Trade 
Coordination Committee, SEA = Strategic Environmental Appraisal, SEF = Subregional Energy Forum, TAGP = Trans-ASEAN gas pipeline, 
TPA = third-party access.
Source: Author.
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Assessment of the Greater Mekong Subregion Energy Sector Development  
Progress, Prospects, and Regional Investment Priorities
 
This report analyzes the Greater Mekong Subregion’s current energy situation and the 
challenges and opportunities it faces, given its resource endowments and development 
efforts. The creation of a Regional Power Coordination Center is a critical step forward, but 
should be matched by supportive infrastructure, national electricity market reform, and 
workable rules for cross-country trade. It endorses the 500 kilovolt backbone grid for the Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic, interconnecting Thailand and Viet Nam, to form the nucleus of 
the regional market. The report proposes support for the Subregional Energy Forum to drive 
regional policy creation through stronger capacity for policy analysis.
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